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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Katja Riikonen 
 
Beyond the Sipahs, Jaishs and Lashkars - 
Sectarian violence in Pakistan as reproduction of exclusivist Sectarian 
Discourse 
 
 
Keywords: Pakistan, sectarianism, sectarian violence, identity politics, 
sectarian discourse, religious violence 
 
 
 
This research project examines sectarianism and sectarian violence in 
Pakistan between 1996-2005. It represents a departure from the security-
focused research on sectarianism and provides contemporary analysis of 
sectarian violence by contextualising it. This thesis distinguishes 
sectarianism as an analytical concept from sectarianism as a phenomenon in 
Pakistan. The existing literature on sectarianism and sectarianism in the 
Pakistani context is critically examined, and this research is located within 
that body of knowledge.  
 
In this thesis, sectarian violence is understood as being conducted to 
reproduce and reinforce exclusivist sectarian discourse. This premise is 
analysed through the framework of identity formation and identity politics, and 
spatial understandings of identities.  
 
The study examines the locations of sectarian violence in Pakistan, and 
analyses the spaces where sectarian identity discourse is enforced and 
maintained through violence.  Consequently, the concept of sacred space 
and sacred time are analysed as locations of sectarian violence. The 
contestations of public space by competing identity discourses, and the 
spatial manifestations of those competing identities are analysed. 
 
This dissertation also attempts to draw out whether sectarian violence is only 
located within and through the organised sectarian groups, or whether the 
sectarian violence indicates wider fault lines in the Pakistani society.  
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A Note on Transliteration and Translation 
 
 
 
 
I have mostly used John L. Esposito’s The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (2003) 
for the translation of words relating to Islam. Transliterated words are in 
italics within the text except for those used as a label or a title, such as, 
Sunni, Shia, Ahmadi, etc. I have generally pluralized words by adding an "s" 
to the end of the words unless the plural itself is as important or commonly 
known, such as, ulama is the plural of alim. The text provides short 
translations of the words in brackets but only after the first time a word is 
used. Those transliterated words used can be found in a glossary in the 
beginning of the thesis for reference. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Learning about Sectarian Violence 
 
I was sitting at the office in Islamabad in October 2003, going through the 
newspapers of the day, when I first read about sectarian violence. The 
headlines in all the papers announced the death of Azam Tariq, right at the 
heart of the capital. Tariq was a member of the Pakistani Parliament (MNA) 
and a leader of a group called Millat-eIslamia, an incarnation of an 
organisation called Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). He was returning from 
his constituency in Jhang to attend the National Assembly session that day 
when three attackers intercepted Tariq’s car and fired with their AK-47s before 
escaping in their white Pajero. I had recently started working at the embassy 
of Finland, my first employment after finishing my master’s degree in 
international conflict analysis. I immediately had the feeling that this murder, 
an incident of violence, was different to the ones that had filled the 
newspapers until that day.  
 
I was puzzled by the word sectarianism, which I repeatedly read from the 
reports and analyses of the murder. I must admit, I did not know what that 
term meant. I was surprised that with my background in international relations 
and peace and conflict studies, I had never come across the term in the 
academic literature, conferences, or interactions. Now, this significant killing 
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was termed sectarian in the Pakistani media. In a country with a myriad of 
different labels for and explanations of violence, this was something new, 
unfamiliar. It was also interesting that part of the well-orchestrated and 
planned killing seemed to be the visibility of the act, that it was perpetrated 
during bright daylight, on the busy road connecting Islamabad to Rawalpindi, 
right in front of the Pakistani government. 
 
After this incident, I started to learn about sectarianism. I wanted to know what 
the term meant and why it was a relevant description for some of the ongoing 
violence in Pakistan. This quest for knowledge took me to a long journey of 
discovery. Learning about sectarianism, as it turned out, was a good way to 
learn about Pakistan, Islam, and how Islam is lived in Pakistan. Sectarianism, 
as a phenomenon, is multifaceted and complex, but it is perhaps appropriate 
that I chose sectarian violence as the focus of my doctoral research. Reading 
about the murder of Azam Tariq then started a process that has resulted in 
this thesis, and one could say that it is an unplanned and accidental outcome 
of an act of sectarian violence.   
 
During the research process, I used the opportunity to learn about 
sectarianism as a phenomenon more broadly than just the precise focus of 
the thesis. I reached out to a variety of people, academic and nonacademics, 
who had knowledge on sectarianism and sectarian violence. I also 
participated in religious festivals, like the Ashura, as well as visited religious 
sites and madrasas. And as I learnt more, I also got to know more about 
Azam Tariz; his story seemed to be linked to various aspects of the sectarian 
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phenomenon. When I researched previous violent incidents related to 
sectarianism, I discovered that that fateful day in October wasn’t the first time 
Azam Tariq’s life had been in danger. In fact, there had been several previous 
attempts on his life, something that he prided himself with as badges of 
honour, which merely increased his status as an SSP leader. His constituency 
of Jhang, I soon learnt, was the epicentre of sectarianism in Pakistan if one 
truly wanted to understand the social organisation and mobilisation around the 
sectarian agenda. Tariq’s personal story also linked the sectarian 
phenomenon to the madrasa and mosque institutions, as he quickly made his 
way from a madrasa student to a prayer leader and preacher in the mosque 
he found in Karachi. His ascension in the ranks of Deobandi, the group—a 
story closely related to the killings of other sectarian leaders—offered an 
insight into the internal dynamics of sectarian organisations. And as I was 
sitting with some local members of Sipah-e-Sahaba in Peshawar and listening 
to their views, in a small shop selling vinegar, I could hear the echoes of 
Azam Tariq’s rhetoric as they presented their version of sectarian discourse. 
 
Sabar ki baat hai1 
 
That ambition I have cherished in my mind for more than forty years. I 
have collected books and materials for it. I have visited places, 
undertaken journeys, taken notes, sought the society of men, and tried 
to explore their thoughts and hearts in order to equip myself for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “It is a matter of patience.” 
2 Later I discovered that there are academic analyses examining this precise reaction. See, 
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task. Sometimes I have considered it too stupendous for me […] Then I 
have blamed myself for lack of courage […]” (Yusuf Ali, 1934: vi)  
 
 
It is easy for me to identify with the journey Yusuf Ali took to translate the 
Quran. Writing this thesis has been a long process—both from the point of 
view of the learning that needed to happen to be able to confidently say 
something about sectarianism in Pakistan and of getting the idea for this 
thesis for it to be completed. During the process, I have lived in four different 
countries, studied Urdu, taught in the Government College University 
(Lahore), and had full-time work in promoting understanding and dialogue 
between Western and predominantly Muslim societies. Carrying this research 
to different settings and locations has made the period of researching and 
writing longer, but it has also enabled me to subject my thinking to different 
audiences, thus contributing to the learning process.  
 
Often when I spoke about my research topic to people both in and outside of 
Pakistan, I was told sectarianism does not exist. At times this took the form of 
vehement denial of the existence of sectarianism altogether. Possibly the 
strong reaction was of my being a Westerner, a white woman interested in the 
world of Islam through divisions and violence, perhaps not only fitting but 
reinforcing and confirming the stereotype of the West’s understanding of and 
interest in Islam only as a religion of violence. As summed up by Iftikhar Malik, 
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The prevalent images of Islam as a violent religio-political ideology, 
with gun toting hordes of bearded men, chest beating and bleeding 
mourning crowds of groups of terrorists and suicide bombers engaged 
in bomb blasts and killing sprees have become pervasive in the 
Western popular consciousness and elitist discourse. (Malik, 2005: 41) 	  
A common reaction after hearing my research focus was also to insist on the 
unity of Islam. There are no Shias or Sunnis, I was told, but Muslims. The 
insistence on unity, instead of discussing the evident differences, felt 
somehow important, and it seemed like a reaction to something much broader 
than my personal research process.2 There was something else there, too, in 
the silence and unwillingness to discuss the topic, in the will to deny the 
phenomenon or religious differences into nonexistence. It seemed that these 
reactions stemmed not only from a tiredness of the West’s fascination of Islam 
through divisions and violence but also, perhaps more importantly, from 
processes and contestations that were ongoing within Islam. One discussion I 
had with some Pakistani academics about my choice of research and the 
complex phenomenon of sectarianism in Pakistan resulted in me receiving a 
present the day after. A Quran translated by Yusuf Ali was brought to me, 
accompanied with an empathetic appeal: learn about sectarianism and 
violence, but if you want to know real Islam, read this. Having been in the 
middle of a research process where the competing narratives on “true Islam” 
were at the heart of the matter, this was a powerful statement on how those 
particular people felt about those contestations.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Later I discovered that there are academic analyses examining this precise reaction. See, 
for example, Nelson (2006 & 2009).	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I also encountered the same denial of sectarianism in the academic literature 
that claimed sectarianism did not exist in the Pakistani society but was the 
domain of extremist and violent sectarian groups. The academic literature in 
peace and conflict studies also often reflected this by focusing on sectarian 
groups and the violent manifestations of sectarianism, as well as the reasons 
why the groups, and the violence, had the form they did in today’s Pakistan. 
This thesis did not want to settle with the premise that sectarianism existed 
only in the minds and through the guns of sectarian extremists. With my 
research, and analysis, I wanted to go beyond the Sipahs, Jaishs, and 
Lashkars. 
 
 
Research Focus 
 
This thesis reflects not only my interest in Pakistan and sectarianism but also 
the different academic interests I have had as an academic. While studying 
philosophy of social sciences as a BA student in Finland, I learned about the 
aesthetics of violence in Machiavelli’s The Prince (1999), and this powerful 
book helped me realise that violence is much more than just a method of 
causing physical harm. While navigating the puzzle that is the Old City of 
Jerusalem when I was studying in the Hebrew University in Israel, I came 
across the idea of communication of group identities in locations where the 
boundaries of those communities are not visible by any concrete demarcating 
lines or objects. The four different parts of the Old City were not separated by 
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any physical dividing elements, but the display of symbols belonging to the 
communities living in the city clearly signalled whose area you had wandered 
into.  
 
This work draws from the literature on conflict analysis, identity conflicts, and 
human geography, which I have been interested in during my academic 
career. Thus the research is explicitly interdisciplinary, drawing from a variety 
of academic approaches and fields of research in order to incorporate a range 
of disciplinary perspectives. Sociological studies on identities and their 
formation, the understandings of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts as well as 
communal and sectarian conflicts in peace and conflict studies, the field of 
human geography, and theological and sociological studies in Islam have all 
contributed to the research.  
 
Very little has been written on sectarianism, particularly in South Asia, in the 
peace and conflict studies discipline. Moreover, there are only few 
researchers that have done fieldwork on the topic. The first aim of this thesis 
is to contribute to the body of literature on sectarian conflicts and violence in 
the peace and conflict studies and highlight the importance of further 
understanding of this phenomenon in the discipline. This work also aims to 
clarify what is meant by sectarianism and sectarian violence or conflict, 
especially in the context of Pakistan. By engaging with the definition of 
sectarianism, and attempting to find a functioning analytical definition, this 
thesis contributes to the academic understanding of sectarianism by creating 
conceptual clarity of the term. With the research, we have a better 
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understanding of what is meant exactly when we talk about sectarianism, both 
as a more general state of conflict or tension and especially as a type of 
violence used (sectarian violence). The thesis, thus, distinguishes the term 
sectarianism from the phenomenon of sectarianism in Pakistan. It will first 
engage with the conceptual analysis of the term, then place it in the context of 
Pakistan.  
 
The focus of the thesis is to examine sectarian violence in Pakistan as 
spatialised identity politics. The research talks about how identities are formed 
particularly in violent conflicts, and by using the concept of border, the 
spatialised forms of identities are then explored. The thesis then talks about 
the spatial uses of violence and, finally, locates sectarian violence in Pakistan 
through an analysis of the data collected.  
 
Research of political Islam is currently very high profile and widely followed, 
both in media and in academia. This study will not join the branch of that 
research that has received the most media coverage i.e., of radical Islam or 
Islamic fundamentalism, since it focuses more on continuous, long-term 
political identification and the use of violence related to sectarian group 
identities within Pakistan. The research will draw from those studies, though, 
and is not totally removed from that discourse. Indeed, the studies on Islamic 
fundamentalism or terrorism explore the use of certain identity frameworks as 
sources of political justification and as bases for political action. More 
explicitly, this research draws from the methods used to analyse terrorism, 
and violent terrorist acts. Also, at least some of the sectarian groups in 
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Pakistan are linked with the groups that are labelled as terrorist groups or 
extremist groups in the Middle East and South Asia, linking this study to the 
global study of political Islam and Islamic fundamentalism, even thought this is 
not the explicit or intended framework of this work. In fact, this research wants 
to distance itself from the security-centric approaches to sectarianism and 
sectarian violence, to offer an alternative way to approach, discuss, and 
analyse sectarian violence.  
 
Most importantly, this thesis contributes to the understanding of sectarian 
violence in Pakistan. It accomplishes it by not reducing violent sectarian 
incidents to statistics and trends but by contextualising violence, looking into 
the details of the violent incidents. With analysing sectarian violence in 
Pakistan, placing it as the focus of the study, this thesis has a different 
emphasis from majority of the studies done on sectarianism. By analysing 
these incidents by using a method of analysis not widely used when analysing 
violence in Pakistan, this research also contributes to the understanding of the 
ways violence in general and sectarian violence in particular are possible to 
analyse. 
  
This thesis does not presume to provide an exhaustive account of 
sectarianism or sectarian conflicts—or sectarian violence for that matter—in 
Pakistan. As observed by Naveeda Khan in her doctoral thesis, 
 
[E]ach strand of sectarian politics, from the rise of anti-Shia Sunni 
militancy in Punjab to the rise of jihadi groups to aid Kashmiri self-
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determination, has its own specificity. This specificity needs to be 
spelled out so that we do not fall into the fallacy of assuming a 
condition of undifferentiated sectarianism across the nation over the 
fifty plus years of Pakistan's existence. (Khan, 2003: 6) 
 
Taking into account the complex nature of the research subject, as well as the 
location this subject is studied in, this thesis is critical of any attempts to 
produce or uncover the truth about sectarianism and sectarian violence in 
Pakistan. This work wants to explicitly state that the research presented in this 
thesis provides an understanding of sectarian violence, stemming from a 
particular research framework and approach.  
 
There are several limitations of the research because of its scope, focus, and 
approach, as well as the positionality of the researcher. The sectarian 
phenomenon is embedded in a complex terrain of regional, national, and local 
processes with a myriad reinforcing and sustaining elements. Even though 
those processes and elements are mapped in this thesis, it is impossible to 
explore those political, ideological, and economic processes and elements in-
depth. The current literature on sectarianism in Pakistan offers much more on 
the history and regional context of sectarianism, or the genealogy and 
functioning of sectarian groups that could be explored here. There is a also a 
body of literature that could have contributed to the understanding of sectarian 
violence but is not included here due to the focus of this research, such as 
literature on Shias in Pakistan and the subcontinent.  
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Furthermore, since physical, or direct, violence is merely one form of violence, 
the existence of other forms of violence related to sectarian conflicts is 
recognised, such as structural violence and violence of the word (Galtung, 
1996). But it has not been possible to discuss at length all the structural 
elements of sectarian violence or the different mechanisations of violence of 
the word, two areas that would warrant further research. Second, the data set 
used for analysis itself is limited in the sense that it is not exhaustive of all the 
violent incidents during the researched period. But since the principal focus is 
not to track the absolute figures of incidents or victims of sectarian violence or 
the quantitative change in violence, the data gathered is valid as a foundation 
for analysis. 
 
Overall, this thesis resides at the intersection of different academic disciplines, 
bringing those different understandings of sectarianism, identities, and 
violence from those disciplines together to form a unique multifaceted 
synthesis.  
 	  	  
Research Hypothesis 
 
Both the thesis analytical framework and the hypothesis are outcomes of 
preliminary research work carried out by first getting acquainted with 
sectarianism in Pakistan through primary and secondary sources and, later 
on, by critically analysing the existing academic literature on the subject.  
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This is the hypothesis at the core of the research: “Sectarian violence in 
Pakistan is conducted to reproduce and reinforce exclusivist sectarian 
discourse.” 
 
The hypothesis emerges from a specific theoretical orientation, as is evident 
in its formulation. The research is anchored in the social constructivism 
theory, inviting the research to investigate not only the political and social 
dimensions of sectarian conflicts but the communicative dimension as well. 
The central argument of this thesis, stemming from observations from the 
review of the literature, is that sectarian violence plays a part in maintaining 
and enforcing exclusivist identity discourse in Pakistan. Violence now is tied to 
exclusivist identity discourse as per the definition of the concept of 
sectarianism. Discourse is seen in terms of enabling but also limiting the array 
of discursive choices that can be made, thus at the same time enabling and 
limiting violent practises within that discourse.  
   
This process of reproducing and reinforcing exclusivist sectarian discourse is 
done through the processes of building, enforcing and maintaining identity 
borders. The task for the research, then, is to locate sectarian violence: What 
are the spaces of sectarian violence? Where are the identity borders drawn, 
enforced, and maintained? And most importantly, through what spaces does 
sectarian violence communicate that discourse?  
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There are also supplementary questions arising from the literature that inform 
the analysis of this thesis:  
 
• What does the term sectarian mean exactly?  
Specifically, what is the definition of the term, and what are the 
conceptual implications when using that term in academic analysis, 
particularly when studying violence? How is the term sectarian 
tangential to the sectarian phenomenon in Pakistan? 
• Are violent sectarian conflicts the domain only of established militant 
sectarian groups?  
In other words, are the violent incidents analysed in this thesis 
perpetrated only by militant sectarian groups, or do they reflect wider 
sectarian fault lines in Pakistan? 
• And finally, what is the significance of the locations of sectarian 
violence to exclusivist sectarian discourse? 
 
 
In order to inform the answers to these questions, the thesis offers a thorough 
analysis of the academic literature related to the research subject, as well as 
the theoretical framework selected. This study also developed an analytical 
framework to gather and analyse relevant data to successfully explore the 
validity of the hypothesis. 
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Thesis Structure 
 
The exploration starts with chapter 1, “Violence, Identity, and Politics: The 
Theoretical Context,” which builds the theoretical framework and premises for 
the analysis. It introduces the concept of identity and explores the process of 
identity formation through the process of building and maintaining borders. 
The chapter then examines how identity is related to violence and what 
mechanisms are at work when identities are in conflict. It also discusses the 
spatiality of identities, conceptualising the location of violence as a research 
focus. The chapter concludes with an exploration of identity politics and 
how—through the concepts of borders, identity, and communication—
sectarian violence in Pakistan can be researched.  
 
The concept of sectarianism is the focus of chapter 2, “The Coordinates of 
Sectarianism: Defining Sectarianism and Exclusivist Sectarian Discourse in 
Pakistan.” It discusses the definitions of sectarianism used in the literature in 
peace and conflict studies and explores in-depth what the term conceptually 
signifies. The chapter examines how the term relates with religion, with 
Islamic divisions, and how it can acquire a systemic character. In the second 
part of the chapter, the term sectarianism is placed in the Pakistani context. It 
looks at what sectarianism has meant for the academics that have analysed 
the phenomenon in Pakistan and how it is approached in the literature. 
Specifically, sectarianism in the current literature is analysed in the contexts of 
political opportunism and the process of Islamisation. The formation and 
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development of sectarian discourse is discussed at length, to understand the 
multitude of processes and actors the sectarian phenomenon in Pakistan 
today is inherently linked to. Finally, the chapter offers an overview of one of 
those processes that have contributed to sectarianism—namely, migration. 
 
The next chapter, “Sectarian Violence in Pakistan: View from the Literature,” 
looks at the current academic understanding of sectarian violence. It 
describes how sectarian violence has been approached by previous studies 
and what relationship violence is thought to have with the phenomenon of 
sectarianism in Pakistan. The chapter maps the beginning of organised forms 
of sectarian violence, as well as the regional and national elements that 
sustain and enable this violence. Particular attention is paid to madrasa and 
mosque institutions and the role of the state in enabling and facilitating a 
permissive environment for violence to exist. The chapter then explores what 
the literature says about the modes of violence and how the academic body of 
knowledge has attempted to explain why sectarian conflicts in Pakistan have 
taken violent forms. Finally, the effects of sectarian violence are explored by 
examining how protracted violence has changed social relations and the 
fabric of Pakistani society, as well as how that violence has transformed 
public space in Pakistani polity.  
 
We then turn to the praxis of devising and conducting research in Pakistan. 
Chapter 4, “Methodology: Researching Sectarian Violence in Pakistan,” 
introduces the methodological framework underpinning this research. It 
discusses the considerations that led to the chosen methodology and 
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methods and how those were subjected to considerations for personal safety 
and what is feasible to study in the context of Pakistan. The chapter outlines 
the process and limitations of data collection and finally discusses the 
principles guiding the data analysis process.   
 
Chapter 5, “Violence as Reproduction of Exclusivist Sectarian Identity 
Discourse,” introduces the role both violence and religion can have in creating 
exclusivist sectarian identity discourses in Pakistan. The difference both 
violence and religion can create is explored through the existing studies on 
Pakistan, with examples on the type of mechanisations at work. The chapter 
then turns to analyse the locations of sectarian violence, as the current 
literature depicts them, and the importance and significance assigned to those 
locations.  
 
“Locating Sectarian Violence in Pakistan 1996–2005,” chapter 6, includes the 
analysis from the data collected. It starts with a brief introduction to the data 
collected and the limitations that the data and the method of analysis place on 
the process of analysis. The chapter then presents and discusses the spaces 
of sectarian violence that emerged in the analysis and the significance of 
those spaces.  
 
Finally, the research is completed with “Conclusions,” in which the questions 
presented at the beginning of this research and the key findings of the 
analysis are reiterated. The implications of the findings are discussed, as well 
as the limitations of studying sectarian violence using this analytical 
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framework and method of analysis. “Conclusions” also assess the 
contributions of this research to the body of knowledge on sectarian violence 
in Pakistan. And finally, the thesis concludes with an exploration of areas for 
further research.  
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Chapter 1  
 Violence, Identity and Politics: The Theoretical Context 
 
 
Some borders are being dismantled, some renegotiated, and yet others 
– new ones – are being erected. The real socio-political questions 
concerns less, perhaps, the degree of openness/closure (and the 
consequent question of how on earth one might even begin to measure 
it), than the terms on which that openness/closure is established. 
Against what are boundaries erected? What are the relations within 
which the attempt to deny (and admit) entry is carried out? What are 
the power-geometries here; and do they demand a political response? 
(Massey, 2005: 179) 
 
Introduction	  
 
This chapter will formulate the theoretical basis for this research on sectarian 
violence, introducing some of the key concepts that the analysis relies on. It 
starts with the premise that identity politics can offer a valid method to analyse 
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sectarianism3. Sectarian groups can thus be analysed as identity-related 
groups in peace and conflict studies, drawing from the vast literature of 
identities in conflict.  
 
The analysis of this chapter does not press identity beyond its explanatory 
weight, but rather tries to locate its proper place in the current conflict 
typology. Sectarian conflicts cannot be reduced to conflicting identity claims, 
or the long and complex conflict histories explained by identities only. In 
conflict analysis, single-factor explanations are in general thought as 
inadequate. For this reason the term ‘identity-related conflict’ is preferred 
instead of ‘identity conflict’4 to point out that identity is hardly ever the only 
aspect of a conflict, which almost always includes other explanatory motives, 
including political and economic claims. Identity is not an independent variable 
but there is a “close relationship between interest and identity aspects” 
(Leatherman, 1999: 193), and identity-claims are almost every time 
formulated in political language. Often the continuous conflict dynamics 
emphasise the identity claims. Thus, the root causes of conflicts are 
important, but at least as important are the conflict dynamics and history, and 
the conflict process in which identity-factor is usually escalated. 
 
This chapter will discuss – and problematise - the relationship between 
violence, identity, and politics, and furthermore the function and location of 
violence in identity-related conflicts. It highlights the notion of the border as an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Using identity politics in this context is not a new idea, see for example, Brass (1979). 
4 Understandably the term ‘identity conflict’ can be seen as too simplistic, and therefore, 
inviting criticism. But, at the same time, the term ‘identity-related conflict’ highlights that 
identity is a crucial feature in these conflicts and cannot be ignored in their analysis.  
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essential element in understanding the conflicts in general, and analysing the 
violence used in those conflicts in particular.  First, the chapter is looking at 
identity and its formation. The role of violence is included in the analysis by 
looking what is behind the term identity politics. This part of the analysis is 
done with reference to ethnic and religious identity discourses. Next, the 
analysis highlights the concept of border and what it means for the analysis of 
violence in general, and its implications for the study of violence in identity-
related sectarian conflicts. As noted by Doreen Massey in the quote above, 
the concept of border is looked at as the process of negotiating and erecting 
borders, and what are the ‘power geometrics’ and terms that condition this 
process of openness and closure – or inclusion and exclusion. Lastly, the 
chapter concludes with outlining some pragmatic steps of researching 
sectarian violence through the framework of identity-related conflicts. 
 
In order to understand the triangular relationship between violence, identity 
and politics, the chapter will begin with exploring the idea of formation of 
identities.  
 
Identity	  Explained:	  Dichotomic	  Basis	  	  
 
 
For Zygmunt Bauman, identity is a fortress that is always under siege: from 
the very beginning it is threatened by enemies, weakening of strength and 
loosing of control. Because identity is built like a fortress and always under 
continuous threat, it is often fragile and unsure of itself.  Identity stands or falls 
	  	   21	  
with the safety and strength of its borders. (Bauman, 1996: 161) This analogy 
illustrates the most fundamental feature of identity, that is the separation of 
“us” (those belonging to the identity, now inside the fortress) from “them” 
(those outside that identity, threatening the fortress). Between, there is a 
border5. These categorisations, forming the basis of identity, mean in fact the 
construction of borders (Paasi, 1999: 81). 
 
Categories are a common way of viewing the existing reality6, making borders 
decisive in creating order in the world. One of the main functions of a border is 
to define and form social space, by delineating and lining territorial spaces. 
Another important function is the formation and maintaining of different, 
especially national and ethnic, identity-groups. (Jukarainen, 2000: 3) Borders 
and frontiers have throughout the history had the function of ”selection”: 
borders form the definitional and concrete reference, founding what is inside 
and what is outside, what can come in and what has to stay out (Eva, 1999: 
34). Thus, borders are multi-dimensional closing in and out, not just territories 
but also social entities. Border is the point or line in space where two entities 
meet (Conversi, 1999: 557), it is also a place where interaction is refused or 
limited, making it a place of power7. Identity is always dependent on the 
existence of the other, and it is built in interaction between the two. Thus, 
borders have to be maintained with certain acts and discourses that 
emphasise the other (Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999: 598).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	   The term boundary is also widely used in this context. Both of the terms have slightly 
different theoretical underpinnings, but are used to illustrate the same phenomenon. 
6 About categorical thinking see Caygill (1993). 7	  Construction of identities is inherently linked to social action and the question of power. “Our 
constructions of the world are therefore bound up with power relations because they have 
implications for what it is permissible for different people to do, and for how they may treat 
others.” (Burr, 2003: 5) See also Knott (2005). 
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But it is not only the other that has an effect on the border. The content it 
bounds inside shapes the borders as well, like those who cross the border or 
are prevented from crossing it. Container and contents are mutually forming 
(Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999: 594), in a dialectic relationship. This emphasises, 
that borders are not just lines on the ground, but foremost, actualisation of 
social practices and discourses. Borders can be thought as a process, 
existing in socio-cultural action. (Paasi, 1999: 72, 75) Identity, then, has to be 
understood in the context of tripartite relations between the border construing 
the identity, the content, and the others shaping that border. 
 
Comparison of identity to fortress describes the group identity in the situation 
of conflict, where collective identity gets different status than in the time of 
peace. In a time of conflict, the identity is crucially under threat, highlighting 
the consciousness of protecting its existence. The more the identity is 
perceived as threatened, the more it demands protection and the more it is 
being fortified. Outside threat legitimises even violent acts against this threat. 
Identity is considered stable when the forces that guarantee its existence are 
stronger than the enemies that are constructed in the process of 
strengthening the identity (Bauman, 1996: 162). 
 
Even though the need for identity is common to the whole humanity, 
consciousness of the feeling of it as a need is not universal. That feeling 
grows stronger the more there identity is competed, or the more the feeling of 
the identity safety is shaken. That is why it is pursued the most when it seems 
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weak and feeble. (Bauman, 1996: 162) Borders are not building only identity 
but security as well. The threat of otherness is projected and territorialised 
outside as a means of protecting the identity of the “sameness” (Sucharov, 
1999: 189). That is why the stress on borders is normally an indicator of deep 
feeling of threat and instability (Conversi, 1999: 554-5). 
 
The other element of identity implicated in the Bauman’s conception8 is that 
identity is socially constructed and produced through social construction of 
borders. This view of social construction claims that (a) identity has no 
authentic content (essence) and (b) identities are never complete, but always 
in the process of being made. One cannot present any legitimate basis from 
what identity a priori is composed of. Social constructionism is challenging the 
ideas of identity being naturally given, and that it is produced purely by acts of 
individual will (Calhoun, 1994: 13). Even though there is space for selection, it 
does not imply that it is totally free. Identities are always located in the context 
of institutional or social continuities, which provide the frames, as containers 
of social rules, which makes identities both sustainable and meaningful (Jabri, 
1996: 130). 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Whereas social constructionist view of identity is most widely used both in sociology and 
social sciences today, there are alternative ways to view identities. Identities can be seen, for 
example, as being constituted from fixed, primordial elements that determine the behaviour of 
those within the identity-group. Primordial identities are fiercely contested in the current 
literature of those disciplines. 
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Identities and Violence 
 
 
Vivienne Jabri’s main argument in her book “Discourses on Violence” states 
that violent conflict arises from the “individual’s membership of bounded 
communities constituted through discursive and institutional dividing lines” 
(Jabri, 1996: 120). According to that argument, violent conflict is constituted 
around the construction of a discourse of exclusion, referring to dichotomous 
representations of the self and other, found at the heart of identity. Jabri 
claims, that exclusionist discourses are not merely manifest in specific 
situations of violent conflict, but are deeply embedded in discursive and 
institutional practises which are reconstituted through every practice of 
exclusion (Jabri, 1996: 131). This links the violent conflict to the normal state 
of identity, both of them involving discourses of exclusion, which aim to typify 
a diversity of individuals into well-defined exclusionist categories. Both 
constitute structures of violence based on segmentation and opposition. 
(Jabri, 1996: 138)  
 
Because exclusionist discourse is deeply embedded in identities, the 
argument Jabri makes would seem to imply that violence is inherent in the 
way people exist in the world: violence is an inherent characteristics of the 
ontology of self-formation. But these dichotomies (outside-inside, self-other) 
are implications of categorical thinking9, that we cannot overcome (Calhoun, 
1994: 19), violence so being included in every exclusive category made by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 World with no borders separating the self would be totalitarian, consisting only sameness. 
See, for example, Shapiro (1997). 
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human beings, including it also in every identity formation. But if every identity 
formation is inherently violent, what does it imply of violent conflict formulated 
around identity?  
 
This idea of inherent violence in itself does not explain why some identities 
are involved in conflicts, and others are not. It also fails to address the 
question why some conflicts are not involving the aspect of identity although 
the parties have distinctly separate identities. In the end, the argument does 
not explain the involvement of violence in a certain conflict; it only refers to the 
possibility of violent conflict because of the exclusionary politics of identity. 
This echoes one of the deepest arguments about human nature: whether it is 
inherently aggressive or not10. Even though one would have the answer it 
would not serve as an explanatory factor, failing to address the fact that some 
people act aggressively in some situations, and some do not. So, when Jabri 
uncovers the ontology of identity formation, it needs additional arguments to 
explain the occurrence of violent identity conflicts. 
 
It also has to be noted that if Jabri’s premises are true, and violence is built 
into the formation of identities, it does not mean that every identity will 
formulate itself using violence. Identities, as well as borders have essential, 
and positive functions. Border is a special type of institution, its important 
function being the forming of structures and normative practices of human 
interaction, and then to reduce the uncertainty and increase ontological 
security (Paasi, 1999: 75, 80). Borders are offering a safe haven from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For this debate, see for example, Rapoport (1989).  
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discrimination, creating the basis of security and identity (Anderson & 
O’Dowd, 1999: 596). 
 
Identity Politics – Politicization of Identity 
 
 
For identity to be in the core of the conflict it has to be politicized. When 
politicized, identity is giving a basis for action that is politically determined. 
Now one can talk about identity politics (in comparison to passive identity) 
because identity is not necessarily in the background or basis of political 
action. (Linjakumpu, 1999: 61, 75) Identity politics seeks to facilitate political 
action through a focus on unity (identity) rather than difference. It also 
prevents political action by limiting the ways in which both differences and 
commonalities can be understood. (Phoenix, 1998: 871-2) 
 
Borders between social entities are always political in the wide sense of the 
meaning. As a way of organising social space, it is not only important to know 
where the border is located, but through what kind of practices and resistance 
this border was built (Paasi, 1999: 76). One has to discover what are the 
political processes through which the identity is formed by borders, and what 
actors and structures are meaningful in the formation at that political moment. 
It is this context that defines identity as meaningful and shows the importance 
of identity in forming the political reality. (Linjakumpu, 1999: 61) One has to 
look at the context where, why and how identity is politicized, and why it is 
raised to the centre of the political practices.  
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The recent literature on identity conflicts – or identity-related conflicts – has 
focused on conflicts formed around the idea of ethnicity. Whereas nationality, 
language or religion can act as a similar identity-marker more theorising has 
been done in relation to ethnic conflicts in peace and conflict studies. The 
analysis will draw on the politicization of identity from both the ethnic identity 
discourse and its religious counterpart. Many of the conflict regions with 
violent identity-related conflicts (former Yugoslavia, Kashmir Valley, Rwanda) 
had been showcases of the ability of different religious, ethnic and linguistic 
groups to live together. What happens in the process that raises identities to 
the core of the conflict, and what initiates it? 
 
 
Conflict dynamics in identity-related conflicts 
 
 
There are two main arguments about identities in conflict, namely that the 
identity is created within the conflict (in the case of ethnicity, ethno-genesis11) 
or it is awaken by the conflict  (ethnic persistence). 12  Identity built with 
exclusion does not depend on objective linguistic, cultural or religious 
differences but the subjective experience of those differences. In this sense 
identity, whether it is national or communal, is contingent and relative. 
(Bulmer, 1998) Regardless of the origin, this debate is secondary to the fact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Ethnogenesis is based on social constructionist view, stressing social/political construction 
of ‘imagined communities’ through the identification of ethnic subjects with the system of 
cultural representations which is also a structure of power, embedded in, and reproducing, 
specific social relations. (Bloul, 1999)  
12 More about the debate see Conversi (1999). 
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that identity is nevertheless politicized in the conflict. Common assumption is, 
however, that the group identity is defined and reformulated in conflict rather 
than being a “pre-existing” cause of it. 
 
It has been argued, that conflict is intrinsic to the definition of ethnic groups 
(Agnew, 1999: 54). What is in the heart of intractable ethnic conflict is not only 
the exclusionist basis of identity, but also the fact that ethnicity is dynamically 
reproduced through the mutual exclusivity of competing territorial, and 
ontological claims (Agnew, 1994: 51). The same can be said about sectarian 
groups in conflict. Whereas ethnic identity includes rhetoric of cultural purity, 
which transforms the heterogeneous contents of any discourse of collective 
identity into a pure, primordial essence of identity, sectarian religious identity 
claims include similar claims on the purity of faith. (Bloul, 1999) These claims 
are also attached to territorial claims. This means these identities are not only 
exclusionist, but seek to invalidate the other by creating existential threat for 
them, attaching the idea of a pure identity to a territorial basis. This 
mechanism can be found, for example, in the purification of a territory13. 
These identities can be thus considered racial for they include hierarchies of 
belonging, stating normative preferences over one particular identity.  
 
But what is noteworthy in ethnic violence is that it often occurs when there are 
few cultural markers accessible to differentiate between entities. When groups 
in conflict share too many elements of the same culture, difficulties in their 
self-definition may emerge. One option then, is to use violence as a means of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Good account on this “demographic engineering” can be found in the article by John 
McGarry (1998). See also Kaldor (1999: 98-100). 
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border building. (Conversi, 1999: 583) So, rather than leaning on existing 
differences in identities, conflict is a way of creating them. Later analysis of 
sectarian violence tries to find out whether the same is true for sectarian 
identity groups and the violence between them. Most important, though, is to 
recognize that mobilisation around identities can be seen as a paramount 
process of border-building, and systematic use of violence as a separating, 
dichotomising tool (Conversi, 1999: 564, 570). Conflict, and the use of 
violence, also reinforces the negative stereotypes of the other, acting as a 
further legitimation of the use of violence. Now identity discourse is better 
understood as a discourse of self-legitimation produced by the violence it 
appears to merely represent (Campbell, 1999: 86). Conceiving of violence as 
a form of political inscription and transcription, rather than the product of a 
“psychogenetic” cause, highlights its constitutive role in identity politics. 
Violence in identity-related conflicts, understood as a deliberate border-
imposing mechanism, is a powerful argument against commonplace ‘ancient 
hatred’ interpretations of those types of conflicts. (Conversi, 1999: 573) 
 
Border-building may then be a quite independent process from existing, 
objective cultural differences (Conversi, 1999: 573). But what initiates this 
process? Daniele Conversi stresses the role of externally imposed violence 
that causes the border-building and centrally imposed character of borders 
(Conversi, 1999: 572-3). The “standard” explanation by the instrumentalist 
school claims that in a world of scarce resources and high communication, 
individuals find it useful and necessary to form collective units for the pursuit 
of wealth, power and prestige; elites and individual leaders in their competition 
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with other leaderships for power and resources need to mobilize followers for 
success; and bases like class, ethnicity or religion afford convenient ‘sites’ for 
mobilization. (Smith, 1986: 65) In short, emerging issues take on an 
increasingly ethnic or religious character because political leaders find it 
relatively easy to mobilize populations by stimulating a sense of collective 
identity. (Carment & James, 1997: 1) The process of politicization of identity is 
thought to be initiated either by national or international actors, ethnic 
entrepreneurs, who articulate beliefs in kinship bonds and common destiny, 
and who mobilize and organize groups to press group claims. (Sisk, 1996: 16-
7) These different actors (military and political leaders, populists) working as 
an entrepreneur seek to make political capital out of the chosen identity 
(Sherrer, 1999: 57). 
 
But the simple dichotomy of an essentialist approach and instrumentalism to 
identities do not offer adequate understanding of these conflicts. When the 
essentialist explanations have been mostly rejected, the instrumentalist view 
is overemphasised in international relations theory and peace and conflict 
analyses. The view is based on the rational choice theory which in its extreme 
form reduces identification to cost-benefit –oriented choices (Väyrynen, 1999: 
128). However, although not natural, given or fixed, ethnic, religious and other 
identities are not to be reduced to strategies and politics only. There are 
existential dimensions involved (Lindholm Schultz, 1999: 231), and they 
should not be forgotten in the expense of the role of the rationality, which is 
overtly emphasized in the process.  
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Even though it is hard, or impossible, to show one centre point where identity 
is politicized14, these views seems to confirm, that invoking identity needs 
some kind of active political initiative. As Kathryn Manzo notes, “human races 
can transmute into ethnic groups through political selection” (Manzo, 1996: 3). 
Religion and ethnicity, as terms, are more widely used to describe a variety of 
forms of mobilization, which ultimately relate to the autonomous existence of 
specifically ethnic or religious forms of socialization. That is why speaking 
about the politicization of ethnicity seems tautological, as noted by Sherrer, for 
what is happening is politicization of identity, taking an ethnic form (Sherrer, 
1999: 57). Identities in conflict should be judged in terms of the relationship 
with the other they embody. Emphasis should be on the discursive practices, 
constructing space and identity, on the ways that self-other relationships are 
framed and played out15 (Shapiro, 1997: 31).  
 
Spatiality of Identities 
 
Concept of a border encourages us to look at identity as an essentially spatial 
concept: identity is both produced and expressed through space. Space is 
now understood as active and dynamic. It is not “merely a passive, abstract 
arena on which things happen” (Keith & Pile, 1993: 2). There is a significant 
body of literature on the concept of space and how it is constructed or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  As Jabri pointed out: “The categorisation of self and other is not a product of cognition and 
information processing, but derives from discursive and institutional continuities which are 
reproduced through every categorisation act.” (Jabri, 1996: 127) 
15 This could be done according to the framework suggested by William Bloom: (1) delineating 
the factors and circumstances which work towards evoking a shared identity; (2) delineating 
the factors and circumstances in which people who share the same group identity may act 
towards enhancing or defending it; (3) explicating the relationship between this mass 
psychological dynamic and the political environment. (Bloom, 1990: 23.) 
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produced.16 For the purpose of this study it is not essential to dive into this 
literature in-depth but to highlight that spaces, as conceptualized by Doreen 
Massey (1993, 2005) are essentially relational. They are constructed out of 
interrelations, “as the simultaneous coexistence of social interrelations and 
interactions”. (Massey, 1993: 155) Social relations exist in and through 
spaces where those relations are actively produced, and negotiated. (Massey, 
2005: 154, 193; Knott, 2005: 15) Space is not only highly active but also 
politically enabling as a result of the fact that it is created out of social 
relations. “Space, as relational and as the sphere of multiplicity, is both an 
essential part of the character of, and perpetually reconfigured through, 
political engagement.” (Massey, 2005: 183) Space is by its very nature full of 
“power and symbolism, a complex web of relations of domination and 
subordination, of solidarity and co-operation”. (Massey, 1993: 142, 156) 
Spaces should then be considered also as lived practices with symbolic 
meanings and significance. (Massey, 1993: 143)  
 
The spaces of expressing identities and identity discourses make them also 
competing spaces.  Spaces become the forces of dislocation and resistance 
as well as social organization. These spaces set for reproduction and re-
enactment of identity are also spaces set for violence, according to the 
premises of this work. Violence has the capacity to organize social space and 
with this organizational capacity comes power: use of violence is then a show 
of power but also an act of power in an attempt to re-organize and affect 
spaces: social spaces and spaces of identity formation and maintenance. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  See for example Lefebvre (1991) or Soja (1996). 
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work, then, wants to situate sectarian violence, and those spaces of 
reproduction of the exclusivist identity discourses.  
 
Borders and Communication 
 
 
Identity borders are not necessarily unconditionally exclusive, nor do they 
necessarily build strong dichotomies (Jukarainen, 2000: 4). Identity is a 
common mechanism to superimpose unity on differentiation, but it need not to 
be formalised in explicitly aggressive forms (Conversi, 1999: 569). Since 
borders are socially constructed, they are contextual phenomena (Paasi, 
1999: 72). The term border 17  brings forth the wide scope and various 
meanings of the term. Borders can be avenues or obstacles, protective and 
capturing, spaces of possibility and insecurity, conflict and contact, 
competition and cooperation. These dichotomies can change depending on 
time and space, and they can be true at the same time for those operating 
continuously in two different spaces. (Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999: 595-596) 
Borders can exist at the same time in various levels of spatiality and different 
practices, for example in culture, politics and economy (Paasi, 1999: 73). 
Borders have thus both material and symbolic usages. They can take a very 
clear physical form, the Berlin wall or the Israeli separation wall being extreme 
examples, or remain invisible. Even though they may be physically invisible, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The use of the term border in different languages: In German, there is only one term 
(granze), whereas in French there are four: frontière, front (military), limite and marche; In 
Spanish there are three words: frontera, marca ja limite; as well as in English: frontier, 
boundary and border. All of these terms have different connotations, although in English the 
terms are used interchangeably. Frontier-word has the widest scope of reference, when 
boundary has the most specific meaning. (Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999: 603.) 
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they are typically carriers of wider symbolism, material representations of 
history and the current situation. (Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999: 595) 
 
Borders do not only separate social groups and communities but also transmit 
contacts between them (Paasi, 1999: 80). Now border does not present itself 
as a barrier, or as a limiting element but as a space of interpretation and 
interaction between two different entities (Zureik, 2001: 220). Besides being 
limiting and delineating, a border is also a meeting point of two those entities, 
a place of change and exchange (of things, people, ideas) – a place for 
interaction. Borders are not only the physical borders of a state but also areas 
of margins where people negotiate practices and meanings that are attached 
to their belonging to a certain group (Wilson & Donnan, 1998: 9).  
 
The ’real’ meaning and interpretation of the borders is in a process of a 
dialogue within the identity-group. The meanings of a border differ depending 
on the person and the context, and various actors are used to define their 
meaning and content, based on various intentions (Tronvoll, 1999). For 
example, military leaders and heads of state produce representations and 
thoughts on the meaning of the borders (Paasi, 1999: 81). It is important to 
note, that socially constructed border is also subject to change. Thus, borders 
can be though as processes, existing in socio-cultural action (Paasi, 1999: 72; 
75). 
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The structural element of borders  
 
 
Vivienne Jabri notes in her book Discourses on Violence that exclusionist 
identity discourses are not merely manifest in specific situations of violent 
conflict but are deeply embedded in discursive and institutional practises 
which are reconstituted through every practice of exclusion (Jabri, 1996: 131). 
The categorisation of self and other is not a product of cognition and 
information processing, but derives from discursive and institutional 
continuities, which are reproduced through every categorisation act. The 
implications of categorisation are of central importance in understanding 
processes which legitimate violence in situation of conflict. (Jabri, 1996: 127) 
This means we can only have identity, or concepts like security, if there is a 
body of typified actions, mediated by structures, from which to draw in order to 
make sense. As we can only do language – speak – if we can draw on what is 
already done. (McSweeney, 1999: 166)  
 
In societies with protracted identity-related conflicts, those identities in conflict 
become institutionalised. For Alan C. Tidwell, the threat that challenges 
identity makes the defence of it become integrated into identity. The end 
result being, that the conflict becomes profoundly embedded in the very 
essence of those engaged in it. (Tidwell, 1998: 136) Also, the borders that 
separate the identity-groups can become institutionalised, as well as the 
social practices upholding and reproducing them. The borders can be now 
located in the various expressions of social narratives creating meanings to 
borders, as in various institutions like school, media, literature, ceremonies 
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etc. (Paasi, 1999: 76), again emphasising the non-material quality of borders. 
Often these spatial as well as non-spatial borders are also upheld by religious, 
historical and exclusive structures of state ideology (Falah, 1996: 825). 
 
Violence as communicative and performative act      
 
 
As noted above, identity does not necessarily have to be formed around, or 
with violence. But when violence is part of the identity building how does it 
manifest itself?  
 
When identity is threatened, by either real or imagined threat, and the feeling 
of ontological security is shaken, the mechanism of rigidification, a 
psychological response to threat, comes to work. In this process, more and 
more minor characteristics about the other becomes threatening. Constructing 
the other becomes an aggressive process, where the other is increasingly 
perceived as and treated like someone entirely different from self. 
Rigidification, then, is a process of crystallizing what is constructed as self and 
not-self, serving the purpose of separating the other from self, in essence, 
putting distance between the self and the threat. (Northrup, 1989: 70.) In 
effect, rigidification involves increasing efforts to secure the borders of the 
self, through separation and polarization (Northrup, 1989: 71). 
 
In protracted conflicts building and defending strong, rigid borders is a part of 
conflict behaviour. In relation to the constructed other there is a need to 
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maintain a distance, which is usually legitimized by security. This distance can 
be pursued through physical separation (fence, wall), but it actualises also 
through the lack of trust, limiting interaction and communication (Bulmer, 
1998). It can also actualise through activities and discourses emphasizing “the 
other” (Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999: 598). 
 
According to the social constructivist nature of identity, important element in 
the building and maintaining of the distinct identities is the communication18 of 
those identities, and the separating border, both to the other and to the self19, 
as well as to the wider society. (Rönnquist, 1999: 150)  
 
These communicative acts can be summarised by using the term discourse, 
referring to “practices which form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 
1972: 49). Discourse refers to sets of organised meanings (which can include 
images as well as words) on a given theme. The term has been used to 
emphasise “the organised way in which meanings cohere around an assumed 
central proposition, which gives them their value and significance”. (Hollway & 
Jeffreson, 2000: 14) The things that people communicate, then, can be 
though of as instances of discourses, as occasions where particular 
discourses are given the opportunity to construct an event in a certain way. 
(Burr, 2003: 66) Now, the above-mentioned communicative acts are those 
‘instances’ of discourses that are constructing not only events but also 
identities. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Instead of the concept of ‘text’ as the focus of analysis that is widely used in social 
constructivism I prefer to use ‘communication’ in this context. Communication emphasises the 
intersubjective nature of identity and its social construction. 
19 Drawing borders create also a dynamics of inner homogenisation being part of creating the 
image of the ideal identity (Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999: 596; 598). 
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Communication now has to be understood in a wide sense of the term, 
including verbal and non-verbal communication, as well as societal action. 
This communication is done in a specific but at the same time changing 
societal environment, (Rönnquist, 1999: 150) and the communicative acts are 
played out in public sphere20. This communication can use conventional 
verbal forms like speeches, fatwas and political manifestos, but identities can 
also be communicated in other forms like wall-writings, and slogans. 
 
Symbols are an effective way to communicate a specific identity. Especially 
divided societies are often filled with symbols (nationalist, religious, etc.) that 
enforce the feeling of belonging to an area and legitimate the ownership of 
that particular space. These non-verbal acts of communication can take the 
form of flags, turbans, or other distinctively meaning-laden symbols. They are 
also a part of the process of making the invisible borders between identity-
groups more communicable. (Kuusisto, 2001: 59). Symbols are expressions 
of certain narratives, which create meanings to borders and identities, and 
acts as references to the other. These narratives help to uphold the borders 
and are then linked also to conflicts on those borders. (Paasi, 1999: 76) Often 
symbolised local borders are a part of a larger, ongoing, identity struggle  
(Kuusisto, 2001: 64). 
 
Violence can be understood as the extreme form of identity communication – 
it is not only creating the border between identities but also communicating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  The symbolic orders and interpretative schemes upon which identity is based constitute 
“public” or political space (Jabri, 1996: 158). 
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that border to ‘the other’. The violent acts that identity groups perform can be 
seen as a form of this communication for it is action that is allowed and 
justified by referring to the identity in question. And like all human action, can 
be seen as “both symbolic and technical, that is, it simultaneously 
communicates something and accomplishes something”. (Lincoln, 2003: 90) 
Thus, the use of violence goes way beyond that of being a dispute resolution 
method: it is a performative act, creating a special place and space to perform 
the act of violence to communicate the identity discourse to the ‘other’. In 
sectarianism, violence can be seen as the ultimate border-building 
mechanism being part of enforcing and maintaining the exclusionist sectarian 
discourse. 
 
The communication of identities does not necessarily require an active 
involvement of members of identity-groups. As mentioned above, exclusive 
identity formations can be institutionalised, especially in protracted conflicts. 
As borders, also these communicative acts can be institutionalised, for 
example working through the physical structures of control21. When thinking of 
sectarianism as an already established characteristic of the society, the 
nature of the violence also changes. The sectarian system no longer requires 
large amounts violence to maintain itself22. Just an occasional act of violence 
will be enough to sustain the border that is already enforced and fortified.   
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Often these would be set up by a state, or an actor with similar position in a society. 
22 See for example Liechty & Clegg (2001: 12).  
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Towards the Praxis – the Context of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan 
 
 
If social (group) identities are constructed and maintained through the 
construction of borders these conflicting identities can be researched by 
analysing those borders, and the practices through which they are 
maintained. In effect, this means that in a general level, this research looks at 
the discursive practices on constructing space and identity, and on the ways 
that self-other relationships are framed and played out. More specifically, the 
research looks at the agency and the location of violence.  
 
The above analysis also indicate why the location or space of violence can 
have other functions than being merely the inadvertent space of intended 
harm: it is a space that is both enforcing and constructing that same sectarian 
discourse that justified the violent act towards the ‘other’.  
 
This research is interested in how sectarian conflict and specifically violence 
exists spatially, and informs the spatial forms of social relations between the 
conflicting parties. As observed by Ravinder Kaur in the context of religious 
violence: “A significant, though often neglected, aspect of religious violence is 
the rearrangement of urban spaces in favour of the dominant groups.” (Kaur, 
2005: 36) Violence, now, can reconstitute relations among parties, change 
social hierarchies, and organize social space accordingly. Conflict and its 
violent forms are not only a reflection on underlying social structures and 
conditions but strongly re-constituting and re-arranging them. It also can affect 
social space where the different forms of interactions between the groups are 
	  	   41	  
played out. The structuring role of violence was also recognized in the context 
of communal violence by Tambiah: “Violence shapes the urban space of 
ethnic enclaves, barriers, shatter zones, liminal areas, barricades; it has 
become a mode of gaining or losing urban space, and of displacing, moving, 
and resettling populations.” (Tambiah, 1996: 223)  
 
The purpose of the use of violence, then, goes beyond that of being a method 
of inflicting terror and causing casualties. Instead, it is part of the exclusionist 
sectarian discourse, and a performative act, form of interaction aimed at 
affecting shared social space. What we need to study, then, is the location of 
violence – which are the spaces and locations where these identity borders 
are enforced in sectarian conflict? Violence and its different forms like 
destruction of property, or sacred symbols, “thereby transformation of spatial 
practices, provides significant insight into societal transformations”. (Kaur, 
2005: 36) This attempt to dominate public space by violence and the 
exclusionary discourses that legitimate the violence is what enables this 
research to study that violence. As expressed by Ravinder Kaur: 
 
The sites of violence often become sites of purification where 
undesirable elements – members of the ‘other’ community, their 
property and places of worship – are ritually removed and boxed in 
ghetto-like locations. (Kaur, 2005: 36)  
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The focus of the analysis is, then, to look at these ‘sites of violence’ and what 
is it that the violence, and the exclusionary discourse, attempts to remove or 
purify of ‘the other’.  
 
For violence to perform the function of border maintaining and identity 
communication it is conditioned by being justifiable in the sectarian discourse. 
This affects the possible location of violence, for it also needs to fulfil its 
communicative function within the sectarian discourse. In other words, if 
sectarian exclusivist identity discourse can be used and mobilised for various 
purposes, it also limits possible political and violent action, since they have to 
fall within the sectarian discourse and to be able to be legitimated within its 
parameters. Thus, the locations of this violence are not randomly selected but 
should fall within the parameters of that discourse. Spaces closely related to 
the other’s identity are favoured targets, helping to create ontological threat to 
the other, as well as maximise violence’s communicative value. Targeting 
places of worship of the other sect, mosques and imambarghas, or religious 
processions, is one example. This method of targeting sacred spaces and 
sacred time is one of the strongest border-reinforcing and communicating 
mechanisms, especially if the locations embody what is thought as being 
outside the realm of the pure understanding of identity, now something not 
belonging to ‘true Islam’.  
 
One of the key authors on religious violence, Mark Juergensmeyer in his 
studies on religious terrorism talks about violence in this context as a form of 
performance. He identifies as a characteristic of religious acts of violence the 
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symbolic and dramatic aspect of acts of religious terrorism, reflecting the 
sense in which they refer to something “beyond their immediate target”. 
(Juergensmeyer, 2003: 125) This makes the acts of violence themselves 
significant, independent of what they accomplish or fail to accomplish in 
strategic terms, as they are expressive as well as instrumental. (Mahmood, 
1999: 79, 81) The role of symbolism in violence is not, however, only a feature 
of religious violence. It is analysed, for example, also in the context of 
communal violence (Tambiah, 1996: 231). This study is also not denying a 
role of political strategy being part of this public performance of sectarian 
violence – it does not perceive these violent acts as merely symbolic. As 
argued by Wellman:  
 
[R]eligion and politics are structurally linked; symbolic and social 
boundaries are always related. No act is only symbolic but arises out of 
a complex latticework of cultural and political layers or persuasion, 
power and force. Social and political forces are by definition entangled 
in our symbolic language. Thus to disconnect these layers creates 
abstractions. (Wellman, 2007: 9) 
 
By focusing on violence as a performative act it is not to downplay or trivialise 
the fact that sectarian violent acts entail loss of life and that it has devastating 
effects on all sects and communities involved, either directly or indirectly.  
 
By using aesthetics of violence – or the ‘drama of violence’ to use 
Juergensmeyer’s term – using public space for big, striking acts of violence to 
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both convey a message and do harm the groups communicate their 
‘message’ and sectarian discourse to the other group and to the wider public. 
(Juergensmeyer, 2003: 124) Again, this notion of aesthetic of violence is not a 
new concept, or tied to the modern conception of terrorism, whether 
religiously or politically motivated. The Italian writer Machiavelli in 1532 guided 
the reader in his work ‘Prince’ on how strategic, and public use of violence is 
an effective form of communicating the intended message (now political 
power and authority) to the public. When Remirro de Orco’s body was 
displayed cut in two pieces on the piazza at Cesena, Cesare Borgia had sent 
a strong and vivid message to the people of Romagna by using strategic and 
public violent act. (Machiavelli, 1999: 25) 
 
Violence as a performative and communicative act highlights three 
components of that act: First, what is being communicated by the act of 
violence; second, what are the forms and locations of that communication, i.e. 
the stage; and third, who the communication is intended to, i.e. the audience. 
As previously seen, within this analytical framework, what is being 
communicated by violence is the exclusivist sectarian discourse and the task 
of this research is to find the forms and locations of that communication.  
 
The third component, the audience the violence attempts to reach is an 
important part of performance violence which is “designed to have an impact 
on the several audiences that they affect” making the audience part of what 
occurs (Juergensmeyer, 2003: 126). Stephen Cohen has analysed the 
concept of ‘audience’ in the context of violence in Pakistan. According to him, 
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this audience is composed of three groups of people: the enemy, bystanders 
and the potential recruits. (Cohen, 2006: 193) Hurting the enemy, according to 
Cohen, is both a goal in itself and a means of forcing the enemy to change its 
policies (in the case of India in Kashmir for example), or even to leave 
Pakistan or change its religious beliefs, which for Cohen is the purpose of 
sectarian violence within Pakistan. (Cohen, 2006: 193) Now, the ‘enemy’ as 
the members of the other sect, is not necessarily seen as primarily being 
forced to change religious beliefs as the result of violence, but violence is re-
signifying the religious difference. Similarly, if the aim of sectarian violence is 
not the purifying the public or shared space of the ‘other’ at least it aims at 
changing the use of that space considerably, and claiming authority over it. 
The second group, the “bystanders,” constitutes the largest audience 
according to Cohen. For terrorists, the goal is to use an extreme act to change 
the way in which this group sees reality and to be able to shock and gain 
attention the level of terror has to increase over time. (Cohen, 2006: 193) The 
analysis of the ways violence affect on these bystanders is out of the scope of 
this thesis, but in the culture of violence in Pakistan, with several forms of 
violence existing in the everyday lives of the Pakistanis, it is perhaps good to 
point out that both striking violent acts and ongoing violence – as well as the 
threat of them – encountered in everyday lives of Pakistanis do have a role. 
Also, the third group adding to the concept of audience for Cohen is not 
analysed here. Very little is known about how efficient recruitment strategy 
violent acts factually are.  
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With media and informal networks the audience can consist of a much larger 
group of people than the immediate group experiencing the violent incident, 
perhaps also affecting the form of violence to enhance the drama of the 
performance to ensure it being broadcasted in the news and taken up by the 
media. With new technologies the concept of audience has significantly 
changed. Violent incidents can be posted and seen online both by the 
perpetrators and the victims. (Minority Support Pakistan, 2012; Tufail, 2012) 
 
Within the context of sectarian violence, the communication is done not only 
by attacking religious spaces but also by pursuing targets who are related to 
the core of ‘the other’s’ identity, and which guarantee a certain amount of 
publicity for the attack  (Irfani, 2004: 157). Thus, the violence is not ‘irrational’ 
but part of regularised conduct of sectarian politics. It is also very effective, for 
it targets the fundamental values, sense of security and self-definition of those 
communities. By analysing data on sectarian incidents we can see if sectarian 
violence follows this model, and whether it is confirms the assumed 
relationship between space, religion (in relation to sectarian identity) and 
violence.  
 
Other forms of communication of sectarian identities are also noted in the 
analysis of violence, although not placed at the centre of it. When the 
communication is often not in the conventional forms of a text, for example, 
there is a need to be creative in ‘finding’ the different ways the communication 
is done. It is not feasible for this research to tackle all of the forms of 
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communication, excluding things like material published by different sectarian 
organisations in forms of tapes, books and pamphlets from its realm.  
 
Violence is a strong organizer of social space and method of communicating 
ones identity, and the main focus of this research, but there are other spatial 
forms of communicating sectarian identities. Since those sectarian identities 
are embedded in the society and include territorialized ontological claims, 
communication can be found in various forms in urban and rural spaces. One 
of the most common forms is the use of religious slogans and wall chalkings 
marking that space, like “Live like Ali, die like Hussain!” or “kafir kafir Shia 
kafir!” as well as display of religious sectarian symbols, or other signifiers of 
identities.  
 
To conclude, it is important to emphasize that to situate violence, or to 
analyse the locations of sectarian violence this research draws from the 
methods used to analyse violence in the context of terrorism, especially those 
terrorist acts that are related to religious discourse. Despite of this 
‘methodological borrowing’ this research wants to distance itself from the 
analyses of sectarianism and sectarian violence that categorise them as 
‘terrorism’. The popularity of this discourse is evident also in writing on 
sectarianism, but it is essentially limiting, and distracting definition of sectarian 
violence. Production of fear and terror is inevitably part of the aim of sectarian 
violence but as already seen in this thesis, sectarian violence should not be 
reduced to this, and the main focus of this study is to look at the other 
functions of the violence. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
Forming an identity is a process of categorical thinking, organising the world 
into dichotomies. It is a process of separating the self from the other. Even 
though this ontological basis of identity would be inherently violent, we can’t 
go outside that categorical thinking. Violence as a latent discourse in identity 
formation requires additional factors in explaining the occurrence of identity 
politics and violent conflicts, where the question of identity is legitimising the 
use of violence. Discourse of exclusion does not totally explain the dynamics 
in identity-related conflicts, nor the form the violence takes in those conflicts. 
Socially constructed identity needs to be raised in the heart of conflict through 
politicization, that is an active political initiative. Violence is often used as an 
extreme form of border-building when there is little real differences between 
the self and the other. Identity, violence and politics have now a mutually 
reinforcing relationship. Still, this has to be considered as a departure from 
what is normal identity formation. Indeed, not all identities form themselves 
using violence, nor not identities are politicized. But the dynamics of this 
tripartite mechanism has to be understood in order to comprehend the basis 
of identity and conflicts. 
 
Religious (or ethnic) divisions and differences are not inherently bad or 
problematic. They become problematic when religious identities have 
exclusionist political agendas and hierarchical notions of existence, as is the 
case with sectarianism. By using identity politics as an analysing tool more 
deliberate focus can be put on finding out how the identity discourse in 
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question is maintained and by whom, as well as for what purpose it is 
mobilised, and more specifically, how the identity is communicated. The main 
analysis of the thesis will focus on the role of violence as a border creating 
and reinforcing mechanism and how it is used to communicate the differing 
identity-claims.  Violence, then, is both a creator of sectarian difference, and 
means to communicate those differences.  
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Chapter 2  
The Coordinates of Sectarianism: Defining Sectarianism 
and Exclusivist Sectarian Discourse in Pakistan 
 
   
 
Introduction 
 
 
In today’s world, the internal divisions in the Muslim ummah (community) can 
be seen to be involved in violent conflicts in various parts of the Muslim world, 
making knowledge of the complex inner landscape of Islam more relevant 
than ever to academics and policy makers alike. The terms sect and 
sectarianism are more widely used in the language of world politics than ever 
before. This is also reflected in the growing use of the terms in the peace and 
conflict studies literature, where sectarianism—especially its violent forms—is 
finally being recognised as a potent force of conflicts. 
 
This newly found attention has not necessarily been matched with analytical 
development and the definition of the term sectarianism. Instead, the term is 
used to brand various types of violence and conflicts, often ignoring the 
complex conflict terrain within which they exist. Especially in escalated, violent 
conflicts, labelling something as sectarian can distort the conflict analysis 
more than offer an explanation. Thus, there is a need for peace and conflict 
studies to clearly define the conceptual coordinates of sectarianism and draw 
on other disciplines—such as sociology of religion—when the discipline’s own 
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body of literature is still underdeveloped. This need for a definition is noted 
and acknowledged in this thesis, giving it the analytical attention it deserves. 
The analysis will, consequently, be multidisciplinary throughout the thesis. 
This chapter discusses sectarianism as a concept, specifically in peace and 
conflict studies and in the Islamic context. The focus will be conceptual—
separating sectarianism, for the purpose of the analysis, from the context in 
which it always exists. With a theoretical study of sectarianism, the chapter 
tries to uncover the inner logic and dynamics at work in this type of social 
organisation and action, shedding light also on its boundaries. After a 
conceptual analysis, sectarianism is placed in the Pakistani context, looking at 
how the phenomenon is approached and defined in the literature, particularly 
in relation to exclusivist sectarian discourse. 
 
Sectarianism: Definitions 
 
To date, the most serious efforts to define sectarianism in peace and conflict 
studies have been conducted in the context of the conflict in Northern Ireland. 
(See, for example, McTernan, 2003; Liechty & Clegg, 2001.) These analyses 
of sectarianism are valuable, but invariably limited in their usefulness for being 
attached to Western culture and especially to the realm of Christianity, itself a 
product of a certain cultural context. Most of these definitions are aware of 
these limitations and do not try to cover sectarianism as a universal 
phenomenon.  
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For Joseph Liechty and Cecelia Clegg, whose work is situated in Northern 
Ireland, sectarianism is “rigid adherence to a particular religious sect” (Liechty 
& Clegg, 2001: 102–3). The Religions and Development Research 
Programme, conducted by an international consortium of academic 
institutions, extends the definition: “‘[S]ectarianism’ refers to a rigid 
adherence, excessive attachment or undue favoring of a particular sect, party 
or denomination” (Religions and Development Research Programme, 2005).23 
This definition highlights the fact that sectarianism is not necessarily tied to 
what is termed as a sect in Islam’s or any other religion’s organisation. Sect 
is, of course, essentially a Western concept relying on the Christian religious 
organisation.  
 
The religious organisation in Islam can be described by using the same basic 
concepts as in other religions. The different religious bodies in Islam can be 
divided into denominations, sects, and cults (Sedgwick, 2004: 289). In 
practise, there are two major denominations within Islam, the Sunnis and the 
Shia24 (Sedgwick, 2000: 201). Looking through the lens of Arabic, the closest 
Arabic term to denomination is madhhab,25 a term normally but inadequately 
translated as “school of law”26 (Sedgwick, 2000: 201). There are five generally 
recognised madhhabs in Islam, four Sunni (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and 
Hanbali) and one Shia (called Ja’fari). For most purposes, the four Sunni 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The programme is an international research partnership that ran in the years 2005–2010 
and explored the links between religion, development, and poverty reduction. It has four focus 
countries: India, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Tanzania. 
24 “Historically, the Shi’a originated as a sect […], but the split between them and the Sunnis 
occurred so long ago that for almost all purposes the Shi’a can be regarded as a 
denomination in their own right.” (Sedgwick, 2000: 201) 
25 “A madhhab is a denomination in the sense that any Muslim is born into one or other of the 
madhhabs: on certain points his family follows the rulings of one madhhab (or rather, of 
scholars from that madhhab) rather than one of the other three.” (Sedgwick, 2000: 201) 
26 The term is closely linked to the concept of fiqh, religious judisprudence. 
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madhhabs together form one denomination, since “the differences between 
them have almost no theological or sociological significance.” There are more 
important differences between the four Sunni madhhabs and the Shia 
madhhab (Sedgwick, 2000: 201).  
 
But because the definition of sectarianism relates to more broad religious 
bodies than merely sects, the Sunni-Shia conflict can be termed as 
sectarianism even though they, strictly speaking, are not sects but 
denominations—or schools of law in Islam. In fact, the term 
denominationalism 27  is sometimes used interchangeably with the term 
sectarianism, although it can also refer to a more general division or 
subdivision of a religion (Christiano et al., 2002). 
 
As noted by Jeff Kenney (2002), sects and sectarian typologies reflect the 
political culture they exist in, and transferring the methodological tools to 
analyse one culture's sectarian formations to another creates “inherent, and 
often insurmountable, interpretive challenges” (Kenney, 2002: 137). The 
definition of Liechty and Clegg highlights that this does not mean that the 
terms wouldn’t have any significance at all in conflict analysis outside the 
realms of Christianity and the Western world; these terms can be operational 
in other contexts. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 “The term ‘denominationalism’ was first employed in the late seventeenth century by those 
groups of Christians in England who dissented from the established Church of England, but 
considered themselves to be entirely loyal to the British state. […] The term was introduced to 
counter the pejorative term sect, which in popular use had the sense of deviant or undesirable 
practices (somewhat as the term cult does today)” (Christiano et al., 2002: 99). Today, the 
term is commonly used to describe the American Christian religious organization. For more 
on denominationalism and the concept of denomination, see, for example, Ruthven (2012). 
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The definition of sectarianism by the Religions and Development Research 
Programme continues: 
 
It [sectarianism] often implies denunciation of, and discrimination or 
even violence against, those outside the sect. The term is most often 
used to refer to religious sectarianism, involving conflict between 
members of different religions or denominations of the same religion on 
the basis of adherence to particular religious dogmas. It is also 
frequently used to refer to political sectarianism, generally on the part 
of a tight-knit political faction or party. (Religions and Development 
Research Programme, 2005)28 
 
This definition speaks of the outward-oriented nature of sectarianism, of the 
meaning attached to belonging to a religious body, and the negative attitude 
towards others outside it. This is confirmed by Liechty and Clegg: 
 
Sectarianism is a system of attitudes, actions, beliefs, and structures 
which arises as distorted expressions of positive, human needs 
especially for belonging, identity, and the free expression of difference 
and is expressed in destructive patterns of relating. (Liechty & Clegg, 
2001: 102–3)  
 
At the core of their definition is the notion that all sectarianism can be 
understood as a destructive way of dealing with difference (Liechty & Clegg, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For the author, the term is most useful when tied to religious discourse and organization as 
opposed to a merely political one. For an examination of the term outside the religious 
discourse, see Margalit (2008). 
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2001: 152). Here the outward-oriented nature is framed with the concept of 
identity, which is placed in a sociocultural context. And what is placed in the 
centre of the definition is action—how that identity, or difference, is expressed 
and negatively communicated to others. In their study, Liechty and Clegg also 
emphasise how sectarianism is always tied to religion since it “is the factor 
that makes an attitude, an action, a belief, or a structure specifically 
sectarian—as opposed to being simply generally bad or destructive” (Liechty 
& Clegg, 2001: 38). This is a departure from the inclusion of the concept of 
political sectarianism to what sectarianism is, as per the definition of the 
Religions and Development Research Programme. 
 
 
These definitions of sectarianism are equally about the group’s or the 
individual’s attitude or relation towards others (sects or other religious bodies), 
as about the group or individual itself. Sectarian claims are always political in 
the wide sense of the meaning, but sectarianism is most problematic when 
armed with exclusivist claims and infused with politics, as we will see when 
addressing the development of exclusivist sectarian discourse in Pakistan 
later in this chapter. This kind of violent exclusivist form of sectarianism is also 
in the heart of the public image of what sectarianism means.  
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Sectarianism and Religion 
 
Religion, according to Liechty and Clegg, is a decisive factor in labelling 
something as sectarian. As with the discussion on terrorism, though, there is a 
great debate about how much explanatory weight can be put on religion when 
trying to analyse and explain the phenomenon. 
 
In general, when sectarianism is discussed, the “role of religion receives little 
attention; remarkably little, given that the popular understanding of 
sectarianism associates it with a destructive mingling of religion and politics” 
(Liechty & Clegg, 2001: 22). This is true in both Western and Muslim worlds, 
as well as in the Pakistani context. It is striking that since 9/11, the study of 
religion has changed, and religiously related violence is rarely perceived as an 
either/or choice between religion and other factors. Instead, religion is mostly 
perceived as having a role in a phenomenon, and the scope of that role varies 
greatly. Religion can be seen as merely a boundary maker, signifying the 
boundaries of the conflicting parties without any significant content or 
influence on the real dividing factors (Liechty & Clegg, 2001: 51). Or, following 
the popular metaphor, religion is viewed as a mask, “which the analyst 
unhesitatingly tears away” (Kepel, 2005: 233) to discover the real factors at 
work. 
 
 
One compelling explanation for this understanding is the various ways in 
which religion is understood. Religion is now often equated with religious 
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doctrine, with which a conclusion is easily reached that a conflict like in 
Northern Ireland is not religious since it is not a doctrinal dispute, or the aim is 
not to create a religious social entity. (See, for example, Liechty & Clegg, 
2001: 50.) Analysts using this view of religion also usually see politics and 
religion as separate spheres. Although the separation of the two can always 
be debated, the separation functions better for certain styles of religiosity—
above all, Protestantism, which easily becomes the implicit model of religion 
per se (Lincoln, 2003: 1). This interpretation of religion is necessarily 
inadequate, though, and as an explanation hides more than it reveals. 
 
In his excellent account of religion after 9/11, Bruce Lincoln (2003) defines 
religion as including the following four domains: (i) a discourse whose 
concerns transcend the human, temporal, and contingent and that claims for 
itself a similarly transcendent status; (ii) a set of practises whose goal is to 
produce a proper world and/or proper human subjects, as defined by a 
religious discourse to which these practises are connected; (iii) a community 
whose members construct their identity with reference to a religious discourse 
and its attendant practises; and (iv) an institution that regulates religious 
discourse, practises, and a community, reproducing them over time and 
modifying them as necessary, while asserting their eternal validity and 
transcendent value (Lincoln, 2003: 5–7). With this definition, it is easy to see 
how religion transcends religious doctrine, and how it overlaps with politics. 
Religion is not purely a matter of belief and worship; it exists in the wider 
social and political spheres and has social and political implications. Islam, 
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especially, is an example of a religion that is more of a holistic system of life 
rather than “just” religion. 
 
When it comes to sectarianism, the role of religion may be immediate or 
diffuse and distant, but it must be present if something is to be described as 
sectarian (Liechty & Clegg, 2001: 39). The working of a sectarian group or 
body is always attached to a religious discourse. And religious discourse can 
have a “persuasive project”—it can attach practise to discourse by defining it 
as religiously sanctioned and, thus, can provide justification to ethnic or 
political claims (Lincoln, 2003: 11; Appleby, 2000: 61). But the explanatory 
weight of religion shouldn’t be stretched too far either. Sectarianism is a 
complex phenomenon involving a variety of factors and has effects reaching 
considerably wider than the religious doctrinal disputes. Nevertheless, the 
cultural context in Muslim societies highlights the need to take religion into the 
analyses. For some analysts, sectarian discourses are politicised because the 
language and symbols of Islam have become the cultural medium through 
which modern Muslims accommodate change. Understanding sects (or 
denominations) in the Islamic world, then, requires sensitivity to the role that 
religion has played, and is playing, in Muslim societies (Kenney, 2002). With 
this definition of religion and sectarianism in mind, one has to be very careful 
when erasing religion from the analysis of sectarianism or its possible 
contributing factors. 
 
Sectarianism and Religion in the Pakistani Context 
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The literature on sectarianism in Pakistan is also almost unanimous in its 
assigned role to religion—or rather in its denial of religion having a role in 
sectarianism at all. Even though the term sectarianism as a concept is 
inherently tied to religion, it is also essentially dynamic and not confined to the 
religious realm. What seems to be imperative to the majority of authors when 
discussing sectarianism in Pakistan is to emphasise that religion exists in the 
name only—the conflicts or power struggles are usually not about religion. 
Religion may be the “new political currency” that could be used when lacking 
other assets (Gragre, 2009: 136), or a vehicle for mobilisation. But the 
grievances and goals “behind the sectarian action” are economic, social, and 
political (Nasr, 2002 & 2006), and the “sectarian discourse of power and its 
underlying paradigm of politics” are not related to religion. Nasr continues: 
 
Sectarianism must, however, be understood as a form of ‘ethnic’ 
posturing, one that combines Islamist and ethnic discourses of power. 
It is tied to Islamism in that its foundational identity is defined in Islamic 
terms, and the ideological world-view of Islamism also controls the 
politics of sectarianism, although sectarianism places greater emphasis 
on Sunni or Shia purity as opposed to establishment of a universal 
Islamic orthodoxy. Still, the sectarian discourse of power and its 
underlying paradigm of politics are ‘ethnic’. (Nasr, 2002: 86)  
 
 
The analysis of sectarianism would indeed miss the point if it was only about 
theology or doctrinal differences, but in the analyses, there is a very limited 
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space for religion.29 Instead, “[t]he dynamics of sectarian strife demonstrate 
that religion is nothing more than a pretext. Above all, the conflict is the 
reflection of socio-economic tensions that pervade a society in transition, and 
an expression of the complex trajectories of modernization” (Abou Zahab, 
2009: 173). Religion exists in the form of sectarianism, not in its content, the 
real content often being power or power struggle. There are also some more 
nuanced interpretations in the literature: “The conflict is neither a simple 
revitalization of religion, nor simply a reflection of an underlying social 
structure” (Manger, 1999: 21). What the literature does not analyse is whether 
categories like social change or modernisation can be fully separated from the 
realm of religion in a country like Pakistan. The literature is also vague in its 
concept of power—power in itself is hardly an adequate explanatory factor but 
one that always exists in a specific context and is relational (power over what? 
power in relation to what?). In the literature, sectarian conflicts in Pakistan are 
about control of economic niches, competition in trade, control of urban 
territory, cultural influence, and about local or regional power.30 (See, for 
example, Tambiah, 1996: 164; Jaffrelot, 2002: 34; Behuria, 2004: 162) But 
even though only through form, they can also be about religion. This is 
common in conflicts in general, which can never be fully explained by a 
single-cause explanation, and none of these explanations are mutually 
exclusive.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For an example where religion is discussed, see Syed (2001). 
30 Too often power is cited as an explanation for a conflict. But conflicts can be thought to be 
always about power. The crucial question then is what type of power? Is it for more funding, 
political influence, religious legitimacy, for example? 
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If not denied as having any role in the religious realm, sectarianism, then, can 
be seen “as a major vehicle of religious change. The effort of urban sectarian 
organizations to extend their influence in the countryside […] and ‘reforming’ 
styles of religious life there signifies […] the growth of a new, urban, text-
based and relatively standardized religious identity among people hitherto 
acquainted only with local forms of religious belief and practice” (Zaman, 
1998: 690). Indeed, sectarian conflicts and sectarianism in general constantly 
interact with broader issues concerning the place of Islam in Pakistan, which 
aspires to be, in some sense, an “Islamic state” (Waseem, 2010: 38). 
 
 
Sectarianism’s Systemic Nature 
 
One of the key contributions of Liechty and Clegg is highlighting the systemic 
nature of sectarianism in societies where sectarianism is protracted and has 
become a characteristic of the society. Sectarianism as a system implies that 
a process of institutionalisation has taken place. This process results in, for 
example, sectarianism being maintained not only by those individuals and 
groups who incite sectarianism by speeches or those who perpetrate 
sectarian violence but everybody whose actions reinforce sectarian agenda, 
without necessarily having the intention of being ‘sectarian’. It also means that 
the reactions to sectarian tensions and violence become automatised and 
structuralised—for example, resulting in segregated living patterns in the 
society (Liechty & Clegg, 2001: 9, 12–13). 
 
	  	   62	  
This makes sectarianism efficient since it does not require any direct or active 
response; that it is not actively opposed or countered is enough to maintain it. 
In fact, the systemic features of sectarianism are rarely addressed since they 
are less visible than, for example, violent acts. And as Liechty and Clegg 
claim, sectarianism penetrates all religiously motivated boundary (or identity) 
maintenance. Even though the motivation would not be sectarian, worship, 
education, and marriages exclusively within one’s own sect, by falling within 
the boundaries set by sectarianism, can end up strengthening the sectarian 
divide (Liechty & Clegg, 2001: 13–14).  
 
This dimension is important if one tries to address the problem of 
sectarianism. The analysis has to look further than studying violent forms of 
sectarianism or sectarian groups perpetrating the violence, which are the 
most visible part of the sectarian system. It also has implications for the use of 
violence and, equally important, how the society and other sects react to that 
violence. The systemic nature of sectarianism will be considered in more 
detail in the following section, where sectarianism is placed in the Pakistani 
context. 
 
In short, sectarianism is an exclusivist group identity of a religious body that 
can also be classified simultaneously as a political or militant entity. That 
group identity is imbued with negative attitude towards its environment, 
leading often to (social/political) action in the form of denunciation of, and 
discrimination or even violence against, those outside the sect. And as we will 
see later on, this action in conflict situations is often directed to the ones 
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seemingly closest to that group identity. 
 
Finally, it is important to emphasise that belonging to a religious body, 
whether it is a sect or something else, is not in itself sectarian, nor are 
religious divisions in general bad or problematic. Sectarianism, like 
fundamentalism, is usually not a self-descriptive term but is attached to a 
social group by outside observers. 
 
 
Definitions of Sectarianism in the Pakistani Context 
 
The Shia-Sunni conflict is at once a struggle for the soul of Islam—a 
great war of competing theologies and conceptions of sacred history—
and a manifestation of the kind of tribal wars of ethnicities and 
identities, so seemingly archaic at times, yet so surprisingly vital, with 
which humanity has become wearily familiar. Faith and identity 
converge in this conflict, and their combined power goes a long way to 
explain why, despite the periods of coexistence, the struggle has lasted 
so long and retains such urgency and significance. It is not just a hoary 
religious dispute, a fossilized set piece from the early years of Islam’s 
unfolding, but a contemporary clash of identities. Theological and 
historical disagreements fuel it, but so do today’s concerns with power, 
subjugation, freedom, and equality, not to mention regional conflicts 
and foreign intrigues. It is, paradoxically, a very old, very modern 
conflict. (Nasr, 2006: 20)  
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There is a vast body of literature relevant to sectarianism in Pakistan, 
although sectarianism itself is still not often the main focus of the analysis. It is 
featured, for example, as a relevant factor when exploring the fashionable 
topic of Islamic extremism in South Asia. Whereas the majority of the analysis 
done on sectarianism is by security and policy analysts—often as part of 
mapping exercises of the most potent security threats related to the region—
the above quote from Vali Nasr sums up the complex terrain within which 
sectarianism in Pakistan exists. It extends the need to look beyond the 
security or policy frameworks if one attempts to understand the conjuncture 
where past disagreements and present political configurations and faith and 
identity converge to form what is today called “sectarian conflict,” or 
sectarianism, in Pakistan. This part of the chapter focuses on those academic 
works that specifically are about explaining sectarianism, looking at how 
academic writers have approached the complex phenomenon, and what 
frameworks of explanation have dominated the analyses. 
 
Most of the literature on sectarianism in Pakistan—even the academic 
research—fails to define the term sectarianism, or to explain the dynamics 
implied in the term, and what those assumptions embedded in it mean in the 
Pakistani context.31 The most common usage of the term is an often-repeated 
statement on sectarianism, referring to the conflict (or relations) between the 
Sunni and Shia traditions. Majority of the academic writing on sectarianism 
recognises that these two groups are not homogenous, having their own 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 One of the rare attempts to approach the term “from the definitional point of view” is based 
on Wikipedia and The Oxford English Dictionary. See Ahmar (2010). 
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subsects, local variants, and different schools of thought. The terms Sunni 
and Shia encompass groups with widely differing interpretations of religion 
and religious rituals. For example, in Pakistan, there are many Shia sects—
such as the Ismailis (Sixers), the Ithna Asharis (Twelvers), the Bohras, the 
Zaidis, and the Nizaris. Sunnis in South Asia include groups like the Brelvis,32 
the Deobandis,33 and the Ahle Hadith.34 The term Shia in this thesis refers 
primarily to the Ithna Ashari, or the Twelver Shia, which forms the majority of 
Shias in Pakistan. Because of this plurality, it is important to note that the 
broad Sunni-Shia division ultimately has limited explanatory power (Mir, 
2010). 
 
Especially when talking about the violent forms of sectarianism, the conflict is 
often specified as being between the Deobandis and Shias, the Deobandis 
having “appropriated the term Sunni for themselves” (ICG, 2005: 2; Abou 
Zahab, 2002b: 77; Fair, 2008: 77). Even more specifically, the conflict is seen 
to be between the Deobandis and the Ithna Ashari, or the Twelver Shia (Abou 
Zahab, 2002; Ahmed, 2011). Some authors have started to extend the term 
sectarianism to intra-Sunni conflicts,35 particularly the conflict and violence 
between the Deobandis and the Brelvis, claiming the divide between different 
Sunni subsects being equally wide as the divide from Shias36 (ICG, 2005: 3; 
Fair, 2008; Ahmed, 2011). This expansion in the definition reflects the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Founded in Northern India in 1880s, based on the writings of Maulana Ahmad Reza Khan 
Barelvi (Esposito, 2003: 10). 33	  Debandis refer to Indo-Pakistani reformist ulama movement centered in the Dar al-Ulum of 
Deoband, founded in 1867 (Esposito, 2003: 66). 
34 For more on these different sects and subsects, see, for example, S. H. Nasr (2004).    
35 Christine Fair also mentions inter-Shia violence, without going into details of that violence. 
(Fair, 2008: 77) 
36 This is not to say that there would not be “ecumenical collaboration” between the groups if 
needed! 
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evolvement of the sectarian phenomenon and the more prominent role 
violence currently plays in intra-Sunni conflicts, as noted by Moonis Ahmar:  
 
In the recent past, in Pakistan, the sectarian conflict got more 
complicated when different Sunni sects began to squabble over 
leadership and parochial interpretation of Islam by some of the leaders 
of the Deobandi and Brelevi schools. In the wake of these changes in 
the dimension of the sectarian conflict, the Shi’a-Sunni conflict got 
marginalized whereas, inter-Sunni conflicts assumed prominence. 
(Ahmar, 2010: 55) 
 
The change in the definition is fundamental in highlighting the complexity of 
the sectarian terrain in Pakistan (Samad, 2007: 172–3). Thus, looking at 
sectarianism in Pakistan only as a Shia-Sunni problem is too simplistic, as it is 
to assume that there is only one sectarian conflict.  
 
 
Sectarianism in Pakistan: View from the Literature  
 
While the academic texts on sectarianism have shied away from looking into 
the conceptual background of the term, or what the term itself implies in the 
Pakistani context, they have attempted to define sectarianism by describing 
the phenomenon through investigating its roots, outlining those historical 
conjunctures where sectarianism has been reinforced, and listing the 
contributing factors that have made sectarianism what it is in today’s Pakistan. 
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This descriptive definition and approach has become widely accepted, 
majority of the writing on sectarianism recycling the same arguments and 
authors, reinforcing its authoritative position. (See, for example, Hussain, 
2008; Grare, 2009; Nasr, 2000.) 
 
The writing on sectarianism in Pakistan is anchored broadly to three key 
processes underlying most—if not all—of the analyses: (1) the state formation 
process and all the competing ideas of Pakistan (Rais, 2009; Jaffrelot, 2002; 
About Zahab, 2002); (2) processes of Islamisation, especially vis-à-vis the 
Pakistani state (Talbot, 2005; ICG, 2005); and (3) evolution of communal 
identities and identity politics (Nasr, 2002; Kamran, 2008; Zaman, 1998). All 
these processes are very much interlinked and intertwined. Next we will have 
a closer look at some themes—some more prominent and some less 
emphasised—emerging from the literature related to the key questions of this 
research.  
 
 
Political Opportunism: The Process of Islamisation 
 
One overarching theme in the academic studies on sectarianism is political 
opportunism—the use of sectarianism—both in national politics and in the 
regional political arena. The main opportunist is General Zia-ul-Haq, the army 
chief who declared the third martial law in Pakistan in 1977, acting as the 
head of the state until his death. In most analyses, the Zia era (1977–1988) 
signals the beginning of sectarianism in Pakistan, as we now understand it, 
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particularly organised and violent forms of sectarianism and religious 
militancy37 (Talbot, 2007: 159). Of course, Zia capitalised on processes that 
started before him (Cohen, 2006), and even though his era marks an 
important time in the evolution of the sectarian phenomenon, the mechanisms 
of how this occurred are often simplified in the literature. 
 
The most important vehicle for Zia’s opportunism—significantly affecting the 
nature of sectarianism—was his Islamisation process. This project, Nizam-e-
Mustafa (Islamic System), although claiming to “manifest a universal Islamic 
vision” (Nasr, 2002: 88; see also Behuria, 2004: 159), was not 
accommodating the different Islamic traditions alive in Pakistan. Instead, it 
was based on, and promoted, a very specific Sunni interpretation of Islamic 
theology and law in a bid to take over “structures of authority—especially at 
the local level—through Islamisation. This meant defining Pakistan as a Sunni 
state, which in turn meant charging sectarian forces to penetrate rural 
structures of authority” (Nasr, 2000: 176).  
 
As argued by Mumtaz Ahmad, Zia’s Islamic reforms were “peripheral”—they 
didn’t threaten the real power holders of “an oligarchy dominated by the 
military and civil bureaucracy” and rather trivialised the Islamisation process 
by depoliticizing a large segment of the ulama (religious scholars) and drafting 
Islamic parties to take part in this process (Ahmad, 1998: 103–4). They 
provided “Islamic credentials to the military rulers […] by accepting these 
inconsequential measures as true and genuine Islamic reforms” (Ahmad, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This is further explored in the next chapter. 
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1998: 106). This, according to Ahmad, emphasised “certain external 
apparatuses of religion” with increased importance of the use of Islamic 
symbolism and enforcement of “orthodox practices and traditional rituals of 
Islam as public policies” (Ahmad, 1998: 107). Rather than the Islamisation of 
the Pakistani state and society per se, what followed were significant changes 
in power structures and dynamics, particularly in the local contestations of 
power in the changing sociopolitical environments—and assertive public use 
of Islamic symbols. Both are important components of the evolution of 
sectarianism and are of particular interest to this study. According to the 
literature, the state establishment, namely, the army and security agencies, as 
well as various governments after Zia (both military and civilian) have 
continued this political opportunism vis-à-vis sectarianism, sectarian conflicts, 
groups, and divisions, with both domestic and international goals (Samad, 
2007; Talbot, 2005; Haleem, 2003; Grare, 2009; Jalal, 2008).  
 
Looking at the policies and political decisions of the various Pakistani 
governments in this context is out of the scope of this work, but this example 
of how the Pakistani leadership has tried to co-opt the SSP to participate in 
the political system illustrates the type of domestic political opportunism in 
question. During the military rule of Pervez Musharraf, Azam Tariq, the SSP 
leader, was permitted to run for the 2002 national elections, even though he 
was in detention at the time for involvement in various terrorist acts and SSP 
had been banned in 2002. Having won a seat in the National Assembly, he 
was released from prison. Following his release, he supported the 
government, which needed his vote to form a ruling coalition. To retain Tariq’s 
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critical support, Islamabad even ignored warrants for his arrest, including 
those issued under antiterrorism laws in July 2000 (Abbas, 2004; ICG, 2004; 
Kamran, 2008). These types of political compromises and opportunistic 
tactics, engaged in by both political and military rulers, continue to empower 
sectarian groups and impact the sectarian phenomenon in Pakistan (Abbas, 
2010; Haqqani, 2006). They also suggest that the state has an important role 
and is an active agency in sectarianism, a premise that is explored further in 
this and the following chapters. 
 
Sectarian opportunism has not been the exclusive tool of Pakistani political 
actors: the involvement of various regional players is well documented.38 
According to the literature, Pakistan has been one of the locations of the 
Saudi Arabian and Iranian relocated proxy war, where the Saudi government 
attempted to counter the Shia threat posed by the growing influence of Shia 
politics and Shia Islam after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Indeed, the brand 
of Sunni Islam Zia’s Islamising process wanted to assert was “inspired and 
underwritten by Saudi Arabia” (Toor, 2011: 160). Countering the threat of the 
revived Shia identity, power-hungry Iran and its growing regional influence 
also impacted the sectarian organisation in Pakistan, and eventually the 
formation of sectarian groups—such as the SSP (Sipah-e-Sahaba 
Pakistan)—whose functions included countering these threats. The Shia 
organisation, on the other hand, drew from this Shia revival and was centred 
on the expressions of that empowered identity and, in addition, acted as the 
counterforce to the mobilised Deobandi groups. And as Pakistan’s character 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See, for example, Talbot (2007), Nasr (2002), and Abou Zahab (2002). 
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as an Islamic state became more established, that sectarian organisation, 
particularly sectarian groups, resorted to a variation of the “Islam in danger” 
theme, focusing on supposed threats to their interests or to Islam as 
interpreted by them (Haqqani, 2006). These threat perceptions have had an 
impact not only on political opportunism but also on the politicising or 
radicalisation of sectarian identities in Pakistan. As noted by Qasim Zaman, it 
is “possible to discover sectarian identity by perceiving, or imagining, the 
existence of threats to it” (Zaman, 1998: 690). Thus, these threat perceptions 
in national, regional, and local levels provide an interesting—and valid—but 
less researched framework for understanding sectarianism (Chandran, 2008: 
7).  
 
What is noteworthy when thinking about the possibility of political opportunism 
both in the regional and the national levels is that sectarianism found political 
relevance “because it so effectively relates regional power alignments to 
specific political constituencies in Pakistan” (Nasr, 2000: 173). The conditions 
in the Pakistani polity then enabled the influence of this regional context; it 
found the political relevance to be able to be influential. But, as noted by 
Mariam Abou Zahab, “[t]hese explanations are obviously relevant but the 
external environment has perhaps been no more than the enabling factor 
which gave scale and sustenance to the sectarian phenomenon” (Abou 
Zahab, 2002b: 79). Thus, while the regional context 39  is important in 
understanding sectarianism in Pakistan, it is also essential to understand the 
limits of the instrumentalist explanations of regional political opportunism and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The regional context is further discussed in the next chapter, with specific focus on how this 
regional context facilitated and influenced sectarian violence. Additionally, the important 
Afghan context is added to the analysis. 
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the regional actors’ ability to implement their proxy war, or agendas, in 
Pakistan. Pakistan’s power configurations and contestations, as well as how 
the regional players and events were perceived in Pakistan, are all important 
in this account.  
 
 
Discourse of Exclusion 
 
The investigation of how the discourse of exclusion has evolved and been 
sustained in Pakistan is critical in attempts to understand the sectarian 
phenomenon in today’s Pakistan, and in trying to answer the key questions 
this research postulates. In the literature, this theme of exclusion provides 
also an opening for religious discourse to emerge when analysing 
sectarianism, and assessing its relation to the political contestations in 
Pakistan, both in the local and the national levels. Sectarianism, when 
analysed in this framework, is placed in the context of the changes in the 
Islamic tradition in South Asia in the past hundred or so years, and especially 
the pressure to standardise the creed (Zaman, 2002).  
 
More broadly, the definition of “what it means to be Muslim” is important not 
only in relation to local and regional power struggles but also for Islamic 
societies in general. Often, this is understood in relation to the challenges 
Islamic societies face when confronted with the challenges of modernity. 
Particularly, the prime locus for this has not been seen to be in the 
“confrontation between Islam and the West” but in tensions between local 
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forms of worship and forms of the faith that are exclusivist, transnational, and 
Pan-Islamist (Pinault, 2008: x). A full examination of the relationship of 
sectarian discourses in Pakistan and in other predominantly Muslim societies 
is out of the scope of this research, but the existence of this context needs to 
be acknowledged. 
 
The definition of Muslim has been at the core of nation building, as is the 
quest for true national identity since the birth of Pakistan—when, according to 
Khaled Ahmed, it began by “positing only two permissible identities in the 
state: the Muslim and the non-Muslim” (Ahmed, 2011: xv). The fact that this 
question of definition of Muslim has been answered in exclusive terms 
provides the backstory for the phenomenon of sectarianism, explaining how 
the political and religious organisations took the form they did and came to 
function as sustaining and enabling sectarian identities and discourse. It also 
illustrates how exclusivist sectarian claims found institutional forms in the 
Pakistani state.  
 
The space for that exclusivist discourse to emerge was first initiated by the 
struggle the liberal-democratic order—as projected for the country to ensure 
the rights of all ethnic and religious groups—faced with the newly emerging 
centralised and authoritative state of Pakistan (Rashid, 1996). The discourse 
was first articulated in the 1950s, when Islam in Pakistan was first defined in 
exclusive terms with the call to declare Ahmadis (Qadianis) as non-Muslims. 
The Majlis-e Ahrar-e Islam (Society of Free Muslims) wanted Ahmadis to be 
defined as a non-Islamic sect and its converts be treated as heretics and 
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apostates (Haqqani, 2006; Kamran, 2008; 66). The Ahmadis are a group 
named after a Punjabi Muslim, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (c. 1835–1908), who 
believed he was the divine instrument for the reform and revival of Islam40 
(Sedgwick, 2000: 210). Controversially, Ahmad “had come to regard and 
describe himself as a variety of prophet” (Sedgwick, 2000: 225), bringing forth 
the question of the finality of Prophethood, conflicting with mainstream Islam 
and its basic tenets. One of the central locations of organised protests against 
Ahmadis was Jhang, in central Punjab. After partition, the Ahmedi community 
relocated their religious headquarters from Qadian in Indian Punjab to Rabwa 
near Chiniot, a Tehsil (subdivision) of Jhang in Central Punjab in Pakistan 
(Sedgwick, 2000: 225). This mobilisation against them culminated in the 
formation of the Tehrik-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwat (TKN), an anti-Ahmadi 
movement, after the government banned Majlis-e Ahrar-e Islam in 1954 
(Hasan, 2011; Zaman: 1998).  
 
Even though the call to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims was rejected in the 
1950s, “the first challenge to a consolidated Muslim identity” (Haqqani, 2006) 
was presented, and the social and political organisations against Ahmadis—
the new groupings that had formed through that movement—had their first 
experience in pressure politics. The demand to denounce Ahmadis as non-
Muslims “remained the focal point for Islamisation of the state” as Pakistan 
continued the process of defining its Muslim identity (Jalal, 2008: 271). The 
anti-Ahmadi movement was more successful in advocating its exclusivist 
agenda in June 1974, when the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1973–	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 For further information on Ahmadis, see, for example, Gualtieri (2004) and Valentine 
(2008). 
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1977) officially declared Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority with a constitutional 
amendment. This “seriously and irreversibly damaged the secular fabric of 
Pakistani society and state” (Toor, 2011: 124) as well as undermined the 
foundation of the Pakistani nation-state in “affirming an exclusionary 
conception of citizenship” (Jalal, 2008: 272). By using a constitutional 
amendment to define a sect as an un-Islamic minority, it also changed the role 
the state could play vis-à-vis the exclusivist discourse. Now that the Islamic 
state in Pakistan had established the right to determine who was and was not 
a true Muslim, religious identity and religious correctness became larger 
issues in Pakistan’s political discourse41 (Haqqani, 2006). 
 
Implications for the Shia Community 
 
Both Sunni and Shia leaders had been part of the anti-Ahmadi movement 
(Behuria, 2004: 158). The joining of forces of Shias and Sunnis in the case of 
Ahmadis might have reinforced the view of intersectarian harmony between 
the main denominations of Islam. But as noted by Ashok K. Behuria, “the 
passion for ‘exclusivity’ has a tendency to metastasise, sub-divide, emphasise 
inter-group differences and crystallise around ethno-cultural religious identities 
in plural societies” (Behuria, 2004: 158–9). The anti-Ahmadi movement 
served as a prototype for the anti-Shia movement and created the dynamics 
and language of exclusion with which to promote further exclusivist claims on 
Islam (Kamran, 2008: 67). This dynamics of exclusion is significant in “a state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Some authors also discuss the exclusionary state policies in the case of West Pakistan and 
the Bengalis in relation to the development of exclusivist sectarian discourse. For more, see, 
for example, Rashid (1996) and Toor (2011). 
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which professes to be guided by the fundamental principles of Islam” as it 
“contributed to sectarian discourse by forcefully raising, and keeping alive, 
such questions as who a Muslim ‘really’ is (irrespective of one’s own claims in 
that regard) and what position he (and those who are not Muslim, or are not 
recognized as such) will have in that state” (Zaman, 1998: 692). It also 
opened up a space for contestations of power and the emergence of power 
brokers who had, or could gain, “the street power to pronounce any Pakistani 
a non-Muslim” (Jalal, 2008: 273). With the declaration of Ahmadis as non-
Muslims, a process was initiated where the constitutional definition of a 
Muslim was then extended to further demand the exclusion of Shias (and then 
later other Sunni sects) from what could be called Muslim in Pakistan (Zaman, 
1998: 692; Kamran, 2008: 67; Ahmar, 2010: 55–6).  
 
This exclusivist discourse against the Shia was formulated and fomented by 
religious scholars and thinkers—like Haqq Nawaz Jhangvi (who later found 
the SPP) and Israr Ahmad and Allamah Ihsan Ilahi Zahir (the chief of Jamiat 
Ulema-e Ahle Hadith). The anti-Ahmadi movement thus provided the anti-Shia 
front with some of their most potent leadership and model for organisation 
around the sectarian agenda. TKN became a forerunner of the SSP, and 
many its leaders, including Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, were members and 
supporters of TKN. The argumentation of those religious scholars and leaders 
culminated in the demand for a similar constitutional decree pronouncing 
Shias as apostates, further defining the exclusivist discourse, and producing a 
new style and language used within that discourse (Nasr, 2000: 160; Kamran, 
2008: 67; Zaman, 1998: 692). This also began the process of transformation 
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of doctrinal and theological disputes into communal ones, the antagonistic 
discourse becoming increasingly focused on the Shia as a people and not 
Shiism as an interpretation of Islam (Nasr, 2000: 160). 
  
The Zia Period 
 
The discourse of exclusion changed significantly during the Zia period and 
with his systematic efforts to establish a Sunni-Hanafi state, as briefly 
explored above. The dynamic of exclusion that had informed state policy 
moved “under Zia from the periphery to centre-stage,” becoming the most 
serious conflict over his Islamisation process (Rashid, 1996; Ahmad, 1998: 
108).  
 
This conflict came to a culmination point in June 1980, when General Zia 
introduced an ordinance requiring the payment of ushr (a religious tax) and 
zakat (religious charity). This attempt to enforce what was seen as a Sunni 
law was met with resistance by the Shia, who wanted to follow their 
jurisprudence (Ja’fari fiqh) and thus a different interpretation of zakat. This 
resistance was turned into a display of street power by an organised march in 
Islamabad in July 1980. The three-day demonstration was orchestrated by 
several different Shia groups 42  and was seen as a crucial factor in 
empowering the Shia of Pakistan, developing a more assertive Shia identity, 
supported by the successful Iranian Revolution the year before. It also led to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Namely, Wifaq-i-Ulema-i-Shia (the Federation of Shia Clerics), a small group of Shia ulema, 
Tehrik-e-Nafaz Fiqh-e-Jafria (TNFJ), and the Imamia Students Organization (ISO). (Abbas, 
2010: 32) 
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the Shia organisation further reflecting this revived identity43 (Abbas, 2010: 
32; Kamran, 2008; Zaman, 1998). Faced with agitation by Shias, Zia was 
forced to exempt them from the compulsory payment of zakat and ushr. Soon 
after Zia’s defeat, there was an increase in denouncing the Shia as heretics, 
in the anti-Shia rhetoric, and in publishing of anti-Shia material (Abou Zahab, 
2007; ICG, 2005). It also led to violent attacks on the Shia in Karachi in 1983 
(Abbas, 2010: 33). This episode reinforced the exclusivist discourse, and it 
also further changed the role of the state in its relation to the process of 
Islamisation, where it became “not only more Islamized, but it was also now 
adopting a sectarian preference within the Islamic context” (Haqqani, 2006). 
By allowing Shias to be exempted from zakat and all those aspects of his 
Islamisation process that contravened Shia law, Zia was seen to concede the 
universalism of his Islamism. It also recognised Shia communal rights, “thus 
legitimating sectarian posturing” (Nasr, 2000: 176).  
 
The sectarian forces worked to advance the exclusivist discourse. The space 
for the Ahmadi community to practise their religion in public was limited further 
in 1984, when the future SSP members helped to formulate legal provisions 
that penalised any Ahmadi that might try to “assert their faith publicly” (Pinault, 
2008: 69). By further defining the role of Ahmadis in the Pakistani state, the 
move reinforced the exclusivist discourse by allowing it to define the use of 
public space in Pakistan. By reserving public space and the use of symbols of 
Islam in that space for those who were defined as Muslims by the Pakistani 
state, the exclusivist discourse found institutional application and enforcement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The Imamia Students Organization (ISO) was at the forefront of this politicisation, and the 
story of the organisation provides a fascinating account on this identity mobilisation. For 
detailed accounts, see Abou Zahab (2007) and Abbas (2010). 
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in an unprecedented way and a new realm of the Pakistani society to claim.  
 
Unsurprisingly, there have later been attempts to define the use of public 
space similarly for Shias. In 1992, as a member of the National Assembly, 
SSP’s Azam Tariq attempted to introduce Namoos-e-Sahaba (“the honour of 
the Prophet’s Companions”) bill. The aim of this legislative move was to 
extend Ordinance 195, the current blasphemy law (which mandates death for 
anyone dishonouring the Prophet Muhammad’s name), so as to inflict capital 
punishment on individuals found guilty of insulting the Prophet’s 
Companions—clearly an attempt to forbid the Shia practise of tabarra 
(cursing) (Pinault, 2008: 68; Hasan, 2011: 83–4). Limiting public space for 
Shia rituals, particularly Muharram, was not the ultimate goal of this proposed 
legislation, but it was hoped to “lay ground for the declaration of Shias as non-
Muslims as the Shias were actively involved in the vilification of some 
companions of the Prophet” (Hasan, 2011: 83–4).  
 
The Pakistani State and Sectarian Discourse 
 
 
In the literature, the list of culprits sowing the “seeds of decay”44 to help 
sectarianism flourish is long. It often focuses more on the active agents of 
inciting and sustaining sectarianism. The literature is rather quiet on the 
passive culprits: those factors and structures enabling and sustaining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The term is borrowed from Khan (2004). 
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sectarianism without active participation or a visible role. Before turning to 
explore the role violence plays in enforcing and maintaining the exclusivist 
discourse, the chapter will explore factors that have facilitated and sustained 
exclusivist sectarian discourse—and continue to do so—according to the 
current literature. 
 
The role of the Pakistani state in providing space for and being agential in 
reproducing exclusivist discourse, as outlined above, clearly indicates that the 
state is not a neutral space or actor when it comes to sectarianism and 
sectarian differences. This pattern of politics that “combines ideological 
puritanism with communal exclusivism […] has found ways to relate its 
demands to vested political, social and criminal interests, it has become both 
entrenched in the political process, and found new functions in society and 
politics” (Nasr, 2002: 109).   
 
Sectarianism, thus, has established an institutional base in politics, and one of 
the most worrying aspects of this institutionalisation of sectarianism is indeed 
the close, even symbiotic, relationship of sectarian groups with mainstream 
religio-political organisations and the blurring of the line between the two, as 
well as the role sectarian mobilisation plays in both local and provincial 
politics. Particularly, SSP has pursued both theological and political 
confrontations with Shias and continues to play a political role, participating in 
electoral politics, as we saw above (Pinault, 2008: 68; Siddiqa, 2013: 6; Irfani, 
2004: 163).  
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The fact that exclusivist sectarian discourse has made inroads into being 
institutionalised in Pakistan is of significance when the attention is turned to 
understanding the power of that discourse and, even more so, to trying to 
counter that discourse. As observed by Saadia Toor, the “institutional power 
behind specific ideological projects is far more significant than the inherent 
persuasiveness of the ideas they embody” (Toor, 2011: 3). Not to 
overemphasise the scope of this institutionalisation, however, it needs to be 
observed that Pakistan’s ruling institutions, including many mainstream 
political parties—such as the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the various 
Muslim League parties—have been, by and large, nonsectarian (despite their 
engagement in political opportunism vis-à-vis sectarian organisations and 
groups). Also, in civil and military services, professionalism and the corporate 
interests of the military and the higher civil service have usually prevailed over 
sectarian affiliations (Ahmed, 2003: 61). 
 
 
But the Islamisation—or Sunnification—process under Zia involved significant 
changes to the structure of the state. The most obvious example of this, 
according to Saadia Toor, was the permeation of the judico-legal system 
through Islamic provisions and laws. The establishment of parallel shariat 
courts and the placement and promotion of Sunni religious conservatives 
within the judiciary—all contributed towards the increasing conservatism of 
the judicial system (Toor, 2011: 160). This, in addition to other forms of 
institutionalisation, creates the possibility and potential of sectarian discourse 
to change the hierarchical patterns of social relations, not only through 
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violence, but “even more significantly, through legal, institutional and 
constitutional changes” (Waseem, 2010: 16).45 Indeed, the importance of a 
sect can be found in a myriad of mutually reinforcing factors in Pakistani 
society—for example, in the organisation of education or the legal system in 
the country. The use of blasphemy laws is an important example of how the 
court system is used for sectarian purposes.46 According to the International 
Crisis Group, religious bias is also built into other official procedures, and 
social discrimination based on a sectarian identity is not uncommon (ICG, 
2005: 6, 25). All these factors help sectarianism to function without the 
intention of individuals, groups, or communities to be sectarian. 
 
The above account on state practises and polices related to the emergence of 
exclusivist sectarian discourse is merely an introduction to the complex and 
multifaceted process in question. But by enabling the space for that sectarian 
discourse to exist, by making it possible for that discourse to have political 
significance, and, indeed, by eventually engaging in the process of sectarian 
identity mobilisation, the state is an agential party to what is called 
sectarianism in Pakistan. This involvement of the state and the law to 
instrumentalise and sustain sectarian discourse renders it more difficult for a 
counterdiscourse to emerge and leaves civil society less likely to challenge 
the appropriation of the state (Rashid, 1996). The way this has affected the 
state-society relationship, changing political rationalities and political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 An important area for future research on sectarianism is the perceived sectarian interest of 
state and government policies. Nosheen Ali refers to this as the “perpetual paranoia of 
‘sectarian interests’ at work in government affairs” and believes that this stems from the 
actual discriminatory practice implemented by Pakistani governments (Ali, 2010: 749). 
46 For more details, see, for example, Rais (2004). 
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possibilities (particularly the absence of strong counterdiscourses) within the 
Pakistani polity is an area calling for further research. 
 
 
Sectarianism and Migration 
 
At another intersection of the various themes in the literature on sectarianism 
is migration. This less emphasised but important theme highlights the 
complexity of the sectarian phenomenon in Pakistan. Migration—both internal 
and external—has shaped sectarianism in a multitude of ways, again bringing 
forth the interplay of regional and national contexts in understanding the 
sectarian phenomenon.  
 
 
Punjab and Gulf Migration 
 
The large-scale migration of Pakistani workers to the Gulf and Arab states in 
the 1970s and the 1980s, and the return of that population in the late 1980s 
and 1990s, helped to facilitate the introduction of different religious 
interpretations to the traditionally “more pluralist, low-church religion.” 
Furthermore, with the return of the labour migrants came significant social and 
economic changes to the Pakistani society. According to Zaman, the timing of 
the emergence of a sectarian organisation at the same time as the return of 
these labour migrants is probably not without significance. This organisation 
was linked, and responded to, the search of an urban religious identity 
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coupled with a quest for middle-class status for a broader societal group, 
which those migrants were a part of (Ahmed, 2007: 82–3; Zaman, 1998: 708–
10).  
 
The migrant flow from the Indian Punjab emigrating after the partition is also 
an important factor in explaining the sectarian phenomenon. The migrants 
from East Punjab were largely Sunnis, belonging to the Deobandi sect 
(Raman, 2002). With their Deobandi beliefs, they brought with them a more 
puritanical brand of Islam, something not favoured before in the area, 
strengthening the Deobandi community in Pakistan. The strengthening of the 
Deobandi brand of Islam is also related to the proliferation of Tablighi 
Jamaat,47 “by far the greatest preaching organization in the Muslims world,” 
originating from the Deobandi tradition. Those ‘converted’ by the Jamaat 
became staunch Deobandis with anti-Shia sentiments (Abou Zahab, 2002b: 
85; Lieven, 2011: 129). There were also Shia refugees from India, albeit less 
in numbers. Nevertheless, they strengthened the Shia communities all across 
Pakistan, especially in the urban centres of Punjab and Sindh. This resulted, 
for example, in the increase in the size and number of Shia religious 
processions in Pakistan in the 1950s (Abbas, 2010: 20).  
 
The importance of migration to the development of sectarian discourse can be 
seen in specific locations—like Jhang in Punjab, which is often characterised 
as the birthplace of sectarianism in Pakistan. Besides the abovementioned 
transfer of the headquarters of the Ahmadi community to Jhang, the arrival of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Tablighi Jamaat was founded in India in the 1920s. For more on Tablighi Jamaat, see, for 
example, Jalal (2009), Hedges (2008), and Rana (2009). 
	  	   85	  
migrants from East Punjab changed the traditional economic and class 
configurations. The emergence of a new middle class engaged in a power 
struggle with the traditional landowning elite, which in Jhang was 
predominantly Shia. This middle class, according to Mariam Abou Zahab, was 
“compelled to use anti-Shia rhetoric” and found the sectarian organisations as 
vehicles for advancing their political interests. Abou Zahab then sees 
sectarianism in Jhang in a context where the traditional power structures were 
unable to accommodate the rapid social and economic change, and left the 
emergence of a new class without representation in a local system of power 
(Abou Zahab, 2002b: 79,80). Whereas for Qasim Zaman the arrival of migrant 
labour from the Gulf might have been tangential to the emergence of a 
sectarian organisation, Abou Zahab concludes in her research that the Sunni-
Shia conflict in Jhang is essentially an issue of class where “sect has become 
an identity marker, a temporary refuge and a platform to articulate grievances 
and get access to power” (Abou Zahab, 2002b: 80).48 
Another author who has conducted extensive research on Jhang, Tahir 
Kamran, on the other hand, looks at the local power contestations there as an 
intersection and competition between urban sectarian mobilisation and 
traditional rural biraderi (kinship) politics. Kamran also explores sectarianism 
in the context of a rising commercial class in Jhang City, drawn largely from 
local shopkeepers, some of them returned workers from the Gulf, and East 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ayesha Siddiqa has countered some of Mariam Abou Zahab’s findings by claiming that the 
available land data in Jhang does not support this theory, as there are a larger number of 
Sunni landowners than their Shia counterparts. She also disputes the idea of the Sunni-Shia 
conflict being an extension of class conflict, because if that were true, “there would be 
violence in other parts of the province as well such as Sargodha where there are important 
Shiite landowners in the rural parts of the division” (Siddiqa, 2013: 30). 
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Punjab migrants, and how they sought political opportunities to match their 
economic power. This group also provided the key base of support for SSP, 
being influential in advancing and supporting the institutionalisation of 
sectarian discourse in Jhang. It is not surprising, then, that most of the 
influential SSP leaders—barring Haq Nawaz himself and to a far lesser extent 
Shaykh Hakim Ali—were from the migrants’ community (Kamran, 2008).  
 
Whether the sectarian conflict in Jhang is a class issue, a group contestation 
related to balancing the political and the economic powers, or a tension 
between the traditional rural and new urban forms of power and influence is 
not the main focus of research. It appears that all those frameworks are valid 
in assessing the developments and changes that took place in Jhang, 
illustrating the complex processes at play in the sectarian phenomenon. 
Sectarianism and sectarian conflicts are multifaceted and complex, allowing 
multiple analytical approaches to be used. What is noteworthy for this 
research, and in understanding the development of sectarian discourse, is 
that sectarian discourse in Jhang was both formulated around and because of 
the new sociopolitical situation, and it was also something that that the 
migrants brought with them, alongside their “redefined religious identity that 
was militantly Sunni and regarded Shia as ‘the other’” (Kamran, 2008: 76). 
The inextricably complex contestations in Jhang are framed in terms of 
confrontationist sectarian identities, contributing to the development of 
sectarianism, and exclusivist sectarian discourse in a very powerful way 
(Ahmad Ali, 2000; Kamran, 2008; Rashid, 1996).  
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Afghan and Internal Migration  
 
The migration of Afghan refugees to the western border areas (like Kurram) of 
Pakistan and to the rest of the country, as well as the internal migration of 
Pathans from NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [KPK]),49 also changed the 
sectarian phenomenon in Pakistan by introducing and asserting other 
interpretations of Islam and by changing the demography of various 
locations—similarly changing the social, economic, political, and religious 
outlooks of those localities (Chandran, 2008: 7; Abou Zahab, 2009: 8). The 
city of Karachi is an important example of how demographic changes have 
been instrumental in sectarian identity mobilisation and aiding the protracted 
violent conflicts ongoing in the city. To assess the immensely complex 
situation in Karachi is out of the scope of this research,50 but that complexity 
highlights the difficulty in defining sectarian conflicts—or other conflicts—in 
Pakistan, as was already seen with the case of Jhang. The urban struggles in 
the city of muhajirs (migrants) are partly explained by the conflicts Pathan 
migration and the ascendancy of the community linked to Sunni orthodoxy 
and militancy triggered with the Muhajirs, the dominant ethnic community in 
the city in the mid-1980s. These conflicts can be termed both ethnic and 
sectarian, either of these explanatory frameworks negating each other (Gayer, 
2003: 3; Nasr, 2000: 183–4). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 The name of the Province was changed in 2010. 
50 For more on the conflicts in Karachi, see, for example, Budhani et al. (2010) and Gayer 
(2007). 
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Sunni settlers from NWFP and Punjab also changed the demographic outlook 
in Gilgit, in Gilgit-Baltistan (previously called the Northern Areas), contributing 
to the sectarian conflicts. Several authors note the role of the Pakistani state 
and its active involvement in efforts to alter the demographic profile of Gilgit–
Baltistan, the only administrative unit with a Shia majority in Pakistan,51 
significantly changing also the sectarian outlook (Khan, 2002; Ali, 2008 & 
2010). Interestingly, the International Crisis Group contributes the increasing 
sectarian tensions to developing infrastructure. Following the construction of 
the Karakoram Highway in 1986 and the opening of trade through the China 
border, Sunni settlers from NWFP and Punjab established businesses in 
Gilgit, altering its demographic balance and inviting Shia resentment (ICG, 
2007: 16).  
 
What these examples on migration and sectarianism highlight are the 
applicability and relevance of sectarian differences and discourse. Studies on 
sectarianism in the localities mentioned above—especially Jhang, Gilgit, 
Kurram, and Karachi—show how sectarian divisions are often superimposed 
on ethnic, linguistic, class, and biraderi divisions and on political fissures 
(Haleem, 2003; Kamran, 2008; Ahmad Ali, 2000). These studies, by placing 
sectarianism in a local context, contribute especially to “revealing the complex 
interplay between different sources of political identity and mobilization in 
Pakistan” as well as the variety of factors that make sectarianism the valid 
form of mobilisation in those contexts (Kamran, 2008: 57–8). Within Pakistan, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 The ambiguous administrative status of the Northern Areas is thought to have resulted 
partly because if made a province, such an entity would have a Shia majority and would be 
the only Shia-majority province in the country. (Nasr, 2006: 159–160) 
	  	   89	  
sectarian organisation is competing with other forms of social organisation in 
vastly different sociopolitical settings. What then makes that form of 
organisation and mobilisation relevant and successful in those different 
settings? Furthermore, often the local conflict configurations do not match 
issues contested at the macrolevel. The literature does not offer simple 
solutions to this question. According to Khaled Ahmed, the rise of the SSP in 
Jhang is located in a complex sociological matrix but outside Jhang, from 
Quetta to Kurram Agency and the Northern Areas, it is located firmly within 
the ideological paradigm of Pakistan and its logical progression towards a 
hard-line Sunni state (Ahmed, 2011: 34). It is then the state project that 
enables the sectarian difference and discourse to find relevance in different 
sociopolitical settings. Ahmed Rashid sees a role in the functioning of 
sectarian groups and the way they project local issues as part of a larger 
concern. In the case of a sectarian group such as the SSP, the local problem 
and power contestations are consciously linked to the international arena of 
Shia-Sunni confrontation by reference to Iran and Saudi Arabia and the battle 
for the soul of the Muslim world (Rashid, 1996). It is clear that there is a space 
for further research both on the role migration in its variety of forms plays in 
the sectarian phenomenon, as well as on how and why sectarian discourse 
finds relevance in the local, the supralocal, and the national levels in Pakistan.  
 
 
Minoritisation and Sectarian Discourse 
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Further important conclusions from these accounts on the effect of migration 
in different localities to the sectarian phenomenon and sectarian discourse are 
the process of minoritisation and the applicability and relevance of sectarian 
discourse. 
 
Most, if not all, of the locations of sectarian conflict in Pakistan (particularly 
Jhang, Gilgit, and Kurram in KPK) are locations where the usual minority 
Shia–majority Sunni balance is reversed, either by demographics (like in Gilgit 
or Kurram) and/or by relative economic power (like in Jhang). Sectarianism in 
those localities is tied to efforts, through local governance, to address these 
perceived imbalances, for example, by intentional state intervention or 
demographic changes. 
 
Overall, there are no precise figures on the percentage of Sunnis and Shias in 
Pakistan. In fact, this is a contentious issue, being reflected in the broad range 
of often-politicised estimates offered. For example, the estimate on the Shia 
population in Pakistan ranges from 2.5 percent (according to anti-Shia 
organisations) to 25 percent (according to the Shia organisation Tehrik-i-
Jafriya) (Ahmed, 2003: 57). The lack of any official statistics allows both 
groups to offer their own inflated statistics (Malik, 2005: 205). According to 
ICG: 
 
By official estimates, 96 per cent of Pakistan's population is Muslim. 
There is no official data on sectarian identity since the state prefers to 
paint a picture of religious homogeneity to justify having adopted Islam 
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as the official religion. By an unofficial estimate, 75 to 80 per cent of the 
Muslim population is Sunni and 15 to 20 per cent Shia. (ICG, 2005: 2) 
 
These vastly different, competing estimates are related to exclusivist sectarian 
discourse and the status of the Shia community in Pakistan. The exclusivist 
discourse, if not successful in bringing forth the official declaration of Shias as 
non-Muslims, can work towards the minoritisation of the community. It is 
important to emphasise that the concept of minority is essentially different to 
“what is less in numbers” in this context, as minority status brings with it both 
legal and political consequences. As observed by Iftikhar Malik, “[t]he Shias, 
inclusive of Ismailis and Zikris, are Muslim communities per se, who are 
deeply disturbed over Sunni demands to designate them as minorities given 
the accompanying stigma and marginalization” (Malik, 2005: 221). In a 
country basing itself on religious majoritarianism, to be termed as minority 
would mean a significantly changed status and changed meanings for the 
community in the Pakistani polity. 
 
 
Conclusions 
  
Sectarianism as a concept has been rarely defined in the academic literature 
in peace and conflict studies. This definition, however, is crucial when trying to 
academically analyse sectarianism and sectarian conflicts, as it helps us 
understand the dynamics and nature of the phenomenon. Sectarianism, in 
short, is an exclusivist group identity of a religious body that can be classified 
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simultaneously also as a political or militant entity. At the core of the definition 
is action and the outward-oriented nature of sectarianism—of the meaning 
attached to belonging to a religious body and the negative attitude towards 
others outside it. Important for analysis of sectarian conflicts is the notion that 
sectarianism is most problematic when it is armed with exclusivist claims and 
infused with politics. 
 
When placed in the Pakistani context, sectarianism is mostly analysed in the 
security and international relations disciplines. The literature offers mostly a 
descriptive definition of the phenomenon, relying on few key authors. The 
writing on sectarianism in Pakistan is anchored broadly to three key, 
interlinked processes underlying most—if not all—of the analysis: (1) the state 
formation process and all the competing ideas of Pakistan; (2) processes of 
Islamisation, especially vis-à-vis the Pakistani state; and (3) evolution of 
communal identities and identity politics. What is evident from the literature is 
the complexity of the sectarian terrain in Pakistan—the explaining and 
sustaining factors of sectarianism are multifaceted, its structural continuums 
are deeply embedded in the Pakistani state, and there is a multitude of 
sectarian conflicts in different localities in Pakistan.  
 
The complexity of the sectarian phenomenon is also apparent in the 
development of exclusivist sectarian discourse. Having been first articulated 
and formulated in the anti-Ahmadi campaign, it later on fed off from General 
Zia’s Islamisation process and the state’s practises and policies in enabling 
the discourse to have political relevance. The discourse sits firmly within the 
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regional framework that shaped it both through material support and 
ideological stimulus. The intriguing interplay of regional, national, and local 
contexts in influencing the sectarian phenomenon in Pakistan can also be 
approached with the framework of migration and how the different forms of 
international and internal migration have facilitated the introduction of new 
interpretations of Islam, ideological underpinnings, as well as new forms of 
community relations through demographic changes.  
 
Next, with this context of sectarianism in mind, we will place sectarian 
violence at the centre of the analysis. The next chapter will have a closer look 
at how violence is understood in the literature on sectarianism in Pakistan and 
the meanings attached to the use of violence in sectarian conflicts. 
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Chapter 3 
Sectarian Violence in Pakistan: View from the Literature 
 
 
 
At the beginning of my time in Pakistan, I could not distinguish between 
the various forms of violence I encountered and I was astonished and 
appalled by much that I read, saw and reported. Then, after a year or 
so, I found myself becoming more habituated to the brutality that was 
so much a part of the life of the country and began to see its variety. 
(Burke, 2007: 32) 
 
 
Sectarian violence, as well as sectarian conflicts, in Pakistan exists in a 
complex web of interrelated and mutually reinforcing forms of violence and 
militancy. As reflected by Jason Burke in the above quote, it is often difficult to 
separate these intertwined violent practises, even for analytical purposes. 
This chapter will take a look at the academic understandings of sectarian 
violence, the contexts in which it is analysed, and what role that violence is 
assigned. Even though some of the literature talks about intra-Sunni violence 
and recognises this as sectarian violence, most analysts refer to Shia-Sunni 
violence when analysing sectarian violence, following the popular definition of 
sectarianism in Pakistan as seen in the previous chapter (Grare, 2009; Abbas, 
2002; Abou Zahab, 2002). This chapter, and thesis, while recognising the 
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intra-Sunni aspect of sectarianism and sectarian violence, will limit its focus 
on the violence between Sunnis and Shias.  
 
As is the case with the analyses of the sectarian phenomenon more generally, 
a lot of the examination done on sectarian violence is done within the security 
framework, with a particular focus on militant sectarian groups. While 
discussing what the literature says about sectarian violence within the security 
framework, this chapter will also study whether there are any alternative 
definitions of violence and whether, for academic writers, the violence exists 
outside the framework of sectarian groups.  
 
This chapter takes a look at sectarian violence as it is analysed in the 
academic literature, also paying attention to why it is difficult to distinguish 
between the various forms of violence and violent practises. First, it explores 
the understandings the current literature has of sectarian violence and how 
organised sectarian violence started in Pakistan. Next, the focus is on 
mapping the elements that sustain and enable violence. Particularly, the roles 
of violence of the word and the Pakistani state are discussed. Finally, the 
chapter turns to look at violence as posited by the theoretical framework and if 
the literature offers any observations on border construction and maintenance 
as a result of protracted violence.  
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What Violence? 
 
Even more than with the general studies on sectarianism, majority of the 
academic and policy analysts interested in sectarian violence come from the 
security field or write for a security-related audience. This is reflected in the 
analyses, where violence is often understood as its most visible physical 
forms of deadly incidents and where sectarian violence itself is often equated 
and conflated with sectarian conflict. (See, for example, Ahmad Ali, 2000; 
Irfani, 2004.) Many analyses trying to understand the growth of sectarian 
violence thus follow the explanations for the growth of sectarianism—often 
also because the difference between sectarian conflicts and the violence used 
in those conflicts is not clear. It also reflects a limited understanding of 
conflicts in general, sometimes taking away from the richness and validity of 
the studies. Therefore, violence in the literature is also frequently reduced to 
the genealogy of sectarian groups, outlines of dates of the most prominent 
violent acts, and numbers of casualties that perished in those acts. There are 
a lot of statistics showing the increasing (or decreasing) number of casualties. 
Violence, then, in many of those analyses is presented as lists of the most 
notable or most lethal incidents (Behuria, 2004; Roul, 2005; Hussain, 2008). 
Violence is showcased and examined through those incidents, through the 
most prominent targets and most novel methods of violence. 
 
Because of this equation of sectarian violence to sectarian conflicts, there are 
certain factors and elements that are well documented and researched in the 
literature—the beginning of organised sectarian violence, the changing trends 
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in violence with the evolution of targets and changing patterns and modes of 
operation, and the hallmarks of sectarian violence with the introduction of new 
methods of violence or weapons. The regional context of sectarian violence is 
also recognised as relevant and widely researched. From the literature, we 
can also track how sectarian violence has evolved geographically and how it 
has become more lethal, with the intention to cause “maximum damage” 
(Hussain, 2002: 89–89). Let us now turn to examine more closely what the 
existing literature says about these themes. 
 
 
The Beginning of Organised Sectarian Violence 
 
The first serious incident of Sunni-Shia violence in Pakistan, according to 
Hassan Abbas, occurred in 1956, during the time when the exclusivist 
discourse was also being formulated and shaped in Pakistan. A demand from 
a group of Sunni leaders in the Punjab Province to ban Muharram 
processions was met with resistance from the Shia ulema, and a local crisis 
ensued. It was successfully resolved with the help of political leaders and 
government functionaries, and no one was killed in the incident (Abbas, 2010: 
20). There had also been other localised disputes, particularly around 
Muharram processions,52 but the literature assigns the start of the current 
form of sectarian violence to the 1980s, when that violence significantly 
changed—both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See, for example, Tambiah (1996: 164).  
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This change is attributed to the organisation of various new groups to promote 
the sectarian agenda and discourse. Sawad-e Azam Ahle Sunnat (Greater 
Unity of the Sunnis) was founded in 1980 by Maulana Saleemullah Khan, a 
Deobandi cleric, around the exclusivist demands of Pakistan to be declared a 
Sunni state and Shias being officially declared non-Muslims. Sawad-e Azam 
followers were later responsible for attacking Shia neighbourhoods and 
religious gatherings in sectarian riots in Karachi. 53  A turning point that 
changed the nature of sectarian violence for Mariam Abou Zahab was the 
murder of Arif Hussain Al-Hussaini, the head of Tehrik-e-Nafaz Fiqh-e-Jafria 
Pakistan (TNFJ), in Peshawar on August 5, 1988. The killing of the first Turi 
Shia leader from Parachinar, Kurram, was “the first of a long series of 
sectarian killings” (Abou Zahab, 2002: 5). For other authors, like Tahir Kamran 
and Zahir Hussain, the chain of sectarian killings started a year earlier with 
the murder of Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer, the head of Jamiat Ulema-e-Ahle 
Hadith. The Shias were accused of being involved, having been the major 
focus of Allama Zahir’s fiery speeches (Ahmad Ali, 2000; Ahmed, 2011; 
Hussain, 2008; Kamran, 2008). Azmat Abbas observes, however, that this 
does not imply that sect-related killings started towards the very end of Zia’s 
era. The spread of sectarian violence had started during Zia’s period, and it 
became uncontrollable with the death of the military ruler just a few days after 
the murder of Al-Hussaini, in August 17, 1988 (Abbas, 2002: 31). 
 
Indeed, both killings were pointing towards a pattern that was expanded to an 
unprecedented level after the murder of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 There were also anti-Shia riots seen in Punjab, particularly in Lahore in 1986 (Rashid, 
1996). 
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the SSP, in February 1990, outside his home in Jhang by two gunmen on a 
motorcycle. Violent sectarian clashes broke out that resulted in dozens of 
casualties, then spread to other parts of the Punjab Province (Rashid, 1996; 
Hussain, 2008: 3; Kamran, 2008: 55–57). The SSP was established either in 
1984 or 1985 (authors differ on the date) under the leadership of Jhangvi in 
Jhang, Pakistan’s Central Punjab Province54 (Haqqani, 2006; Nasr, 2000: 
171; Lieven, 2011: 293).55 The SSP started a program of anti-Shia attacks, 
making Jhang the focal location of the new organised sectarian violence. 
Despite there being other locations of violent incidents (like Karachi) or even 
long-standing disputes, such as in the Tribal Areas between Sunnis and 
Shias, 56  the Central and Southern Punjab—particularly Jhang—has been 
seen as the birthplace of violent sectarianism and from where it spread to 
other parts of Pakistan (Hussain, 2008: 96; Grare, 2009: 144; ICG, 2005: 13). 
This emphasises how the narrative of sectarian violence in Pakistan is tied to 
the organisation around sectarian discourse, not examining the relationship of 
that discourse to the previous violent incidents—like riots—or continuing 
conflict in Kurram in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas. 
 
The Shia militancy in Pakistan dates back to the early 1980s, and the 
formation of the previously mentioned TNFJ57 (the militant Shia organisation) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 SSP was originally named Anjuman-e Sipah-e Sahaba (ASS), or Society of the Army of the 
Prophet’s Companions. According to Husain Haqqani, once the unfortunate English 
connotation of the abbreviation became apparent to the militia leaders, the name was 
changed to SSP (Haqqani, 2006).  
55 Other founding fathers of SSP include Maulana Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi, Maulana Eesar-ul-
Haq Qasmi, and Maulana Azam Tariq (Rashid, 1996). Several authors offer different details 
on the birth of SSP. For more information on SSP, see, for example, Khaled (2011). 
56 According to Mariam Abou Zahab, Pakistan’s Tribal Areas have seen Sunni-Shia violence 
since the 1930s (Abou Zahab, 2009: 2). 
57 TNFJ was renamed Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP, the Jafri Movement of Pakistan) in 1993, 
thus removing the word nifaz, which in Urdu means “implementation.” With this move, Allama 
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was centred around Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP, Army of 
Muhammad), formed in 199358  (Abbas, 2002: 25; Rashid, 1996). It was 
founded by Ghulam Raza Naqvi, who declared that he wanted to set up a 
Quds force of both Sunnis and Shias to liberate Palestine and protect the Shia 
community in Pakistan (Abou Zahab, 2002: 5; Abbas, 2002: 25). But in 
practise, SMP did little more than retaliate for SSP’s assaults on Shia by 
killing SSP leaders and cadres and occasionally attacking Deobandi mosques 
in reprisal for attacks on Shia mosques. The group also suffered a severe 
blow only a few years after its formation, when Allama Murid Abbas Yazdani, 
SMP’s patron-in-chief, was assassinated in 1996 and one of SMP’s hit men 
was arrested, attributing the murder of Yazdani to the orders of Ghulam Raza 
Naqvi. The same year, the Punjab Police also raided SMP’s stronghold in 
Thokar Niaz Beg in Lahore, furthering the decline of the group59 (Abbas, 
2002: 26; Ahmed, 2011: 141, 143; Haqqani, 2006).  
 
In the mid-1990s, most likely in 1994,60 the SSP split into two groups, with 
some of its leaders forming Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ, Jhangvi’s Army), so 
named to commemorate the memory of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi (Abbas, 2002: 
22; Siddiqa, 2013: 6). Riaz Basra, SSP’s former information secretary, set up 
LJ after accusing the SSP’s leadership of not fulfilling Naq Nawaz Jhangvi’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sajid Naqvi, who followed Hussaini as the leader of the organization, wanted to appear less 
provocative to Sunnis (Abbas, 2010: 37). 
58 Again, there are different views as to the details of the birth of SMP. Vali Nasr, for example, 
dates it to 1991, almost a year after the murder of SSP leader Jhangvi (Nasr 2000, 171). And 
according to Rashid, it was created by Maulana Mureed Abbas Yazdani (Rashid, 1996). 
59 Different authors debate whether this decline led to the total disintegration of SMP. Yunas 
Samad claims that by 1998, SMP had disintegrated due to a concentrated campaign by the 
police and other agencies. Many of its members were either jailed or in exile in Iran or 
Southern Lebanon (Samad, 2007: 172). This is disputed, for example, by Azmat Abbas 
(Abbas, 2002: 27). 
60 As before, authors differ on the exact year and details of the formation of LJ. According to 
Tahir Kamran, LJ was formed in 1996 (Kamran, 2008: 80). 
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mission. It has also been argued that the establishment of a separate, more 
violent group was done with the SSP leadership to form a separate platform to 
advance a sectarian agenda (Abbas, 2002: 23). Indeed, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 
was “uncompromisingly violent” (Haqqani, 2006) and operated so successfully 
that it is assigned the title of “the most violent sectarian militant organization 
that has ever existed in Pakistan” (Abbas, 2002: 22). 
 
Fundamentally, these sectarian militant groups are a product of “factionalising 
of the existing politico-religious parties” (Rashid, 1996) and, as such, are the 
offspring of sectarian parties and organisations. The latter provides ideological 
inspiration for violence, which is carried out by paramilitary groups (Kamran, 
2008: 3). Although it is debatable whether these groups were formed for the 
sole purpose of violence, it may at least partly “be more of a division of labour 
arrangement wherein the primarily political is separated from the primarily 
militant so that each side can work effectively in its own sphere” (Rashid, 
1996). 
 
If many academic writers on sectarianism do not differentiate between 
sectarian violence and sectarian conflict, it is equally common to equate 
sectarian violence with sectarian groups, especially the SSP, LJ, and SMP 
(Irfani, 2004; Abbas, 2002; Mir, 2005). These groups are also understood to 
be the sole perpetrators of sectarian violence. Whether or not all sectarian 
violence can be attributed to these organisations, they have a significant role 
in understanding what that violence means in Pakistan, what forms that 
violence takes, and the power of sectarian discourse that violence advances. 
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As observed by Qasim Zaman, these organisations are a “new and powerful 
means at once of fostering sectarian identities and of expressing them, 
frequently with the threat or the actual use of violence” (Zaman, 1998: 690). 
 
 
Sustaining Elements of Sectarian Violence 
 
The analyses of sectarian violence in Pakistan centre on the elements 
enabling sectarian violence, the factors that support and sustain it, and how 
those have evolved over time. Even though these analyses usually focus on 
the violence perpetrated by sectarian groups, and what factors provide these 
groups “‘operational spaces’ to function and grow” (Abou Zahab, 2007: 7), 
uncovering these elements gives an important insight into the role sectarian 
violence plays in the Pakistani state and society.  
 
Violence does not exist without supportive elements in the society. These 
supportive factors and systems are not confined within the borders of 
Pakistan but extend to neighbouring countries and regional politics. They can 
also be found in existing institutions within the Pakistani society, as well as in 
the action and inaction of the Pakistani state. There are both protective 
architectures as well as enabling ones, providing both active and nonactive 
support for those operational spaces to exist. 
 
 
	  	   103	  
Regional and Local Support 
 
The regional context and how it has facilitated sectarian violence is widely 
researched. Especially the current forms of sectarian violence are seen in the 
regional context of the rise of the Afghan War, the Taliban and Talibanisation, 
and the convergence of different militant and jihadi groups. (See, for example, 
Abou Zahab, 2002 & 2009.) Sectarian violence is clearly embedded in the 
different border-defying structures of violence and closely linked to, or a part 
of, jihadi violence, (Budhani et al., 2010; Grare, 2009), terrorist networks, and 
“dizzyingly diverse universe of Pakistani Islamic militancy” (Roul, 2005).  
 
The Afghan War is seen as the most significant regional contributor to 
sectarian violence with the “supply of manpower, military training, weapons, 
networking and funds,” not only affecting the level and intensity of sectarian 
violence, but also facilitating the qualitative change in the modes of violence 
(Grare, 2007: 141, 144; Abou Zahab, 2002). Ian Talbot sums up the legacies 
that the Afghan conflict left for the rise of sectarian violence in Pakistan:  
 
First, the leakage of weapons intended for the mujahideen resulted in 
the growth of what has been termed the “Kalashnikov culture” in 
Pakistan. This enabled militant sectarian organizations to readily take 
on a paramilitary character. […] The fire-power of sectarian groups far 
exceeded that of a corrupt and demoralized police force. […] Second, 
the Afghan War created links between elements of the Pakistani Army, 
the Inter-Services Intelligence, and Islamic militants. This provided the 
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latter with invaluable training. It also ensued a degree of immunity if 
they turned from jihad to wage sectarian violence within Pakistan. […] 
Third, the collapse of the state in Afghanistan created the conditions in 
which military training camps could be established. […] Fourth, Sunni 
extremism within Pakistan was encouraged by the Taliban’s rise to 
power. […] They shared a commitment to Sunni orthodoxy and a 
hostility to the Shias. (Talbot, 2007: 161–2)  
 
Talbot highlights how the Afghan conflict contributed by providing not only 
material support affecting the operational competency of sectarian groups—
like weapons, fighters, and training—but also institutional support in the form 
of backing of state elements or the Taliban. Also, other types of links were 
established that are of crucial importance in understanding sectarian violence. 
Sectarian militancy is not the province of a few militants acting in isolation. 
The members of groups like LJ consisted mainly of Afghan jihad veterans, 
who were attracted to the sectarian group able to employ them. These 
linkages resulted, for example, in SSP fighters also attacking Shia targets in 
Afghanistan (Haqqani, 2006; Kamran, 2008; Samad, 2007). The overlapping 
membership with a host of Deobandi militant groups, as well as the Deobandi 
Islamist political party Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), meant that “these 
Deobandi groups are strongly rooted to an archipelago of Deobandi 
madrassah and mosques, which also produced the Afghan, and later the 
Pakistan, Taliban” (Fair et al., 2010: 507). With these linkages come a large 
regional support network and an affiliation with the Afghan Taliban (Rashid, 
2001; ICG, 2005; Fair et al., 2010: 507). 
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Where the Afghan context was crucial for the Sunni sectarian groups, the 
Shia group SMP relied on support from Iran. Besides material support, Iran 
offered safe havens for SMP militants once Pakistan’s law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies started targeting the group more aggressively in the 
early 1990s. But by the mid-1990s, the SMP had already lost most of its 
Iranian support. Iran stopped financing Pakistani Shias because it was 
counterproductive and it feared a backlash of Sunni militancy in Iranian 
Balochistan, alongside the border it shares with Pakistan (Abbas, 2010: 37–8; 
Abou Zahab, 2002: 117; Samad, 2007: 172). 
 
Funding has been the most obvious and direct form of regional support for 
sectarian violence. Most of these outfits got their initial funding from the 
Middle East and the Gulf, as a part of the relocated proxy war between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran discussed in the previous chapter. As noted by Khaled 
Ahmed, “this money did not start the killings; it simply helped the two sides do 
the killings more efficiently” (Ahmed, 2011: 115). Later on, the groups funded 
their activities increasingly with resources generated from their own 
operations and help from segments of the state (Siddiqa, 2013: 6; Rashid, 
1996). The role of this regional support—as with the case of funding—to 
sectarian groups and violence has evolved. Some of the key factors in the 
emergence of sectarian violence in Pakistan, such as the support from the 
Middle East, are now of reduced importance; whereas others, such as the war 
against terrorism, have become more prominent (Grare, 2009: 131). 
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The role of local support has also evolved and gained increasing importance, 
although relatively little research has been done on those bases and networks 
of local support. According to the literature, this local support consists mostly 
of material assistance and sympathy of influential people from major 
communities (Rais, 2009: 126). In Jhang, where detailed studies have been 
conducted on SSP’s support base, a sizable proportion of urban traders and 
shopkeepers have continued to fund the SSP. Even though some argue that 
many of these groups no longer condone the violence associated with the 
party, supporting SSP is a matter of buying security (Rashid, 1996; Abou 
Zahab, 2010). The support for sectarian groups and violence, then, is 
reciprocated, and it helps to form mutually beneficial relationships (which may 
evolve over time with significant changes to their utility or functionality). 61 The 
bazaar merchants not only contributed financially to these groups but also 
added weight to their sectarian agenda through their ability to shut down the 
markets and bring people out on the streets for demonstrations (Toor, 2011: 
161). Other examples of these mutually beneficial local relationships include 
the role of the landed elite in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This landed 
elite in many instances provided protection for sectarian and criminal 
networks. In return, it received financial benefits from criminal activities and 
used sectarian forces as private militias (Nasr, 2000: 181). According to the 
literature, sectarian groups are also involved in settling local disputes, 
extorting money, and land grabbing, particularly in the urban areas of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 There can also be negative consequences of these relationships. Rashid notes that there 
may have been some decline in middle-class, particularly the trader/shopkeeper communities, 
support for the SSP over recent years as a result of the economic consequences of sectarian 
strife (Rashid, 1996). 
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Pakistan (Siddiqa, 2013: 17; Abbas, 2002: 36). In his book Pakistan: A Hard 
Country, Anatol Lieven gives an account of a conversation with a local police 
in Jhang confirming cases where local Sunni businessmen paid the SSP or LJ 
to kill Shia creditors or other Shia rivals in business disputes (Lieven, 2011: 
293). 
 
Sectarian violence is also interlinked with criminal networks, both in the 
regional and the national contexts. Sectarian groups have partnered with drug 
traffickers in mutually benefiting partnerships, replicating the economic and 
political relationships between militant groups and drug traffickers in 
Afghanistan (Nasr, 2000: 180). The narcotic groups provided “financial 
benefits, expertise and resources in perpetuating violence” (Samad, 2007: 
173). They also gave operational assistance, like physical protection, by 
giving shelter for wanted criminals. In return, sectarian groups were able to 
provide a religious cover for criminal activities, thus protecting criminal 
networks. According to Vali Nasr, there are also cases where the criminals 
have actually set up sectarian organisations as fronts for criminal activities 
(Nasr, 2000: 151, 180; Abbas, 2002: 37). Criminal activities also became a 
source of funding for sectarian groups. Armed robberies, kidnapping for 
ransom, smuggling and sale of illicit weapons, and extorting protection money 
are among the means with which the groups sustain themselves, further 
blurring the line between criminal networks and militant sectarian groups 
(Abbas, 2002: 37). Also, the participation of criminals in sectarian violence 
has helped escalate that violence, for hardened criminals have been more 
willing to target places of worship—like mosques—and have generally been 
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“more willing to kill” (Nasr, 2000: 180–1). The result, as observed by Nasr, is 
an Islamisation of criminal activity and a criminalisation of segments of 
Islamism in Pakistan (Nasr, 2000: 180). 
 
In general, networks of local support are identified by many analysts as being 
crucial for sectarian violence, not only through funding, but also in the 
operational level of violence. Particularly, the success of violent attacks relies 
on sympathetic and supportive local elements that help the perpetrators by 
providing local knowledge, assistance with operational logistics, and helping 
the attackers escape law enforcement afterwards. The existence of these 
local support networks somewhat contradicts the claims that sectarianism 
hasn’t penetrated the grassroots or community level of Pakistani society—a 
claim that is further analysed later on in this chapter. (See, for example, 
Samad, 2007; Hussain, 2008.) 
 
 
All these factors illustrate the complex web of interrelated and interdependent 
forms of violence. Sectarian violence, if defined by violence perpetrated by 
sectarian groups, is clearly involved in the enterprise of violence that extends 
beyond “just” targeting their sectarian rivals. The groups are engaged in a 
competition of funds and superiority, trying to “out-do each other in rhetoric 
and violence” (Kamran, 2008: 152). The internal logic of the functioning of 
sectarian groups—survival and competition—thus has a direct effect on 
violence, which in turn has affected sectarian organisations and their 
structures (Abbas, 2002: 39). The interests—political, financial, and 
	  	   109	  
ideological—of funders, criminal networks, and local power brokers are also 
shaping violence. As noted by Frederic Grare, “sectarian violence, therefore, 
rapidly acquired a dynamic of its own” when a large number of people—from 
local personal rivalries to regional criminal networks—became linked to the 
enterprise of violence (Grare, 2009: 136–7).   
 
After examining the enterprise of violence and the complex web of elements 
enabling and sustaining it, it is important to highlight the difference between 
sectarian violence as defined by this thesis and violence perpetrated by 
militant sectarian groups, the latter being a much wider phenomenon in 
scope, including a broader range of targets and functions beyond the 
advancement of sectarian discourse. The fact that such a thing as enterprise 
of violence has formed around militant sectarian groups points towards the 
growing autonomy of violence as a self-legitimating and self-sustaining sphere 
in Pakistan. In the words of Maulana Ajmal Qadri from the Jamiat Ulama-e-
Islam (JUI), “Sectarian violence has become a culture and it is here to stay” 
(Abbas, 1998; quoted in Abou Zahab, 2002b: 88).  
 
Madrasa Networks 
 
The mosque and madrasa institutions are important—and contentious—
factors in the literature, looking at the ways both sectarian discourse and 
sectarian violence are sustained in Pakistan. (See, for example, Rahman, 
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2003 &1998; Fair, 2008; Grare, 2009; Ali, 2009.) Madrasas62 are now defined 
as religious schools or seminaries attended on a full-time basis, emphasising 
their role as a substitute (not supplement) to Pakistan’s mainstream public 
and private schools. The definition differentiates madrasas from Quranic 
schools, or maktabs, which are part-time religious institutions where children 
read and recite the Quran only at a very elementary level.63 A madrasa offers 
a more organised institutional structure and different academic levels of 
religious studies (Siddique, 2009: 9; Puri, 2010: 52). 
 
Madrasas, and to a lesser degree the mosque institution, feature prominently 
in the analysis not only because of the ideologies and interpretations of Islam 
sustained and spread via their networks but also because they are important 
signifiers of sectarianism due to their inherently sectarian structure—every 
sect has their own mosques and madrasas associated with them. The 
majority of Pakistani madrasas are affiliated with one of the five Islamic school 
boards, or wafaq: three Sunni madrasa boards (Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahle-
Hadith), one for Shia, and one for Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) (Siddique, 2009: 9; 
Nasr, 2000). Madrasas and mosques are also spaces for contested power 
both locally and nationally, whether it is the power struggle(s) of the ulama, 
control for an authority of a locality, or “a competition between various Islamic 
and Islamist institutional and intellectual traditions for the control of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Madrasa is an Arabic term (madrasah). The plural of the term is madaris. As with the other 
transliterated terms in this thesis, the English plural madrasas is used. For more on the term, 
see Esposito (2003: 184). 
63 Religious education also takes place in public schools, under private tutors, in part-time 
mosque schools, and in various kinds of private schools. 
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Islamization process” (Nasr, 2000). 
 
The importance of these institutions and the emphasis placed on them in the 
literature warrant a closer look at the ways they support, sustain, and facilitate 
sectarian violence—and at the same time, more generally, exclusivist 
sectarian discourse. 
 
Madrasas and Sectarian Violence 
 
Even though most authors are careful of not overstretching the madrasa 
argument,64 some recent studies have taken a step further and challenged the 
previous literature on its simplistic assumptions on the links between 
madrasas and especially the violent forms of sectarianism (Rahman, 2005; 
Evans, 2008). Ayesha Siddiqa, on the other hand, identifies a tendency in 
recent years to disregard madrasas as insignificant—or less important as 
previously thought—when it comes to sectarian and other forms of militancy in 
Pakistan (Siddiqa, 2013: 21). Indeed, if Pakistan’s madrasas are posited to be 
the breeding and recruitment places of militants, it is necessary to 
problematise this relationship in the light of recent research.  
 
For example, the profiles of sectarian activists involved in violent incidents 
show that a number of them had no religious education and had never been 
to a madrasa (Rashid, 1996; Siddique, 2009). Christine Fair has explored the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 In the words of Grare, “Still, the link between sectarian violence, international terrorism and 
madrassas should not be overestimated” (Grare, 2009: 138). 
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operational benefits madrasa education provides and found that it offers only 
limited utility for several types of violent operations, and for the operational 
needs of militant groups. Madrasa graduates may be suitable for only certain 
kinds of violent attacks and hence preferred only in some operations, but not 
all, depending on the type of operation or attack. The graduates may not be 
the first choice of sectarian groups when selecting candidates for operations, 
or the madrasa education might not be the only selection criteria (Fair, 2007: 
110). Despite the recruiters of sectarian groups often seeking unskilled and 
unemployed madrasa students for their operations, a madrasa education—or 
background in general—does not guarantee their candidacy (Fair, 2007; 
Siddique, 2009: 8).   
 
Despite the limited explanatory power this relationship provides for sectarian 
violence, “the limited empirical research so far carried out on the connection 
between Pakistani madrassas and Islamic extremism find a positive 
relationship between religious seminaries and sectarian violence” (Siddique, 
2009: 28). There are other noneducational functions that contribute to this 
positive relationship, which are of equal interest to this research. Madrasas 
provide, and are, functional spaces when looking at the operational level of 
sectarian violence. They serve as transit points and safe havens providing 
hospitality for militants. They—along with mosques and public proselytizing 
events (tabligh)—are also spaces for interaction where militant groups, 
religious ideologues, and potential recruits can interact. They also have an 
outward-looking role in their community, where they are generating public 
support for violence. They thus have different contributory roles in the buildup 
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and execution of violent acts beyond supplying manpower, relevant 
education, or training (Puri, 2010: 52, 63–4; Fair, 2007: 108). 
 
This diversity of purpose and function makes the madrasa institution difficult 
to evaluate in relation to both sectarianism and sectarian violence. For 
example, the number of madrasas directly supporting violence and being 
involved in militant activities is highly debated.65 Even though the exact scope 
of this support is unknown, the various functions the madrasa network has in 
relation to violent sectarian conflicts highlight the importance of the institution 
in supporting and sustaining sectarian violence.  
 
Violence of the Word 	  
Madrasa Education 
 
The network of mosques and madrasas has been instrumental “in extending 
the scope of sectarian causes to ever larger numbers of people, and to areas 
where these may not have been immediately felt before or where the social 
and economic contexts in which sectarian (or other) conflict takes place is 
different” (Zaman, 2002: 131). According to Qasim Zaman, this has ensured 
the creation of supralocal sectarian communities “whose members can relate, 
and react, to the tribulations of their sectarian kin anywhere, irrespective of 
local context” (Zaman, 2002: 131). Madrasa and mosque institutions have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 For this debate, see, for example, Riaz (2005), Siddique (2009), Evans (2008), and Fair 
(2008). 
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been instrumental in reproducing the ideology and discourse in which 
sectarian conflict has its moorings. This reproduction is done in several 
different ways using a variety of means. Often these institutions themselves 
have a sectarian orientation, as observed above, which they impart to their 
students through the content of teaching, materials produced and 
disseminated (either by writing, audio, or through loudspeakers), or fatwas 
(religious edicts) issued (Ahmed, 2006 & 2007; Pinault, 2008; Rashid, 1996). 
 
Christine Fair argues that madrasa education is inherently sectarian because 
its principal “objective is to produce students who share and agree with the 
sectarian worldview espoused by a particular board” (Fair, 2008: 77).66 The 
International Crisis Group report is aligned with Fair’s argument, stating that 
every madrasa has its own variant of the curriculum they use to base their 
teaching on, each of the madrasa boards supporting curriculums that are 
“mutually conflicting and characteristically sectarian” (ICG, 2007b: 14). But 
violent Islamist texts—that is, those advocating violent jihad against other 
religious sects—are not traditionally part of the madrasa curriculums 
(Siddique, 2009: 11–12). 
 
Within the overall teaching imparted by the madrasa institution, Qandeel 
Siddique downplays the role of textbooks in helping shape the students’ mind-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 There are also madrasas in Pakistan that actively work against the exclusivist sectarian 
discourse. Based on the visits by the author to some madrasas in the Peshawar area in KPK 
in 2008, it was discovered, for example, that some of them had a program of visiting religious 
scholars from other sects as a part of their syllabuses. This does merely provide anecdotal 
evidence on the existence of active work done to counter the exclusivist sectarian discourse 
in Pakistani madrasas, but it illustrates a counterpoint to consider when assessing the role of 
madrasas in relation to sectarian violence and reproduction of sectarian discourse. 
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sets to a particular religious and sectarian interpretation of Islam. For 
Siddique, it is primarily the transmission of oral lectures (held in Urdu or 
Pashto) that are internalised by the students and are more important for the 
advancement of the sectarian agenda (Siddique, 2009: 12). Besides the 
madrasa curriculum and the textbooks used, militant pamphlets and 
magazines are also circulated in madrasas, also those openly aligned with 
particular militant groups (Siddique, 2009: 12). This is a common practise 
amongst many madrasas in Pakistan, and a significant amount of this 
literature is targeted against other sects (Riaz, 2005). Also, radd—or 
refutation of other sects, subsects, and “heretical” beliefs and philosophies—is 
an integral part of some madrasas67 (Siddique, 2009: 11; Riaz, 2005: 19–20). 
Through the vilification of other beliefs and stressing the importance of 
safeguarding the purity of the greater Muslim community, students learn to 
defend their own tradition’s worldview (Fair, 2008: 77; Siddique, 2009: 31). All 
these factors—curriculum, material circulated and produced in madrasas, and 
the practise of radd—offer an illustration of the ways sectarian discourse is 
reproduced in the madrasa institution. The list is not exhaustive, however, and 
the concept of violence of the word is much broader.  
 
To balance the view of a madrasa education’s role in contributing to sectarian 
discourse and the sectarian understanding of Islam, it is important to note that 
public education has also been called to negatively contribute to the 
discourse. The Shia community has been conscious of the “version” of Islam 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 The number of those madrasas that engage in the practise of radd is highly contested as 
before, making it difficult to evaluate how common these practises are within the 
madrasa/mosque networks.  
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portrayed in public school textbooks (and demanding changes accordingly) 
since the 1950s (Abbas, 2010: 20). Perhaps the most famous case where 
sectarian conflict intersected with the portrayal of Islam in public school 
education was the “textbook controversy” in Gilgit in Gilgit-Baltistan, where in 
2004–2005, the Islamic content of public school textbooks became the source 
of the most intense Shia-Sunni conflict the region has witnessed in the last 
two decades.68 (Ali, 2008) Even though a detailed examination of Pakistan’s 
public school sector and the way the teaching, textbooks, and narratives of 
Islam in that sector relate to sectarian discourse is out of the scope of this 
work, this relationship deserves much more attention in the future (Fair, 2007: 
110). The relationship between secular education and sectarianism should not 
be unproblematised in the studies of sectarianism in Pakistan, and as 
Nosheen Ali observes, secular education doesn’t constitute an entirely 
nonsectarian setting (Ali, 2008).  
 
Fatwas and Speeches 
 
Another method the madrasa institution contributes to the violence of the word 
and sectarian discourse involves the speeches made by the ulama and the 
fatwas, or religious edicts, they have issued. Several authors have explored 
the impact these have on sectarian violence. Despite the links between the 
two not being obvious or straightforward, the speeches and fatwas are 
referred to as the violence of the word (Ahmed, 2007 & 2008; Marsden, 2005; 
Ahmad, 1998; Grare, 2009). Generally, it is recognised that the practise of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 For a detailed account on this controversy, please see Ali (2008 & 2010). 
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issuing edicts against other groups by madrasa leaders is not an uncommon 
practise (Siddique, 2009: 36) and that they fuel and exacerbate violence. At 
the core of that violence of the word is the reproduction of the most damaging 
form of exclusionary sectarian discourse—inciting followers to eliminate 
members of the other sect, invariably categorised as enemies of Islam69 
(Grare, 2009: 131; Ahmad, 1998).  
 
Many sectarian leaders are well known for their sermons and speeches. Haq 
Nawaz Jhangvi’s speeches are widely spread both in print and in audio, and 
because of Azam Tariq’s provocative anti-Shia rhetoric, his followers dubbed 
him “a man who could ignite fire in water” (Tohid, 2003). In fact, Tariq was 
advised “to use [his] powers of speech as a weapon,” and he developed the 
art of delivering firebrand sermons (khitabat) (Tohid, 2003). Madrasas, then, 
do not only produce potential militant recruits, or students with sectarian mind-
sets. They also produce “religious entrepreneurs” who justify violence and 
contribute to communities of support (Fair, 2007: 110). 
 
Indeed, it is not only the content of the violence of the word that is important to 
understanding sectarian violence or the power of sectarian discourse. It is 
also about the active agency of those who give those fiery speeches, produce 
fatwas, and broadcast on illegal radio stations. Violence has empowered not 
only sectarian groups as actors but also the mullas (religious teachers) who 
found that they made greater impact when backed by threats of violence 
(Grare, 2009; Khan, 2003). In chapter 2, we saw how sectarian conflicts more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 It is important to also note that there are religious leaders who issue fatwas against 
violence. 
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generally have impacted and played a part in the processes of contesting 
Islamist discourses in Pakistan (Nasr, 2000: 140). Violence, as a specific part 
of sectarian conflicts, also had a role in these processes.  
 
With the rise of sectarian violence in Pakistan, the ulama went from “being a 
relic of the past to being a gun-toting instigator of sectarian violence and a 
fearful portent of the future” (Khan, 2003: 46). Moreover, allegiance to 
violence was locally empowering. The clergy found that their sermons had a 
much greater impact if they were backed by real threats and violence—hence 
their constant ‘rage’ posture (Grare, 2009: 136–7). More broadly, these 
sectarian conflicts have produced new patterns of interaction between ulama 
and Islamists, giving rise to discourses of power among them, which have 
been important in giving shape to a new style of Islamist activism, as militants 
struggle to assert their domination of their religious communities and gain 
control of Islamist discourse (Nasr, 2000: 140).70  
 
Violence of the Word Online 
 
Through the madrasa and mosque networks, sectarian discourse has spread 
far and wide in Pakistan, as noted above. Cassettes, loudspeakers of 
mosques, illegal radio stations, printed pamphlets, books, and collections of 
fatwas have also spread the discourse. Those are still in use, but in the recent 
decade, new technologies have added to the arsenal of ways to spread the 
violence of the word: websites, computer disks, and mass e-mailing, amongst 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 For more on the changing role of the ulama, see, for example, Nasr (2010). 
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others. There is very little academic research yet done on the role of these 
new technologies, specifically in relation to sectarianism in Pakistan, but there 
are some conclusions that can be drawn from the existing literature.  
The violence of the word has an increasing online existence. There are 
articles posted on websites or forums, audio lectures and speeches, or like-
minded groups meeting in various Internet chat rooms. For example, books, 
speeches, and audio messages of various sectarian leaders can be found on 
the web, and many of the print publications—like monthly magazines—
produced by sectarian groups are now online (Siddique, 2009: 33; Tufail, 
2012). Also, mullas have taken to the Internet and maintain websites that offer 
religious opinions on subjects ranging from politics to matters of faith (ICG, 
2007b: 15). Both Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and SSP are active online and run a 
vibrant media campaign using sites like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube 
(Tufail, 2012). In general, the nature of the posts is either inciting violence 
against Shias (and to a lesser degree against Ahmadis) or promoting the 
activities of the organisations. Tweets and posts invite their readers to various 
events and conferences organised by LJ and SSP in different Pakistani 
towns, urge followers to watch live webcasts of speeches delivered by their 
leaders, or direct readers to newspaper reports about statements of Islamic 
clerics in Pakistan and abroad (Tufail, 2012). For example, a tweet dated 
October 2, 2011, from LJ’s main Twitter account (@Jhangvi) urged its 
followers to watch the live webcast of the Shuhada-e-Islam (Martyrs of Islam) 
Conference on October 6, 2011, in Islamabad, marking the martyrdom of 
Maulana Azam Tariq (Tufail, 2012). SSP is suspected of being active in a chat 
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room on Paltalk, where madrasa lecturers also come to give talks (Siddique, 
2009: 33).  
 
New technologies are widening the scope and reach of sectarian groups and 
discourse and are further transforming the role of ulama and sectarian 
leaders. The use of the Internet has also created new spaces of activity and 
self-understanding for various groups, becoming a means to draw together 
divergent traditions as well as like-minded groups by making them accessible 
to individuals all over the world (Naef & Sahabi, 2007: 8). Despite the fact that 
the number of both computer and social media users remain limited in 
Pakistan, new technologies offer new methods of reproducing and 
maintaining sectarian discourse, and its significance is expected to increase in 
the future. It makes it possible for the traditional authorities of that discourse 
to reach wider audiences, but they can also be challenged in their authority 
status. With new technologies, it is possible for new contestations of the 
authorship of exclusivist sectarian discourse to emerge, particularly with the 
global reach of those technologies.   
 
 
State and Violence 
 
The role of the Pakistani state, and the different state actors, is of paramount 
importance when thinking of the sustaining elements of sectarian violence. 
The role of the state in both providing active support and contributing to 
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operational spaces has already been referred to several times when 
discussing the formation and evolution of sectarian discourse and political 
opportunism in the previous chapter.  
 
A lot has been written on state involvement in the birth and growth of 
sectarian groups, particularly vis-à-vis the Afghan conflict (see, for example, 
Abou Zahab, 2002; Abou Zahab & Roy, 2004), and the national contestations 
of power politics between governments, security agencies, and the army. 
Several authors claim the existence of evidence of the security agencies 
keeping sectarian violence on the boil by supporting various groups to 
pressurise and delegitimise Pakistani governments that were becoming too 
independent (Ahmed, 2011; Haqqani, 2006; Talbot, 2005). Whether this 
sponsorship can be extended to the various Pakistani governments is a more 
contested idea. According to Anatol Lieven, unlike with the jihadi groups 
fighting in Kashmir and Afghanistan, there has been no evidence of Pakistani 
governments backing the anti-Shia militants since General Zia’s time (Lieven, 
2011: 294). It’s unclear, however, how much leverage—and indeed what 
leverage—security agencies (and the Pakistani state) had with sectarian 
groups and how much they were able to direct the actions of those groups for 
their own strategic purposes, particularly, as seen above, that security 
agencies’ interests were not the only ones affecting sectarian groups’ violent 
agendas. 
 
 
As observed above, sectarian groups in Pakistan do not operate outside the 
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state apparatus, but they take part in it. Their parent parties function in the 
parliamentary framework of politics, acting both as pressure groups and as a 
protective umbrella (Talbot, 2005; Waseem, 2007).  
 
In addition to active support, the role of the Pakistani state can also be 
examined through looking at the preventive measures taken and institutional 
systems put in place against sectarian violence. Various governments have 
tried to ‘crack down’ sectarian groups. During Nawaz Sharif’s second term as 
prime minister in 1997–1999, he initiated an operation against sectarian 
groups and pushed through a new antiterrorism law in the parliament. Pervez 
Musharraf’s administration banned several militant organisations. First, SMP 
along with LJ were banned in August 2001, then the Shia party Tehrik-e-Jafria 
Pakistan (TJP) and SSP in January 2002. Both these government actions 
were followed by a swift response: LJ attempted to kill Nawaz Sharif in 
January 1999, blowing up a bridge on the Lahore-Raiwind Road shortly 
before the then prime minister was due to pass by. A few weeks after 
Musharraf’s announcement of the ban of TJP and SSP, Rawalpindi, the city 
where the army headquarters are located in, was attacked just a few miles 
from his office (Nasr, 2000: 185; Malik, 2005: 208; Lieven, 2011: 294). 
Banning of the organisations changed very little in the long run. The banned 
sectarian groups continued to operate under new names.71 For example, SSP 
now operates under the banner of Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), headed 
by SSP leader Maulana Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi. In fact, the old names 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 After the ban in 2002, SSP was renamed Millet-e-Islami, which was again banned later in 
the same year (ICG, 2005: 3). 
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are still widely used, both by the groups as well as their supporters. Also, 
since the groups are most commonly known by these names and monikers, 
they are also still widely used in the media and in academic writing. 
 
If the reintroduction of democracy in Pakistan after Zia ul-Haq’s death was 
followed by an increase in sectarian violence (Hasan, 2011: 85), it is also 
noted that sectarian violence “continued unabated even after the military take-
over in 1999, and the international campaign against terror in 2001” (Malik, 
2005: 208). There are then no convincing arguments for or against a specific 
form of government in relation to the proliferation of sectarian violence.  
 
Law Enforcement and Judiciary 
 
The state’s inefficiency to deal with sectarian groups and militants does not 
depend solely on government action (or inaction). Particularly, the role of law 
enforcement and judiciary are highlighted as key factors in contributing to the 
free operation of sectarian groups and the continuation of violence.  
 
The police has been claimed to be passive in its efforts to pursue cases 
against sectarian activists, reacting only after a high-profile incident and then 
rounding up suspects that might be quietly released soon after. This can stem 
from a fear of retaliation; police officers have been amongst the high-profile 
targets of sectarian groups. The police also plays a crucial role in investigating 
violent sectarian incidents and preparing evidence for court cases. These 
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processes are affected by a lack of capacity to collect evidence, relevant 
training, and the lack of information sharing between various agencies (ICG, 
2005: 23; Siddiqa, 2013: 37). Also, the perception of police action towards 
sectarian groups plays a role. The authorities in Pakistan find it difficult to 
crack down on activities that are associated with organisations that operate in 
the name of Islam and claim to be defending its interests. Police action 
against them can be seen as harassment of the ‘true servants of the faith’ and 
thus faces resistance from local communities (Nasr, 2000: 180). 
 
The role of the judiciary is equally important. The judicial process of dealing 
with sectarian cases is marred by intimidation, both of judges and witnesses, 
making the court system often unsuccessful in trying sectarian cases (ICG, 
2005: 23; Rashid, 1996). Also, judges have become the target of threats and 
are therefore hesitant to hear cases involving religious militants. Securing 
judges and witnesses, as well as the judicial process itself, has meant that in 
antiterrorism courts, judges presiding over cases of sectarian militancy are 
often forced to hold trials in jails (ICG, 2005: 23). And when sectarian militants 
are tried, it doesn’t automatically translate into a reduced role in the 
leadership or reduction in sectarian violence. When Usman Saifullah Kurd and 
Shafiq Rehman, the two most senior leaders of LJ in Balochistan, were kept in 
the Anti-Terrorism Force (ATF) prison in Quetta during Musharraf’s 
nationwide operation against LJ in 2007, incidences of sectarian violence in 
the province decreased to near zero (Minority Support Pakistan, 2012: 19).72 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Minority Support Pakistan reports that later both Kurd and Rehman, despite having been 
sentenced to death and life in prison, respectively, “simply vanished from their cells in the 
middle of the night, walked outside, were swopped up by a waiting vehicle and whisked off 
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But during the imprisonment of Azam Tariq, he continued to act in his role, 
and his orders were “equally effective when he was in jail,” making no 
difference to the statistics of the ongoing violence (Ahmed, 2001). The lack of 
a systematic counterforce to sectarian militants and a reliable state system 
able to process these crimes has a significant impact, not only on the 
existence of those operational spaces for sectarian militants, but also on how 
the Pakistani state is perceived. The state appears weak, unable to protect its 
citizens, and there is a general lack of trust in the law enforcement and judicial 
processes in relation to sectarian violence. Consequently, when violence has 
reached a critical stage, and the governments in power have been unable to 
deal with the situation, the military steps in to restore order. This has 
happened on several occasions: in 1992 in Peshawar, in 1995 in Parachinar, 
and in August 1997 and March 1998 in the North-West Frontier Province. 
However, these operations were limited; the military merely imposed a cease-
fire and ended the ongoing violence (Nasr, 2000: 182). 
 
This inefficiency and inability to catch the perpetrators of sectarian violence 
has at times led to frustration of the police—as well as the political leadership. 
In 1998–1999, the Punjab Police with Shahbaz Sharif as the chief minister 
killed several sectarian militants in what was called “police encounters” 
(Abbas, 2002: 19). Once his selection to the political office was confirmed, the 
Nawaz government took a hard-line approach against sectarian militancy and 
applied shortcut methods to deal with the situation. When courts especially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the compound” (Minority Support Pakistan, 2012: 19). 
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set up to deal with sectarian terrorism failed to produce the desired results, 
the government tacitly approved the killing of sectarian terrorists in these 
police encounters (Abbas, 2002: 24).73 As a result, from September 1998 to 
the removal of the Sharif government by the military in October 1999, the 
Punjab Police killed dozens of sectarian terrorists belonging to the Sipah-e-
Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in what the police termed “shoot-outs.” 
However, both the organisations alleged that the shoot-outs in which their 
militants were killed were dubious. The strategy, though unlawful, turned out 
to be a great success, and the number of violent sect-motivated incidents 
decreased significantly (Abbas, 2002: 45). Anatol Lieven confirms this by 
referring to his discussion with a police officer in Jhang District in 2002. During 
this discussion, the police officer freely admitted that the difficulty of getting 
convictions means that if the police get an order to deal firmly with some 
sectarian leaders, their response often is to kill them74 (Lieven, 2011: 295). 
These police encounters might be an effective short-term strategy to deal with 
sectarian militants whom the law enforcement and judicial process is unable 
to reliably try and convict. Essentially, however, it further expands the 
enterprise of sectarian violence, making the state agential in one more way to 
contribute to sectarian conflicts and escalating the culture of violence. 
 
The weakened role of the state in relation to sectarian violence and sectarian 
militant groups does not stem only from the state’s failure to enforce laws. 
Sectarian organisations, and sectarian violence, have challenged the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 According to Azmat Abbas, the Punjab police have always been notorious for killing 
suspected outlaws in dubious encounters, but before this, they had never used these 
encounters against the activists of sectarian organizations (Abbas, 2002: 44–45). 
74 The term encounter is still used in the Pakistani media to describe unclear shooting 
incidents with militants and criminals where the police have been involved. 
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Pakistani state, competing with state presence both at the local and the 
national levels. By attacking Shia targets, who besides being Shia are also 
state functionaries like municipal officials and community leaders, sectarian 
groups have combined their attacks on the state with the killing of Shias. For 
example, from January to May in 1997, 75 Shia community leaders were 
killed in a systematic attempt to remove Shias from positions of authority 
(Nars, 2006: 166). According to Vali Nasr, this strategy was designed to 
enable the appointment of Sunni officials, who would also be more favourably 
disposed towards strengthening the power structure of sectarian groups and 
their parent organisations (Nasr, 2000: 183). Thus, by being able to operate 
without impunity and by targeting state institutions, it is clear that sectarianism 
and sectarian violence also inform state-society relations (Rashid, 1996). By 
inaction and failing to address these conflicts, the Pakistani state enables a 
permissive environment that allows militant groups and the enterprise of 
violence to function and grow (Ahmed, 2011: 115). It is thus pertinent to agree 
with Naveeda Khan, who says, “[S]ectarian politics and violence originates in 
part from the Pakistani state’s policies and projects” (Khan, 2003: 211). 
 
 
The Modes of Violence 
 
 
According to the literature, the birth of sectarian groups not only started 
organised sectarian violence but also substantially changed the nature of 
such violence. The changing patterns of violence; selection of targets; and 
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introduction of new modes of operation, violence, or weapons reflect the 
elements and processes sustaining that violence and the interests guiding the 
enterprise of violence. From the literature, we can also track how sectarian 
violence has evolved geographically and how it has become increasingly 
lethal, with the intention to cause “maximum damage” (Hussain, 2002: 89–
99).  
 
Until 1995, around the time of the forming of LJ, the targeted killings were 
mostly limited to leaders and activists of both sects, as well as each other’s hit 
men (Abou Zahab, 2002: 5). From then onwards, symbols of state authority 
were included in the target list, including senior government functionaries, 
police officers, and judges (Rashid, 1996; Abou Zahab, 2002: 5). Violence 
also started to target ordinary citizens, just for being Sunni or Shia. Tit-for-tat 
killings also targeted high-profile members of the two communities—like 
doctors, lawyers, traders, and intellectuals (Abou Zahab, 2002: 5; Syed, 2001: 
253). The pattern of target killing by the Shia became rare, but when it 
happened, the target was usually a very prominent Sunni cleric (Ahmed, 
2011: xxiii). Midnineties were also when attacks on mosques and mourners in 
cemeteries, religious processions, and public spaces were included in the soft 
targets. By default, anyone even remotely connected to the other sect 
became a target in these indiscriminate attacks (Irfani, 2004: 157; Abbas, 
2002: 33; ICG, 2005: 13).  
 
Sectarian violence took a very different form in the cities of Parachinar and 
Hangu in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, where the long-standing 
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disputes over ownership of forests, hills, land, and water resources between 
the Sunni and Shia tribes have at times virtually taken the form of a tribal civil 
war, with the army and paramilitary forces having to be called in to restore 
order, as discussed above (Irfani, 2004: 154; Abou Zahab, 2009: 2). 
 
Even though the academic literature doesn’t offer an in-depth analysis on why 
these particular targets were chosen, there are some general explanations for 
certain categories of targets. The fact that sectarian violence also targets 
state functionaries—and the Pakistani state via them—was discussed above. 
The fact that sectarianism is embedded in the regional context is visible 
through the targets of sectarian groups. For Sunni sectarian militants, 
Pakistan’s Shia groups and Iran were closely linked, and they sought to 
involve Iran directly through attacking Iranian targets, like Iranian diplomats, 
military personnel, and Iranian cultural centres. Also, this explains why only 
Ithna Ashari Shias, who are seen most linked to Iran, are killed, while other 
Shia sects—like Ismailis and Bohras—have so far been exempt from violence 
(Abou Zahab, 2002; Ahmed, 2003; 2011; Haqqani, 2006; Nasr, 2000). Khaled 
Ahmed also assigns the targeting of Shias to a rumour that Iran was funding 
Shia terrorists through Pakistan’s Shia doctors. This meant that “the most 
prominent doctors were earmarked for death” (Ahmed, 2011: 170). 
 
Both SSP and LJ are identified to have similar modes of operation. The 
groups have two general modes of attack: assassinations and massacres. 
Massacres are typically executed with an SSP or LJ cadre opening fire on 
large gatherings of Shias at mosques, at wedding parades, or during 
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important Shia religious celebrations (Fair, 2004: 110). Assassinations, or 
targeted killings, are based on a simple formula. The attackers would wait in 
crowded commercial areas, usually outside the workplaces of their intended 
victims, quickly open fire on them, and then disappear into the crowd (Minority 
Support Pakistan, 2012: 14).  
Suicide bombing was used the first time in July 2003, in an attack on an 
imambargah in Quetta during Friday prayers, adding a new dimension to the 
modes of sectarian violence (Hussain, 2008: 90; Minority Support Pakistan, 
2012: 15). Both Shias and Sunnis started deploying suicide bombers to inflict 
maximum casualties. Mosques, religious processions, and rallies became the 
prime targets of suicide attacks. Unlike suicide bombers elsewhere, who 
simply detonated their explosive-strapped bodies, Pakistani militants hurled 
grenades and fired on the crowd before blowing themselves up, in order to 
cause maximum damage (Hussain, 2008: 98–99). Both the choice of 
weapons and type of operations show growing professionalism of militant 
sectarian groups. The availability of sophisticated arms—such as rocket 
launchers, hand grenades, and highly explosive devices—and the increase in 
operational know-how have ensured that over the course of time, sectarian 
violence has become significantly more lethal (Grare, 2009: 144–5; Rashid, 
1996; Abbas, 2002: 34). 
 
From the literature and the accounts of violence it offers, we can sum up the 
characteristics of sectarian violence as portrayed by the literature. Essentially, 
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sectarian violence is public—it is conducted in public, not private, spaces.75 It 
is urban, originating from and concentrating on cities (Fair, 2004). Violence is 
asymmetric, for many more Shias than Sunnis have been killed. Shias are 
killed more often and in larger numbers (Syed, 2001: 253; Ahmed, 2011: 150, 
160). This asymmetry is explained by the strength of the Sunni-Deobandi 
combine, which was, and still is, simply too strong to be countered by Shia 
organisations (Ahmed, 2011: 150). Besides significant differences in 
organisational capacity, this asymmetry is also explained by the absence or 
rarity of mass killings by Shia groups (Siddiqa, 2013: 8). As explained by 
Khaled Ahmed:  
 
The thinking behind this pattern of killing is that the Shia are not many 
in Pakistan and can be ‘finished off’ if killed en masse. Therefore, the 
targeting of Shias is motivated by numbers to be killed; on the other 
hand, the Sunnis cannot be killed en masse because of their 
overwhelming numbers. (Ahmed, 2011: 160)  
 
Sectarian violence is also purposive and is rarely ad hoc but premeditated 
and planned (Talbot, 2007: xiv). This violence is heterogeneous in a sense 
that its motivation and form vary, but those violent incidents “occur within a 
context in which violence is purposive” (Talbot, 2007: xiv), and there is “a 
great amount of sophistry and selectivity in sectarian terrorists acts” (Malik, 
2005: 206). And finally, sectarian violence is conditioned by the enterprise of 
violence: the internal logic of competition and survival of sectarian militant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Magnus Marsden has researched the role of nonpublic places in determining the nature of 
sectarian conflict in Chitral, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Marsden, 2005). 
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groups; the incentives of those attempting to use these groups for their own 
agendas; and the local, national, and regional elements and processes that 
help those groups function. 
 
Explaining Sectarian Violence 
 
After narrating how sectarian violence came to be, and how it is sustained in 
Pakistan, the literature has attempted to explain why sectarian violence exists: 
Why have sectarian tensions and conflicts turned violent? What are the 
motivations and the instigators of that violence? None of the analysts explain 
violence as stemming from the original split between Shias and Sunnis, but it 
is seen as a product of the conditions in modern Pakistan, originating from the 
raison d’être of sectarian groups and, to some extent, of their parent 
organisations. The explanations of violence are tied to an instrumental 
understanding of violence: violence is seen as a tool, a means to an end, a 
way to pressurise and intimidate—as well as to eliminate and kill.76 Violence 
is also seen as a form of self-defence. Militant Shia groups turn to violence to 
defend their community, as a response to the Deobandi groups’ violent 
threats (Abbas, 2010: 5). Violence perpetrated by Deobandi militant groups, 
on the other hand, is a response to the more general Shia threat and then, 
more precisely, a retaliation to the killings done by Shia groups. As observed 
by Qasim Zaman, “violence by sectarian opponents only reinforces their 
perception of the threat from the ‘other’” and thus reinforce their justification 
for safeguarding their existence (Zaman, 1998: 712). Violent attacks are also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 See, for example, Ahmed (2011: xxvi-xxvii). 
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a show of power demonstrating the groups’ abilities to retaliate and to defend. 
Violence, both perpetrated and targeted against one’s own community or 
group, then, guarantees the functional utility of militant groups, particularly in 
an environment where the state can’t be trusted to provide security (Kamran, 
2008: 11; Rashid, 1996). These explanations and analyses of sectarian 
violence are very much tied to the framework of militant sectarian groups, 
reducing the violence to a phenomenon related to the existence and 
functioning of organised sectarian forces. This framework allows the analysts 
to claim that sectarian violence is not a communitarian phenomenon. There 
are, however, exceptions to this—namely, those areas where “concentrations 
of Shia settlements have the ability to strike back and settle scores” (Ahmed, 
2011: xxx).  
 
Some authors have also explained the utility of violence by referring to larger 
societal processes lying behind the violence.77 Some of these explanations 
are unconvincing or too broad. For example, sectarian violence has been 
explained as the only outlet for the Pakistani youth to “express themselves” 
(ICG, 2007: 15) or as a way to express discontent (Abou Zahab, 2009: 168). 
According to these explanations, violence has its roots in socioeconomic 
inequities and it is ‘merely’ perpetuated by sectarian groups.  
 
Violence has also been seen to stem from the overall competition between 
Sunnis and Shias and the aim of both to assert their dominance on the other. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 See, for example, Talbot (2005) and Chandran (2008). 
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Sectarian violence has become an important medium of this dominance, 
alongside the control of Islamist discourse and the redefinition of state-society 
relations (Nasr, 2000). The existence of sectarian violence is also attributed to 
a general spread of violence, the increase of the means of perpetrating that 
violence, and an overall decline of civility in the political culture of Pakistan 
(Syed, 2001: 260). But how this dominance is achieved—the mechanisations 
of this process—or how this general spread of violence has taken a 
specifically sectarian form have not been fully explored. Despite their different 
views as to the cause, most authors endorse identical processual models of 
sectarian violence, emphasising violence as a tool (or utility) or a derivative 
symptom.  
 
To see sectarian violence as a surface expression of “deeper” socioeconomic 
and/or ideological contexts portrays violence as a surface effect of the 
perceived origin that legitimates violence by empowering social actors. The 
acts of violence themselves are rarely seen as carrying significance. Violence, 
now, is “denuded of any intrinsic semantic or causal character” (Feldman, 
1991: 19–20). In short, violence, in these explanations, is meant to transform 
socioeconomic inequities or ideological contexts or discourses, but the 
transformative role of violence itself, particularly protracted violence, is not 
adequately recognised or analysed. By subordinating violence to prior 
ideological formations and not treating violent practises as developing those 
formations, important factors in the escalation and development of sectarian 
violence are overlooked. With instrumental explanations of violence and by 
reducing that violence to a surface-level symptom, violence is denied 
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transformative status as “residual institution, with is own symbolic and 
performative authority” (Feldman, 1991: 21). Next, the chapter turns to 
examine the effects of sectarian violence and whether the transformative 
status of violence is present in the literature discussing the ways it has 
impacted the relationship between Sunnis and Shias, as well as the spatial 
organisations and practises of those communities in Pakistan. 
 
Effects of Sectarian Violence  
 
Violence and Social Relations 
 
Only few academic works are interested in the existence and effects of 
violence in the community level. Violence of this character is not the main 
focus of international security or policy analysts, and access to researching 
this type of violence is difficult. Partly this lack of research on a community 
level can also be explained by the understanding that “the hatred, hostility, 
and violence between sectarian groups have not trickled down to the popular 
level. At the local and neighbourhood levels, the relationships between Shia 
and Sunni communities remain largely unaffected by what transpires between 
the militants who claim to represent them” (Ahmad, 1998: 113). This popular 
assertion sees that sectarianism has remained mostly as an occasionally 
violent political phenomenon, perpetrated by sectarian groups, and it has not 
spread to the grassroots or to the community level. The commonalities of the 
same culture and the same language outweigh the surface-level differences, 
	  	   136	  
and the two communities continue to live peacefully together in the same 
neighbourhoods (Abou Zahab, 2002b: 78). This separation of sectarianism as 
a distinct and mostly unconnected sphere from the community level is 
contested by the fact that sectarian organisations, like SSP, run vibrant 
organisations at the grassroots level and are also involved in community work 
(Tufail, 2012). There is still very little documentation on this community-level 
presence of sectarianism and sectarian organisations and the roles they play 
in those communities. 
 
The literature also offers only cursory remarks on the responses that violence 
has elicited. For Marian Abou Zahab, the Pakistani society seems to have 
learned to cope with sectarian violence, for it does not resist either physically 
or intellectually (Abou Zahab, 2002b: 88). Vali Nasr, already in 2000, 
observed that militant Sunni groups have succeeded in creating a specific 
consciousness about the “Shia problem” in Islamist discourse, thus hardening 
attitudes about Shiism (Nasr, 2000: 165). At the same time, the literature tells 
us that the majority of the members of the Shia and Sunni communities have 
watched sectarian killings with awe and disgust. The violence perpetrated in 
the name of Islam is “responded to with a communitarian disgust and sheer 
despair” (Malik, 2005: 75). This horror that sectarian violence triggers in those 
communities is coupled with the sympathy and support of some elements in 
the same communities, without which that violence could not have flourished 
as it had, as explored before.  
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Khaled Ahmed, interestingly, thinks that the claim of sectarianism not affecting 
the community level is proved by the pattern of violence and its asymmetric 
nature:   
 
It is often said that the people of Pakistan are not sectarian. This is 
meant to point to the lack of a general anti-Shia animus at the popular 
level. Yet, Pakistan has seen a lot of sectarian violence in recent years. 
The truth of the above statement is substantiated by the pattern of 
killings: the Sunnis kill Shias at large, targeting congregations, and the 
Shias target-kill—with some exceptions—the self-proclaimed anti-Shia 
clerics. This pattern tells us that the Shias are aware that the Sunni 
majority does not hate them. (Ahmed, 2007: 61)  
 
Previously, the same point made by Ahmed on the pattern of violence and the 
absence of Sunni mass killings proved the sectarian militants’ wish to 
eliminate the Shia and the lack of the possibility for the Shia to do so. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to substantiate a claim on whole communities 
based on patterns of violence allegedly perpetrated by only a small segment 
of those communities. 
 
Some authors, like Rasul Bakhsh Rais, speak of “structured intolerance at the 
societal level” (Rais, 2009: 116), but rarely has an analysis had a closer look 
at whether sectarianism in general and sectarian violence in particular have 
really had an impact in communities, although that impact has occasionally 
been recognised in a general level as damaging the fabric of society (Samad, 
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2007: 170). Also, what type this impact is, is also not usually addressed. This 
claim on violence relates to another persisting statement on Sunni-Shia 
relations more broadly in Pakistan. These relations, in general, have been 
amicable, or “normal”—or existed with some ‘latent tension’ until the arrival of 
General Zia (Ahmad, 1998; Ahmed, 2011; Abbas, 2010: 5; Lieven, 2011: 
191). Unfortunately, there is little hard evidence to back this strong claim, and 
it is contradicted by the few studies that look at sectarianism and sectarian 
violence and their impact on the community level. General community 
relations are of course very difficult to research and verify. 
 
Fair, Malthora, and Shapiro in their research based on a survey of 6,000 
Pakistanis tried to gauge the pervasiveness of Shia-Sunni bigotry. They asked 
the respondents which of the two, Sunnis or Shias, are better followers of 
Islam. The researchers found that fewer than one in three of those surveyed 
answered that “both are equal.” Most (65 percent) did admit that they believed 
Sunni Muslims are “better followers of Islam.” Three percent indicated that 
Shias are better followers, consistent with the distribution of Shias in the 
sample. The researchers concluded that since nearly two in three of their 
respondents believed Sunnis to be better Muslims, Pakistan’s sectarian 
conflicts “should not be surprising” (Fair et al., 2010: 506). Although these 
results do not mean problematised relations between the two groups or an 
automatic endorsement or approval of violence against ‘the other’, it “would 
appear that Pakistanis overwhelmingly see themselves as Sunni Muslims” 
(except for Shias, of course) rather than members of a particular interpretative 
tradition, and most respondents clearly believe that Sunnis are better Muslims 
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than Shias are. Given that Shias remain vulnerable to sectarian conflicts and 
violence, this perception is potentially problematic (Fair et al., 2010: 506). 
More generally, the researchers draw the conclusion that “while most 
Pakistanis do not identify with a sectarian identity, a majority do appear to be 
highly engaged with their faith and do harbor anti-Shia sentiments” (Fair et al., 
2010: 506). How representative the sample used in the research is of the 
Sunni and Shia communities is difficult to gauge without further studies on this 
matter,78 but the findings point towards reassessing perceptions of the ‘other’ 
and the relationship in general, as they might not be as unproblematised as 
the majority of the literature portrays them to be, particularly after protracted 
violent conflicts ongoing in Pakistan. 
 
Most of the studies that zoom to the local contexts of sectarianism, like Jhang, 
trying to contextualise the phenomenon in a particular locality, also remain in 
the sociopolitical level. The literature usually only briefly mentions the social 
fabric of those locations, is mute of the level of interpersonal relationships or 
the streets of Pakistani cities or villages. It says nothing about how the 
phenomenon manifests itself there, how it is experienced by the people, and 
the transformative power of sectarian violence. For these studies, one has to 
turn to anthropology. There, the literature talks about the lived sectarian 
experience from the point of view of a village, a specific mohalla 
(neighbourhood), or an individual, offering a welcome balance to the security- 
and sectarian-group-focused narrative on sectarianism.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 For a similar study but with a very different sample, see Rahman (2007). 
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In other words, this research introduces the lived experience of the sectarian 
divide to the literature on sectarianism.79 This addition of the personal brings 
in stories of fear, concealment, pressure, and intimidation—all of which are 
absent in the main body of literature on sectarianism. In these accounts, 
sectarianism also stops being a male-only phenomenon, where women are 
nonexistent and nonpartisan. (See, for example, Marsden, 2005; Ali, 2010; 
Varley, 2010.) For these studies, sectarian violence does exist in the 
grassroots level and has clearly affected the relationships between Sunnis 
and Shias, contesting the claims that those relationships are “normal” and 
unaffected by the violence.  
 
Finally, to recognise that the Sunni-Shia relationship in Pakistan is perhaps 
not as unproblematised as the literature tells us doesn’t mean that violence, or 
intolerance, is a routinised feature of that relationship. There are Muslims in 
Pakistan who are critical both of the deployment of sectarian discourses and 
the increasingly violent nature of relations between the country’s diverse 
Muslim communities. 
 
 
Transformation and Securitisation of Space 
  
Even though the academic literature in peace and conflict studies on sectarian 
violence does not analyse in-depth the effects of sectarian violence in 
Pakistani communities, it is clear that “the destructive impact of sectarian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 This theme is further explored in chapter 5. 
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violence goes far beyond its body count” (Irfani, 2004: 164) and that there is a 
psychological dimension of sectarian violence (Talbot, 2007: 167). Academic 
writers use different languages when describing these effects, depending on 
their theoretical approach, but sectarian violence is seen as reinforcing 
community stereotypes (Talbot, 2007: xiii), hardening sectarian identities 
(Marsden, 2005: 17; Nasr, 2000: 165), polarizing communities (Ali, 2010: 
749), or increasing the sect consciousness (Ahmed, 2006: 184–5).  
 
To relate these described effects to the theoretical framework of border 
construction as a result of a protracted violent conflict, it is important to see 
whether the literature talks about those borders—both material and 
immaterial—in addition to general Sunni-Shia relations. The literature 
accounts for changes in social practises signalling forms of separation of the 
two communities. The sectarian difference is visible in changed interactions 
patterns, such as the decrease of intersect marriages (Marsden, 2005: 250; 
Ahmed, 2011: xxiii). The existence and hardening of borders between the 
sects also take more concrete, visible forms. It can be seen in internal 
migration, Shias migrating to other cities (or even abroad), particularly from 
locations of protracted violent conflicts, such as Parachinar and Quetta (Abou 
Zahab, 2009; ICG, 2005). Those protracted conflicts have also resulted in 
changing territorial identifications and settlement patterns (Ali, 2010: 749; Ase, 
1999: 64, 67–70; Ahmed, 2011: 179). This highlights the structuring role of 
sectarian violence, making the changed perception of ‘the other’ visible and 
tangible. This spatial transformation due to sectarian violence is crucial for 
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understanding both the power of exclusivist sectarian discourse and the 
transformative role violence plays.  
 
In addition to Shias moving from one Pakistani city to another, there has been 
internal movement within cities. Khaled Ahmed and Abou Zahab use the term 
ghettoisation to illustrate this movement—forced or voluntary—of Shias to 
enclaves (Abou Zahab, 2009: 5; Ahmed, 2011: xxiii). In ghettoisation, 
previously mixed areas of Sunni and Shia settlements turn into separate 
concentrations of communities within a locality. In the history of sectarianism, 
Parachinar establishes the rule of ghettoisation, which later can be seen in 
Gilgit in Gilgit-Baltistan, Quetta in Balochistan, and to some extent in the cities 
of Kohat, Jhang, D. I. Khan, and Karachi (Ahmed, 2011: 179). The impetuses 
for this concrete separation of communities are manifold, but one of the major 
reasons is the threat perceptions experienced by the Shias. Ghettoisation can 
also be an active attempt of Shia communities to protect themselves.  
 
What happened in the Shia Hazara community in Quetta in 2011 illustrates 
this process of ghettoisation—and the effects of protracted sectarian violence. 
As narrated by the Minority Support Pakistan, the community started the 
construction of security check posts and physical barriers at all points into and 
out of the two main Hazara neighbourhoods in the city. This not only resulted 
in the further ghettoisation of already-separate neighbourhoods, but it also 
affected the movement of the occupants of that locality, enhancing the sense 
of confinement (Minority Support Pakistan, 2012: 2). This construction, 
according to the Minority Support Pakistan, was done because the Shias felt 
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unsafe even in their community and were “left with no other options” (Minority 
Support Pakistan, 2012: 20). They took protecting their community a step 
further by establishing private security schemes and armed self-defence 
militias. This was a reaction to a failed attempt to bomb Hazara Eidgah, a 
courtyard/meeting place busy with the members of the community, in August 
2011. The 200-kilogram car bomb failed to reach the target but managed to 
kill over ten Shias at the heart of Mari Abad, in the Hazara neighbourhood of 
central Quetta. A private security system, Nadir Security, staffed the 
neighbourhood check posts with retired Hazara police officers and privately 
trained Hazara guards. The scheme continued effectively for two months until 
later on that year the police intervened, complaining that “the Hazara had 
become ‘a state within a state’” (Minority Support Pakistan, 2012: 20). 
 
While offering a sense of security for the residents, these separate 
neighbourhoods and enclaves make these communities easy targets, 
attracting violence and continuing the cycle of violence (Abou Zahab, 2009: 5; 
Ahmed, 2011: xxiii). These enclaves, or separate mohallas, are at the same 
time a result of sectarian violence, both actual and anticipated, and 
perpetuating that violence. They emerge by internal migration, as a way to 
deal with perceived insecurity, while also creating a possible space to target 
those communities, making that space agential in generating more violence 
and sustaining sectarian conflicts. Furthermore, the above example of private 
security and militias in securing that space is alarming and speaks of the 
depth of perceived threat in those communities, as well as the lack of trust for 
the state to provide the needed security. 
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This transformation and securitizing of space is not exclusive to the enclave or 
mohalla in question; there are also implications to the use and perception of 
public space. The reluctance of the male residents of those Quetta Hazara 
neighbourhoods who work as day labourers and merchants to use public 
transportation and leave their own enclaves signals changed perceptions of 
that public space, which should in theory be neutral and nonsectarian 
(Minority Support Pakistan, 2012: 7). According to Khaled Ahmed, most of the 
Shia drivers of the Northern Areas Transport Corporation that drive buses 
between the Northern Areas and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa refused to get on 
the buses because they feared attacks on the way as the buses passed 
through Sunni-dominated areas, like Kohistan and Diamer (Ahmed, 2011: 
196).  
 
Adding to the reluctance and anxiety of using public spaces are the ways 
sectarian militants have identified and singled out Shias in some recent violent 
incidents in those public spaces. From the summer of 2007 onwards, 
sectarian militants have stopped vehicles and identified Shias by asking for 
their ID cards or asking them to remove their shirts to see whether there are 
marks left on their backs by Muharram rituals. This tactic has been used for 
targeting regular Shia travellers, Shia army and paramilitary officers, and Shia 
pilgrims (Abou Zahab, 2009: 9; Abou Zahab, 2009b: 4). This departs from the 
previously used methods of violence, where the targets have been previously 
identified and selected for targeted killings or Shias have been killed because 
of their presence in a location specific to Shia ritual or worship. Now anyone 
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using public space that happens to cross paths with sectarian militants can be 
a potential target, changing the nature of sectarian violence yet again.80  
 
 
These examples highlight the idea of sectarian geography: how localities with 
larger-than-average Shia populations are organised and how this organisation 
and fragmentation “facilitates a multifaceted competitive sectarianism” 
(Varley, 2010: 64). This sectarian geography also extends beyond the 
community enclaves to include the use of public space—something that 
exclusivist sectarian discourse has tried to define and has successfully 
defined for the Ahmadi community, as we saw in the previous chapter.  
 
These processes of transformation and securitizing of space also affect the 
perceptions of how one can protect, and bring a sense of security, to one’s 
community. The enclaves are spaces that create “paradoxes of security and 
insecurity” (Kaker, 2013). The perceived security through segregation (Kaker, 
2013; Gayer, 2003) actually means further hardening of the community 
borders and the protection of those borders, rather than seeing the borders—
and the separation they produce—as problematic and a source of insecurity.  
 
The need to protect and secure public space is also a challenge for the state: 
it will have to not only provide safety for the communities but also ensure that 
militant groups and exclusivist sectarian discourse are not defining and 
determining the use of public space (Ahmed, 2011: xxxii; Mujtaba, 2011: 44). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 There is material available online that teaches LJ followers to identify Shias, for example, 
by their surnames (Tufail, 2012). 
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Furthermore, if the example discussed above of private militias formed to 
protect those enclaves are duplicated in the future, and the communities 
assert control over the borders of their community spaces, it leads to further 
challenges for existing state-society relations. This social organisation—
border drawing—along sectarian lines should also be of interest to security 
analysts, as it signals deeper penetration of sectarian conflicts in the Pakistani 
society and enables a certain type of conflict dynamics and violence. The way 
these conflicts affect the use of public space can significantly change the 
polity of Pakistan in the future. 
 
 
Violence of the Everyday 
 
To conclude this examination on what the existing literature tells us about 
sectarian violence, we examine the concept of violence present in those 
studies that focus on examining how sectarian discourse is present in 
everyday life, in personal and territorial identification, and in a multitude of 
everyday interactions (Ase, 1999: 64). What is needed, according to these 
studies, to make sense of sectarianism is the investigations of “the everyday 
forms through which religious conflict is produced, as well as the specific 
political contexts in which religious identities are created and shaped” (Ali, 
2010: 738). These analyses challenge the “approaches to the study of 
sectarian conflict in Pakistan that […] over emphasise both the instrumentality 
of ‘the state’ and so-called ‘extremist’ and armed ‘Islamist’ groups in 
determining the nature of the relationships between Muslims in Pakistan who 
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claim affiliation to a diverse array of Islamic doctrinal traditions” (Marsden, 
2005: 245). Instead, these researches show how in some localities, daily lives 
are penetrated by sectarian considerations, and how a sectarian divide is 
constructed during the course of the daily lives of people experiencing that 
difference. 
 
These studies also offer examples of the violence of the everyday (Ali, 2010: 
742; Varley, 2010). There is no involvement of organised religious groups and 
often no physical violence. Sectarian tension is created and manifested, for 
example, through the invocation of epithets and an unexpected ridicule of 
sectarian identity (Ali, 2010: 741). Nosheen Ali accounts an incident of 
violence of the everyday that took place in Gilgit, in 2006 after an army public 
school introduced biodata forms for teachers and students alike, asking for 
their sectarian affiliations. The senior head teacher of that school narrated a 
case to Ali arising out of the situation created by those forms and the sensitive 
information they were inquiring about. Because of the forms, the children 
started to talk about sects, without necessarily knowing what they meant. 
When a boy in class 2 discovered that one of his classmates was Shia, he 
beat him up. Apparently, he had heard at home that “Shia people are bad, 
and should be beaten up” (Ali, 2010: 724). Ali provocatively calls this incident 
a case of sectarian violence, to underscore and ask why such discursively 
and physically violent encounters at the micropolitical level are silenced in 
normative analyses of sectarianism. For her, attention to such encounters is 
critical in understanding the deployment of sectarian discourse in practise and 
in grasping the intimate production and experience of sectarian conflict. 
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Moreover, micropractises of sectarian hostility embody a violence of the 
everyday, which serves to constitute the very conditions of the possibility for 
dramatic eruptions of collective violence (Ali, 2010: 742). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Distinguishing between various forms of violence is challenging in Pakistan. 
This chapter looked at how sectarian violence is embedded in a complex web 
of interrelated and mutually reinforcing forms of violence and militancy. Those 
elements that sustain violence link the phenomenon of sectarian violence to 
regional, national, and local contexts and a myriad of different actors and 
agendas involved in that violence. These sustaining elements and actors 
produce and ensure operational spaces for sectarian groups to exist and 
function. They also provide crucial operational support for militants. With the 
entanglement of sectarian violence to other forms of militancy and crime, the 
enterprise of violence extends it reach much wider than violence perpetrated 
“merely” against sectarian adversaries. That enterprise is also conditioned by 
the internal logic of the functioning of those groups and partners in crime: 
violence is also about competition and survival and about establishing one’s 
superiority in violence.  
 
With the complex contexts and interrelated forms of violence in mind, the 
analyses of sectarian violence carefully avoid monocausal explanations of 
that violence. The story of sectarian violence in Pakistan is, however, 
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integrally linked and equated with sectarian groups to the extent that the 
violence is reduced to a phenomenon related to the existence and functioning 
of those organised sectarian forces. Organised forms of violence started with 
targeted killings of high-profile leaders of those groups, the organisation 
around the sectarian agendas then producing the impetus for the current 
forms of violence and also its first victims. This equation of sectarian violence 
to sectarian groups is explored in chapter 6, where the findings of the data 
analysis—the locations of violence—are presented.  
 
 
One of the main culprits in the literature for both fostering militants and 
maintaining sectarian discourse is the madrasa and mosque institutions. 
Inherently sectarian organisations and the production of the violence of the 
word in various forms are seen as playing an important role in the overall 
sectarian phenomenon. This role is likely to further develop in the future, as 
new technologies enable the spread and reproduction of sectarian discourse 
in an unprecedented way. Also the partisanship of the Pakistani state in 
sectarian violence is unquestionable. Political opportunism and government 
inaction, inefficiency of government institutions, alongside with active support 
are crucial in creating a permissive environment for that violence to flourish.  
 
The explanations of why violence? in the literature are tied to an instrumental 
understanding of violence: violence is essentially seen as a tool, a means to 
an end, a way to pressurise and intimidate—as well as to eliminate and kill. 
The acts of violence themselves are rarely seen as carrying significance or 
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being agential. Therefore, the explanations of violence think of violence as a 
derivative symptom, reducing it to a dependent variable, a mere consequence 
of other processes. The transformative role of violence itself, particularly 
protracted violence, is not often recognised or analysed, but it is inadvertently 
examined when the literature discusses the relationship between the Sunni 
and Shia communities, which today are not as unproblematised as before, 
particularly in locations with a long history of violent sectarian conflicts. The 
literature also offers us examples of transformation and securitisation of space 
as a result of sectarian violence. The organisation of communities into 
separate enclaves, and even the forming of private militias to protect those 
enclaves, takes us back to Zygmunt Bauman’s metaphor of a fortress and 
how the perceived need to defend that fortress emphasises the borders built 
to protect one’s identity, creating paradoxes of security and insecurity, while 
trusting the provision of security through segregation. 
 
This transformative role of violence is further explored in chapter 5, where the 
concept of difference both violence and religion create in sectarian conflicts is 
further analysed. The next chapter is going to have a look at the methodology 
that informed the research design and the methods used to conduct this 
study. 
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Chapter 4  
Methodology: Researching Sectarian Violence in Pakistan 
 
Introduction 
 
It is true that, while I merely observed the behaviour of others, I 
found little basis in it for certainty, and I noticed almost as much 
diversity as I had done earlier among the opinions of philosophers 
(Descartes, 1968: 33). 
 
This chapter introduces the methodological framework underpinning this 
research and outlines the considerations that led to the selection of the 
methodology and methods. When researching a sensitive subject such as 
violence in a location with genuine security threats, those considerations are 
never purely theoretical; they also stem from a careful assessment of what is 
feasible and safe. 
 
The chapter starts with a brief discussion about how the basic research 
premises guide the selection of methodology and what direction, in turn, the 
methodology points to when choosing the appropriate methods. This chapter 
then maps the journey of conducting research in Pakistan, with special focus 
on how the dangers in the field were taken into account and negotiated. 
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The focus then turns to the data collection and analysis. The source of the 
data is introduced, with the process of selecting, recording, and formatting the 
data. A further selection process of the original collected data is then outlined 
with details of what is left out of the final data analysed and why. A careful 
assessment on the limitations of the collected data is included, to be reflexive 
on the restrictions that the collected data places on the data analysis phase. 
Lastly, the chapter introduces the variables used for analysis and then briefly 
explains the principles guiding the data analysis process. 
 
The process of selecting the final methodology and the methods for data 
collection and analysis follows the hermeneutic circle. The process shows 
how all research is guided by the theoretical commitments following the 
research premises. At the same time, it emphasises that research is also 
inevitably situational and contextual: who is the researcher; what are the 
background, values, and assumptions they bring to the research process; and 
how do those relate to what is being researched. This relationship and the 
interplay of the different elements of that relationship not only inform the 
methods chosen but also play a significant role in data collection and analysis. 
 
Methodology: The Analytical Framework of the Research 
 
 
Based on the theoretical assumptions, as outlined in chapter 1, the research 
is firmly anchored in the social constructivist theory of knowledge. The 
research looks at violence as a method of forming and maintaining exclusivist 
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sectarian identities through the creation of borders. These ontological 
assumptions of identities being constructed in a shared action fit with the 
broad theoretical premises characterising social constructivism. 
 
Social constructivism as an approach is known to avoid easy definitions (see, 
for example, Burr, 2003, “What Is Social Constructivism”), but the basic tenet 
of the approach argues that reality is socially constructed. Because of this, the 
main aim of the researcher was to understand the multiple social 
constructions of meaning and knowledge constituting the research subject 
(Robson, 2002: 27). 
 
If, as this thesis assumes, social (group) identities are constructed and 
maintained through the construction of borders, these identities can be 
researched by analysing those borders and the practises through which they 
are maintained. Instead of the concept of text as the focus of analysis that is 
widely used in social constructivism, this research uses communication in this 
context. The borders are communicated to the other as well as to the wider 
society by different communicative acts, those acts being an important part of 
the border building and maintaining. Communication emphasises the 
intersubjective nature of identity and the process of social construction. It also 
places the emphasis on processes rather than structures. As Burr writes, 
 
The aim of social enquiry is removed from questions about the nature 
of people or society towards a consideration of how certain 
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phenomena or forms of knowledge are achieved by people in 
interaction. (Burr, 2003: 9) 
 
In effect, this means that this research looks at discursive practises on 
constructing space and identity and on the ways that self-other relationships 
are framed, played out, and communicated through violent sectarian acts. 
 
This communication (of identities) can take a variety of forms. Verbal 
communication can happen in conventional forms—such as speeches, 
political manifestos, etc.—but it can also take other forms, such as wall 
writing. Communication also occurs nonverbally, for example, by showing 
identity-related symbols—such as flags. The specific form of this 
communication that this thesis is interested in is violent acts against the other. 
These communicative acts can be summarised by using the term discourse, 
referring to “practices that form the objects of which they speak,” as was 
defined in chapter 1 (Foucault, 1972: 49). Discourse refers to sets of 
organised meanings (which can include images as well as words) on a given 
theme. The term has been used to emphasise “the organised way in which 
meanings cohere around an assumed central proposition, which gives them 
their value and significance” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000: 14). What is being 
communicated, then, can be thought of as instances of discourses, as 
occasions where particular discourses are given the opportunity to construct 
an event in a certain way (Burr, 2003: 66). Now, the aforementioned 
communicative acts are those instances of discourses that are constructing 
not only events but also identities. 
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Social constructivism as a methodological framework does not inform the 
research on any particular research methods per se because there are no 
particular methods that are intrinsically social constructivist. However, 
because it is interested in meaning (of discourses), the qualitative methods 
are seen to offer more appropriate tools for research within this framework 
(Burr, 2003: 24). 
 
There are a variety of methods that are used to analyse communication. 
Content analysis, for example, entails the systematic examination of forms of 
communication to objectively document patterns. It involves establishing 
categories followed by counting the number of instances when those 
categories are used in a particular item of text, allowing the researcher to 
obtain a quantitative description (Rossman & Rallis, 2003: 198; Silverman, 
1993: 59). Some of these principles can also be applied in this research, 
despite the fact that communication is now understood in a very untraditional 
manner, in the form of extreme human interaction. 
 
Social constructivism argues that the way discourses construct our 
experience can be examined by deconstructing these communications, taking 
them apart, and showing how they work (Burr, 2003: 18). This idea of 
deconstructions is at the core of the research design of this thesis. 
Furthermore, as observed by Rossman and Rallis, “The words or objects 
themselves are less important than when and where they are used and the 
meaning we attach to them: what is the process by which meaning is 
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transmitted?” (Rossman & Rallis, 2003: 101). Clearly, the focus of the 
research now is not to quantify communication by certain categories; what is 
more important is to look at the contextualised process of communication, 
particularly the temporal when and the spatial where. This approach points 
towards the interpretive data analysis methods within textual or documental 
realities as possibilities to use in the research. However, within that category, 
there are various methods based on different methodological and theoretical 
assumptions as well as different research practises. 
 
Any academic study that places violence as its central concept and as the 
main focus of research must go through a careful assessment process of not 
only what is interesting—and important—to find out through the process of 
academic analysis but also what is feasible. The researcher’s own position 
and background vis-à-vis the research topic and the context of the research in 
question do create parameters for what is safe, efficient, ethical, and 
achievable. 
 
This chapter now details the process of selecting the research design and 
conducting the data collection starting from these two premises: (1) what data 
are required to answer the research questions and to assess the hypothesis 
as informed by the theoretical assumptions of this thesis and (2) what data 
are accessible safely and reliably for a white European female researcher 
researching a sensitive subject in the context of Pakistan. 
 
	  	   157	  
Qualitative versus Quantitative Approach When Studying Violence 
 
Where sectarianism as a phenomenon is usually presented with qualitative 
accounts, sectarian violence is mostly approached quantitatively. Sectarian 
incidents are turned into numbers, and victims of those violent acts are turned 
into body counts, which then are summed up, compared, and contrasted.81 
 
The aim of this research was not to distance the violent incidents to 
quantifiable occurrences but to look at them more closely. The research 
assigns significance to the violent incidents and places them at the core of the 
analysis in a way not representable by numbers. The aim was to contextualise 
violence and look at it as a method of reproducing or reinforcing identity 
borders and studying its locations and forms and its temporalities and spaces. 
This strongly points towards qualitative research as a methodology to be 
used, since it “is ‘situational’ or contextual, often based on a single case study 
and its particular circumstances rather than replication or generalisation” 
(Morvaridi, 11). 
 
In addition, although the emphasis of this research is on qualitative data and 
qualitative analysis, the collected data also allow some space for quantitative 
analysis, as seen below. For example, the data reveal information on the 
frequency and quantity of violent sectarian attacks in Pakistan or in other 
locations, such as provinces or districts, although these numbers are not what 
the research aims to produce. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See, for example, Hussain (2010). 
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The Researcher and the Researched 
 
Long before the research design is ready, a researcher assesses the 
conditionalities of studying the chosen research topic. It is not only about 
deciding what the appropriate methodology and methods are but also about 
what the practical realities of doing research in the location selected are and 
how the researcher himself/herself influences the equation. The author had 
firsthand experience of the complex societal realities in Pakistan and how, 
coupled with the difficult security situation, that could affect conducting 
research in the country. It was vital to plan the research design in a way that 
would ensure personal safety as much as possible in a country like Pakistan, 
with constantly changing political and security settings. 
 
Any fieldwork in Pakistan related to sectarian violence is necessarily—to 
some extent—unstructured and unpredictable. As noted by Mariam Abou 
Zahab (2006), who is among the few Western people (and maybe the only 
woman) who are actively conducting research in Pakistan on sectarianism, 
“You can only see what is feasible when you are in Pakistan.” She 
emphasised the practical limitations of data collection, stating that it is very 
hard to predict what will happen in the field. She also added that when 
researching this type of topic, “you have to accept that there are things that 
you will never know” (Abou Zahab, 2006). The circumstances in the field are 
also changing fast, making it impossible to predict whether a research design 
would be feasible for a certain period. In this research, then, the scientific 
ideal of controlled and structured research—an idea at the very core of 
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scientific inquiry in general—is aimed at with a research design that does not 
rely on access to the perpetrators or subjects of sectarian violence. 
 
Although the research is archive based, there is also a period of fieldwork, or 
“being in the field.” It was deemed important for the validity of the research to 
collect the data in Pakistan (this is discussed further below). By being in 
Pakistan, it was clear that the element of physical danger was part of the 
process of doing research, although the element had been minimised as 
much as possible through the research design itself. Taking care of personal 
safety82 is an imperative in this research setting to avoid any potential threats 
arising from being situated in Pakistan. This ambient danger, as called by 
Stanko and Lee (2002), occurs “when the researcher is exposed to otherwise 
avoidable dangers simply from having to be in a dangerous setting for the 
research to be carried out” (Stanko & Lee, 2002: 4). Being familiar with 
Pakistan and living in the country, the author had some prior knowledge on 
how to negotiate and anticipate these ambient dangers. But even with careful 
planning and keeping updated on the security situation, it is impossible to fully 
avoid these situations or close calls in Pakistan. Indeed, there were several 
occasions during the field period when these ambient dangers were present.83 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 The concept of personal safety in doing research is discussed further by Knox & Monaghan 
(2002). 83	  The morning of Christmas day in 2008 started with a sound of a low-intensity bomb going 
off in the author’s locality in Lahore, with one casualty later reported. The author successfully 
resisted one robbery attempt and attended an event in Lahore where three low-intensity 
bombs exploded. But threats to personal safety can also come in unexpected forms. Perhaps 
the most surprising example of this is being attacked by a kite, a bird of prey, while sitting at 
the roof top terrace of the author’s residence in Lahore. 
	  	   160	  
Although these threats to personal safety do not necessarily result in physical 
harm and injuries,84 they can take the form of emotional danger. As noted by 
Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, emotional danger can affect researchers in two 
ways: “first, through destabilising personal identity and second, through 
providing greater insight into the research process” (Lee-Treweek & Linkogle, 
2000a: 4). In this case, the author experienced both of the effects, gaining 
understanding of the practical realities of conducting research in a dangerous 
setting.85 
 
Being in the field made it possible to test some assumptions on doing 
research in Pakistan on a sensitive subject such as sectarian violence as a 
white European female, especially in relation to the sectarian groups and 
people closely related to violence. This experience confirmed Mariam Abou 
Zahab’s notion of interviewing the leaders of sectarian groups being 
“disappointing” for they tend to present the same discourse in interviews as 
they do to the media, it being extremely rare that they deviate from the official 
line of rhetoric or reveal other previously unpublished information. It was also 
evident that some of the people linked to violence in one way or another did 
regard the author as a “propaganda tool,” as further elaborated by Jipson and 
Litton (2001). The value of reaching out to those groups for academic 
research purposes is then questionable at best (Abou Zahab, 2006). Although 
negotiating access to subjects related to sectarianism is potentially difficult 
and dangerous, being a female is an advantage in this process. As confirmed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  The encounter with the kite did lead to a mild concussion!	  85	  It was certainly draining to have to incorporate constant security assessments into daily life 
and to realise that those close calls are sometimes very close indeed. It was also a very vivid 
way to get a view of the lived realities of people living in Pakistan and what their daily lives 
consist of.	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by Mariam Abou Zahab, it is easier for a woman to do fieldwork in Pakistan, 
where you are culturally more protected compared with men (Abou Zahab, 
2006). In addition, being from a neutral and relatively unknown country such 
as Finland also helped. The position of the author in the research process 
was also crucial in this regard: emphasising explicitly that the research 
interests stem from the academia (and particularly from peace studies) 
instead of government agencies, for example. Although this theoretically 
means that a peace researcher—being explicitly value-laden (research for 
peace) with clear normative commitment to peace—is far away from the 
positivistic ideal of a neutral, objective, and impartial fact finder and instead 
pursues certain values and ideologies, it was easier to appear neutral in 
interactions and in the overall research process in Pakistan (Schmid, 1968: 
217, 220). 
 
After the period in the field, it was evident that researching sectarianism with 
alternative research designs is possible, with foresight and proper planning, 
albeit it being difficult and more unpredictable. Conducting this research was 
then a lesson learned not only about the phenomenon of sectarianism in 
Pakistan but also about doing research in a complex and insecure place as a 
white European female with limited Urdu skills. 
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
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Data Source 
 
There are a variety of comprehensive data sources and databases, such as 
the Global Terrorism Database (GTD),86  which records terrorist incidents 
around the world. The possibility to collect accurate and reliable information 
on violent sectarian incidents from open-source data sources is very limited. 
The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) is the biggest open-source web-
based data source available on terrorism; low-intensity warfare; and ethnic, 
communal, and sectarian conflicts in South Asia. It is maintained by the 
Institute for Conflict Management in India. The data, according to the portal, 
are gathered from news sources. It is difficult to assess the reliability of the 
data and the data collection methods used because they are not presented in 
the web portal. In addition, the data-presentation method varies by year. From 
2010 onwards, sectarian incidents are presented with clear categories and 
variables, but before that year, the data are in the form of partial descriptive 
news arranged chronologically. 
 
There are also records of sectarian incidents being collected by the Pakistani 
police and the Pakistani courts, but whether they are comprehensive or 
accurate, or indeed accessible, remains a question. The Pakistan Institute for 
Peace Studies (PIPS) has also developed a database 87  on conflict and 
security issues at the national level with variables related to sectarianism 
(“sectarian clashes” and “terrorist attacks by sectarian groups,” or “sectarian-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 GTD is an open-source database maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. It is the 
world’s largest database on terrorism incidents. 
87 For details on the database, see http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?id=3. 
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related terrorist attacks”). The PIPS database is not an open source, however, 
but needs a paid membership to access the data. 
 
One possibility to collect data on violent sectarian incidents is to go directly to 
the newspaper archives. Because not all Pakistan newspapers have online 
archives and those with back issues in online format are available for different 
periods, this option would have meant going through the paper archives of the 
different newspapers, which is very time consuming and raises a question on 
efficiency. It would have also meant having to decide what is a “violent 
sectarian incident,” imposing the researcher’s own framing and understanding 
to the process of recording the data. From the point of view of the research 
and its objectivity, it was thought important to have that framing done by an 
impartial Pakistani entity. 
 
The only impartial body in Pakistan that systematically collects records on 
violent sectarian incidents and whose records are freely available for 
researchers is the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP). This high-
profile nongovernment organisation (NGO) working for the promotion and 
implementation of human rights in Pakistan was established in 1987 and has 
(and has had) prominent lawyers, thinkers, and advocates as employees and 
office holders. As noted by Iftikhar Malik, the organisation is a nationwide, 
nonsectarian, and nonprofit think tank that has done laudable work throughout 
its existence (Malik, 2005: 150, 225). Part of the organisation’s mission is to 
collect information on human rights abuses and issues relevant to human 
rights and minorities in Pakistan. This information is then analysed yearly in 
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their annual reports.88 The NGO also produces other written publications as 
part of their advocacy work, frequently holds seminars and workshops, and 
conducts fact-finding missions throughout the country. 
  
 
Data Format 
 
The archives of the HRCP, or reference section as the organisation calls it, 
are located in its secretariat office in Lahore, Garden Town. The archives 
store information in the form of newspaper clippings categorised 
chronologically in books for each year. The organisation gathers news items 
related to sectarianism, not only news about violent sectarian incidents. As 
mentioned above, the categorisation of what is sectarian is made by the 
HRCP, allowing the researcher to gain an understanding of that framing while 
going over the collected data. The fact that the organisation gathers news on 
sectarianism more broadly means that to be able to record the data on 
sectarian incidents, you have to sift through a lot of other news items all 
centred on the theme of sectarianism. 
 
Going through the news items collected in this manner was more time 
consuming but also much more rewarding. It permitted observations about 
sectarianism not possible through already-processed data from databanks 
and thus greatly contributed to the overall understanding of sectarianism as a 
phenomenon. It also allowed our understanding to broaden on all the actors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88  For these annual reports, please see http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/publications/annual-
reports/. 
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linked to the phenomenon of sectarianism in Pakistan and the roles they 
played in it. 
 
Conducting the data collection in the HRCP archives not only enabled 
acquiring the context of sectarian violence but also provided context to the 
research process. By recording the data in the reference section, something 
that is an inherently solitary work got injected with social interaction, and it 
was possible to observe the methods used to collect and categorise the data 
in the archives firsthand. 89  Having a long-term association with the 
organisation also provided the opportunity to get to know the works of an 
NGO in Pakistan and the people working in this field. The author was also 
invited to participate in meetings and workshops organised by the HRCP, 
providing intellectual company and valuable contacts, enriching the research 
experience tremendously. 
 
As mentioned above, going through the sectarian news in this format allowed 
the context of the violent incidents to be present. The archives included news 
about meetings on sectarianism, opinions, and statements of various political 
figures. The clippings informed the researcher about the political rhetoric on 
sectarianism and the favourite euphemisms used for the phenomenon both by 
the politicians and media alike.90 Other significant and recurring news items 
were Muharram preparations, banning or booking of ulema, rallies, protests, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Going through the yearbooks on sectarianism and sitting in the same grey plastic chair at 
the far-left corner of the reference section also gave the author a window to the daily life of a 
small Pakistani office, which the author is very grateful for. 
90  For example, the euphemism favoured by the media in 1997 was to talk about 
“sectarianism as a virus.”	  
	  	   166	  
and arrests. This context, however informative, is not the focus of the 
research. 
 
Limitations of the Data 
 
Despite all the advantages of using the HRCP’s archives on sectarianism, the 
collected data are not without limitations. These limitations can relate to both 
media’s reporting on news related to sectarianism in general and sectarian 
violence in particular and the HRCP’s data collection methods. 
 
Despite violence and violent incidents typically being the type of news that are 
well reported by the media, one cannot assume this for all categories of 
violence. It is important to be aware that the media in Pakistan might have the 
tendency to report certain types of violent incidents while not being interested 
in, and thus leaving out, others that could be categorised as sectarian 
violence. Big striking acts of violence are sure to be reported and widely 
publicised, but whether all low-level and community-level violence crosses the 
print threshold is uncertain. The possibility of media bias cannot be fully ruled 
out either. Furthermore, the media in Pakistan has its own restrictions about 
publishing material, although it is likely not to affect the reporting of violent 
sectarian incidents extensively. When President Musharraf banned some of 
the sectarian groups in 2001 and 2002, there was also a restriction placed on 
the media. They were not allowed to publish material such as statements from 
those banned groups. This most likely had an effect on the media’s reporting 
on sectarian news in general, but it is unlikely to have affected the publishing 
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of violent incidents. Overall, it is pertinent to acknowledge that the data 
collected from the HRCP’s archives do also depend on the media’s ability and 
willingness to report all sectarian incidents as accurately as possible. 
 
The second element limiting the data collection relates to the HRCP archive’s 
data collection methods. The person in charge of the sectarian news files 
collects the news items by going through the day’s newspapers and cutting 
out the relevant news items, then gluing them into the relevant yearbook. This 
method relies on the personnel of the HRCP archives to systematically spot 
sectarian-related news and record them in the yearbooks. With this human 
element in mind, it was evident that the archives did not include absolutely 
every news item published about sectarianism or sectarian violence. Thus, 
the data collected from the archives do not include every violent sectarian 
incident from the selected period. Although the data set attempts to be as 
accurate and as comprehensive as possible to be able to test the hypothesis 
and answer research questions, the analysis does not have to cover all violent 
incidents of that period. What is more important than to achieve a 
quantitatively perfect data set is for the data to be representative of all the 
possible violent sectarian cases and typical of its kind (Knox & Monaghan, 
2002). 
 
The majority of the news items collected and archived by the HRCP were 
from English-language newspapers. Table 1 provides details on the 
newspapers that were used by the HRCP for their data collection on news 
related to sectarianism. The table shows that HRCP included all major English 
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dailies, particularly Dawn, Daily Times, the News, and the Nation, in their data 
collection. The fact that news items from Urdu dailies were not present in the 
archives raises a question on a potential news bias. Because of the author’s 
limited Urdu skills, any data collected from Urdu newspapers would have 
been left out from the analysis even if such data were available. It is important 
to keep this data limitation in mind when thinking about the validity of the data: 
the focus of the research is not explanations of violence or the perpetrators 
but the locations and spaces of that violence as well as the methods used. It 
is safe to assume that these details are similar with the Urdu news or at least 
very close to the English news reporting. 
 
Although it is impossible to verify, there is a possibility that the definition of 
what is considered as sectarian news might have changed as the person in 
charge of collecting the news items has changed, although there are specific 
guidelines for the selection of news items, which all the personnel working in 
the HRCP archives are following. 
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Table 1.  Newspapers used by the HRCP archives in 1996–2005. 	  
Business Recorder	  
Dawn (the Karachi edition of Dawn was 
also occasionally used)	  
Daily Times	  
Frontier Post	  
Muslim	  
The Nation	  
The News (the Rawalpindi edition of the 
News was also occasionally used)	  
The Statesman	  	   	   Source: Data collection 	   	   	  
Time Period 
 
The HRCP’s archives on sectarian news start from the year 1996. This was 
also selected as the starting point of the data collected for the thesis. Because 
the older sources on sectarianism are harder to gain access to, particularly 
outside Pakistan, and thus are not often featured in the analyses on sectarian 
violence, the researcher chose to start the researched period from as early as 
the data allowed. The data collection period spanned five months, from 
September 2008 to January 2009. The year 2008 was the last year with a 
complete yearbook in the HRCP archives by the time data recording was 
finished. However, it was not deemed necessary by the researcher to include 
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all the data available in the reference section for the purposes of the analysis. 
A period significantly longer than ten years was acknowledged to create a 
very lengthy analysis process, without creating additional value to the ability to 
answer the research questions. Thus, 2005 was selected as the final year to 
be included in the data set. 
 
The period from 1996 to 2005 provides the analysis process news items from 
ten years of sectarian conflicts in Pakistan. It is a long-enough period for the 
analysis to be valid, but it also corresponds with some major events in the 
story of sectarianism in Pakistan, and the qualitative and quantitative changes 
in sectarian violence are discussed in chapter 3. The exact beginning of 
sectarian violence is debatable and not commonly agreed on, but analysts 
usually date the start of organised sectarian violence to the mid-1980s, with a 
major escalation of that violence occurring in the mid-1990s. This escalation 
was related to the emergence of sectarian groups, as detailed in chapter 3. In 
particular, the birth of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) in the mid-1990s changed not 
only sectarian violence and but also militancy in Pakistan in later years. By 
analysing sectarian violence starting from 1996, the collected data are able to 
track the emergence of the LJ as an actor in the field of sectarian violence 
and to record incidents after the major qualitative and quantitative change in 
violence has taken place. What the analysis of the selected data is not able to 
do, however, is to compare the data on sectarian incidents before the 
organisation entered the sectarian scene. The analysed period also covers 
both military and civilian rule and the banning of sectarian organisations in 
2001 and 2002. 
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Recording of Data 
 
Data from the HRCP’s archives was recorded in notebooks by hand because 
the use of computers was not practical in the archives section, mostly 
because of the difficult access to power from the workstation and constant 
electricity cuts, which would have affected the reliability of computers as a 
recording tool. The data collected in the notebooks was then electronically 
transferred into the data set. 
 
The notes include a wide selection of news items, not just those focusing on 
sectarian violence, but only those related to violence are included in the data 
set. Because the focus of the research is Sunni-Shia violence, only these 
incidents were included in the final data set, excluding the following categories 
from the analysis: 
 
• Violence against Ahmadis or Christians: The HRCP has separate 
archived files for violence against minorities, but there were few news 
items related to the Ahmadi and the Christian communities in the 
sectarian files as well. 
• Kashmir: The analysis focuses on the four provinces of Pakistan as 
well as Gilgit–Baltistan (formerly called the Federally Administered 
Northern Areas or FANA) and does not cover sectarian violence in 
Kashmir. 
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• Violence with the police, especially encounters with the police: These 
encounters were discussed in chapter 3 as a category linked to 
sectarian violence. 
• Securitisation of sensitive places and events in preparation for possible 
violence: This category is briefly discussed in the analysis of sectarian 
violence, but news items on security plans (especially in preparation for 
Muharram), the police, and other security force deployments in 
different areas are not included in the analysis. 
• Speculations about perpetrators: After the most violent incident, there 
are speculations by different political and religious actors and by the 
families of the victims on who was behind the attacks. 
• Bringing alleged perpetrators to justice: These are news items on 
arrests, court cases, and convictions in violent sectarian cases. 
• Action initiated by violence: Often, after violent incidents, there are 
reactions by the groups or communities involved. Very often, these 
reactions are patterned, including closing of shops and markets, 
demonstrations, and protests. These are not included in the data set 
unless the reactions themselves have been violent. 
• Nonnews items: The data collected in the archives include a variety of 
pieces referring to sectarian violence without reporting those incidents. 
These pieces—such as editorials, opinion-editorials, and analyses—
are not included in the data set except few selected cases when they 
contain relevant information in the categories chosen that is not 
obtained from other news items reporting that incident in question. 
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Despite that the above categories were not included in the analysis phase, 
they provide a view of the enterprise of violence discussed in chapter 3. 
Sectarian violence as a category is much broader than Sunni-Shia violence, 
with a complex web of different actors and processes involved, existing in 
local, supralocal, and regional contexts simultaneously. 
 
When it was evident that news items were not recorded in the archives 
(another news source referred to incidents not included in the yearbook, for 
example) or that there was only partial information on the incident (news items 
reported the casualty figure after an incident rather than reporting the incident 
itself, for example), online newspaper archives were used to gather further 
information if available. Similarly, when in the archives there were news items 
of an incident from only one newspaper, the information of that news item was 
verified from the online archives of other newspapers also used by the HRCP 
archives, if possible. These additions are all noted down in the data set. This 
triangulation of data helped to create some flexibility with the data collection 
by not being limited to the information found in the HRCP archives. It ensured 
that as reliable and accurate data as possible were included in the data set. 
(Macdonald, 2001: 208) 
 
 
Research Variables 
 
To be able to test the research hypothesis, the following variables were 
included in the data set and were later analysed: 
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• Location of violence: For locating the incidents geographically, details 
of the locations were recorded with as much detail as the news items 
allowed. Location in this study does not only refer to the geographical 
location of an incident but also refers to the type of location of an 
incident (mosque, local residence, procession, for examples). 
• Target and victims: This refers to information on the (intended) target 
and those who were killed in the incident. 
• Methods: This refers to the method or methods of violence that were 
used in the incident. 
• Time: Rather than referring to the exact time of an incident, time here 
signifies whether there are any specific temporal elements attached to 
the violent sectarian acts. 
 
 
These variables ensure that there are adequate and accurate data to assess 
the research hypothesis. They also ensure that the research is designed in 
such a way that the data gathered from the archives—and from the online 
newspaper archives—do not have to be verified by using other sources. 
There is no need, for example, to verify agency—that is, who was really 
behind the violent acts. There is also no need to verify motivation—that is, 
why was violence perpetrated—behind the violent acts. Both agency and 
motivation are highly debated in analyses on sectarian incidents both by the 
media and by analysts, and getting reliable information on those categories 
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would be nearly impossible to do. All these chosen variables and their 
significance for the research are discussed at length in the next chapter. 
 
 
Data Analysis 
 
What is needed, then, is to adjust these methods to the existing 
realities of where and how the data was collected, and use them to 
“bring the data together in meaningful way.” (Wilkinson, 2000: 77) 
 
The process of data analysis resembles the idea of understanding as a 
“hermeneutic circle.” You enter the analysis with few prethought variables, but 
their number and content are subject to change as the understanding of the 
subject deepens with the analysis.91 
 
In many ways, data analysis has already started in a research project long 
before the researcher enters the field or the actual analysis stage is reached. 
Researchers analyse the data that are around them (data that are mostly in 
the secondary form, such as literature and newspapers) once the research 
project starts, although that analysis is not necessarily very systematic. This 
has an effect on the research process by influencing how the research subject 
is seen in general and what methodologies and data collection methods are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Hermeneutics originates from the Greek verb hermeneuein, “to interpret,” and it argues that 
explaining a phenomenon is always tied to the understanding we have of it. Thus, the 
analysis model has to be revised during the analysis process and, as Nigel King advices, 
should be looked at by outside advisers with knowledge of the field. (King, 1999: 122) 
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chosen. As long as researchers are aware of this continuous role of data 
analysis, it is possible to be reflective of this in the research process and 
account for this in the final analysis. 
 
It is also important to be aware of one’s own position as a researcher in 
relation to data analysis. When looking at sectarian violence as a form of 
communication, the author, as a non-Pakistani researcher, imposes her own 
understanding of what communication is to the collected data. This raises a 
question on the validity of the analysis vis-à-vis the ability to really understand 
the complex and foreign terrain of sectarianism in Pakistan. This question was 
raised during the research period in the field. The only response that justified 
the researcher’s position and the research design was to point towards the 
value of plurality in academic research and the need for the outsider 
perspective in that plurality. As noted by Rossman and Rallis, a qualitative 
researcher assumes that analysing and interpreting the data and representing 
the findings are filtered through his or her own personal biography, which is 
situated in a specific sociopolitical, historic moment (Rossman & Rallis, 2003: 
11). This combination of a unique educational background, personal 
biography, and skill set enables researchers to produce new understandings 
on the research subject, despite—and because of—being an outsider to the 
research context. This dichotomy of insider and outsider researchers and the 
advantages and disadvantages of these positions are further elaborated by 
Hermann (2001). 
 
In practical terms, the process of data analysis started with the input of data 
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from the handwritten notes to the first version of the data set. The second 
stage was to organise and categorise the data and exclude those news items 
that were not related to the core of the analysis, the Sunni-Shia violence (as 
described previously in this chapter). While organising and categorising the 
data, preliminary notes were taken of data observations, which helped to 
further formulate key themes arising from the analysis at later stages. These 
notes were kept separate from the collected data but were useful in identifying 
the emerging themes and patterns from the data. The next step was to 
reassess the validity of the variables chosen in relation to the hypothesis. The 
data were then further analysed, and locations, methods, targets, and times of 
violent incidents were looked at within the theoretical framework and 
assumptions of this research. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
The research on the discursive practises on constructing space and identity 
and on the ways that self-other relationships are communicated through 
violent sectarian acts shares theoretical assumptions with the social 
constructivist theory of knowledge, which is interested in shared meanings 
and knowledge constructed in social interaction. When studying a sensitive 
topic such as sectarian violence, it is important that not only theoretical 
considerations enter the process of selecting the research design. The 
commitment to personal safety is paramount, although risks are impossible to 
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fully avoid in a location such as Pakistan. There are serious security issues 
involved with just being in that locality. The research design, stemming from 
the constructivist theory, then has to cater for both what data are required and 
what data are (safely) accessible. 
 
Although risks involved in conducting research can be minimised through the 
research design, with forethought and planning and with a careful positioning 
of the researcher while in the field, there is still a possibility that ambient 
danger does create unexpected situations and affects personal safety. This 
can have a negative effect on the researcher but can also help in 
understanding the research context and the research subject in question. The 
rationale of investigating violence through collecting data from the HRCP 
archives was a result of an assessment of not only what data were relevant 
for a novel approach to study sectarian violence but also what research 
design would be feasible to conduct in a research environment like Pakistan. 
 
The conditionalities of collecting the data and the limitations of the data itself 
create parameters on what is possible to know in the research. Despite the 
limitations that the data collected from the HRCP archives placed on the 
analysis, it has one important advantage: the categorisation of what is a 
violent sectarian incident was done by the organisation, not by the researcher. 
This was crucial to avoid imposing the author’s understanding of that 
categorisation on the data collection and later on to the analysis of that data. 
The archives also had the advantage of having collected data starting from 
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the year 1996, allowing the analysis to include a period of sectarian violence 
not accessible otherwise. 
 
During the first data selection process, it was clear that the collected data 
included a vast amount of news items not directly related to Sunni-Shia 
violence. Despite excluding those from the final data analysis, they point 
towards the scope of the sectarian violent enterprise and the need to look at 
this context when trying to understand sectarian violence in Pakistan. With 
this in mind, the next chapter discusses the idea of violence as a form of 
communication and how it is communicating the discourse of exclusivist group 
identity—the sectarian difference—particularly in relation to the research 
variables of location, targets, and time of violence. 	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Chapter 5  
Violence as Reproduction of Exclusivist Sectarian Identity 
Discourse 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
So far we have looked at the theoretical understanding of identity and the 
construction of identities through borders in chapter 1. We also touched upon 
the way sectarianism, as a specific way of dealing with difference, and 
violence are related to identity formation and maintenance. Now these 
concepts and relationships are analysed in more detail, specifically in the 
context of Pakistan and exclusivist sectarian discourse. 
 
The chapter starts with exploring the impact violence can have in creating 
borders and changing the meaning of sectarian differences between different 
identity groups. Then it will analyse the specific type of difference that is 
created when it is tied to a religious discourse, how that differs from other 
identity signifiers, and the type of differences they create. The chapter also 
touches upon the discussion of religion and violence and how this study is 
situated within that framework. 
 
Lastly, this chapter will turn to look at the concept of location of violence—the 
spatiality and temporality of violence—and relate it to the idea of violence as a 
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performative act. This section introduces the variables of location and time 
used in the data analysis with more detail. Finally, the chapter locates 
sectarian violence in sacred spaces and discusses their relevance in 
sectarian conflicts. The victims of targeted killings on locations of violence are 
also examined. 
 
The Difference that Violence Makes 
 
In sectarianism, as previously stated, violence can be seen as a border-
building mechanism between the different groups in conflict. Through the 
creation of borders, violence can both try to magnify difference with the other 
and minimise the difference by projecting a false sense of homogeneity on 
their own group (Liechty & Clegg, 2001: 152). Sectarian violence can thus 
occur to create difference, especially in cases when groups in conflict share 
the same culture and perhaps also other group identities and identity markers. 
Conflict and violence can then serve as a means of enforcing a border and 
creating the required difference to separate the identities from each other. 
This mechanism of ‘violence as a creator a difference’ should not be 
overstated, however. Conflict and violence cannot build borders unless some 
kind of division, or difference, exists a priori, but violence can effectively 
problematise and change the nature and meaning of those divisions and 
differences. 
 
Tor Ase (1999) has examined sectarian difference in his sociological study on 
Sunnis and Shias and the violent sectarian conflict in Gilgit, Gilgit–Baltistan 
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Pakistan. The region first witnessed sectarian strife during General Zia’s time, 
creating a legacy of decades of sectarian conflict and tension. As previously 
mentioned, Gilgit is one of those locations in Pakistan where the usual Shia-
Sunni demographic balance is reversed, Gilgit-Baltistan being the only Shia-
majority political unit in the country. This demographic balance was affected 
by the migration of Sunnis to the area, and it is claimed that this change was 
actively pursued by the Pakistani state to counter the Shia threat. In addition, 
the state policies, in relation to the constitutional status of the region, and the 
centralised administration and limited political rights of the residents have 
contributed to sectarian conflict in the area (ICG, 2007). 
 
As described by Ase, “The situation in Gilgit must be described in terms of 
resignification of principles of social differentiation. Formerly, the population 
was differentiated according to principles other than religious affiliation, on the 
basis of language and ethnicity (from the Arabic qawm)” (Ase, 1999: 63). He 
then pursues to explain the change in emphasis on group signifiers and why 
sectarian difference—or theology—has become the dominant form of social 
differentiation. Ase’s analysis highlights the importance to distance the 
concept of identity formation from thinking of identity—whether group or 
individual—as singular but rather as identities.92 
 
This is further explored in other research locating sectarian difference in the 
multiplicity of identities, again in the context of the city of Gilgit. In his study on 
identity discourses and processes of identity formation in Gilgit, Martin 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  This also relates to the discussion in chapter 2, whether sectarian conflicts are actually 
class, ethnic, or biraderi conflicts. 
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Sökefeld analysed five “dimensions of difference”: religion, qom (ethnicity), 
clan, locality, and language (Sökefeld, 2010: 238). He uses three related 
terms that together make up a concept of identity: multiplicity, difference, and 
intersectionality. Multiplicity denotes that identity exists only as identities and 
not in the singular. It is “formed through a plurality of relationships of 
belonging and otherness.” Intersectionality, for Sökefeld, points to the fact that 
the different identities (or the various differences) characterising an individual 
are not unrelated among themselves (Sökefeld, 2010: 235, 236). He then 
goes on to show the fluidity of these differences and the various meanings 
they can acquire in different “momentary positions” (Sökefeld, 2010: 239). 
 
Nosheen Ali traces the change in the meaning of sectarian difference and the 
consequences of that change, again in Gilgit, since the 1970s and sees the 
processes that have enabled the production of sectarian difference and made 
it politically significant, stemming from the state practises in the area (Ali, 
2008: 28, 30). Both Ali and Sökefeld note how, with the resignification of 
sectarian difference, that difference produces the tendency to define, 
understand, and interpret other nonreligious matters as well as disputes and 
conflicts overall through a sectarian lens (Sökefeld, 2010: 251; Ali, 2010: 745). 
 
Although this study focuses on violence and its role in identity formation and 
maintenance, it does not want to claim that violence, or violent conflict, is the 
only method of resignification of principles of social differentiation or the only 
form of border maintenance between the different identities. Both Ali (2010) 
and Marsden (2005) talk at length about how religious difference is 
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experienced, negotiated, and reproduced in everyday life. In the context of 
these studies, sectarianism is not the domain of militant and organised 
sectarian groups or dependent solely on the variety of forms of violence. 
 
These studies are important in showing how individual and group identities 
are interlinked when talking about the significance of sectarian difference. 
Through other identities, belonging to a sect is intertwined with belonging to 
different ethnic or linguistic groups or being affiliated politically, for example. 
They also highlight that sectarian difference is not the only difference each 
individual—and group—has to negotiate when thinking about their identity. 
However, especially with a protracted violent conflict, sectarian difference can 
become dominant, through which other matters are then perceived. These 
studies are also, within their own context, accounts against the essentialist 
understandings of identity and what is termed as sectarian identity or 
difference. The meaning and consequence of sectarian difference change; 
they are not static. Therefore, they are also changeable, both in being 
significant or less significant as compared with the other differences. 
 
What is noteworthy for this thesis is the tension between the terms used in 
these studies, quoted above, and the analysis conducted here. Whereas Ali 
produces a variety of examples to challenge the understanding of sectarian 
identity as “inherently exclusionary and antagonistic” and that “differences 
between sects naturally lead to conflict” (Ali, 2008: 28; Ali, 2010: 747), Ase 
and Sökefeld talk about theological or religious differences instead. The 
difference in terminology is significant because sectarianism is now defined as 
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a way to deal with difference, as a rigid way to adhere to a group identity—in 
other words, as a group attitude related to a group identity rather than as a 
group identity itself. Thus, belonging to a sect does not equal sectarian 
identity. The theoretical examination of the term sectarian reveals that 
sectarian discourse is inherently, or as per definition, exclusivist and 
antagonistic, whereas being a Sunni or Shia, or of any other sect (or 
denomination) in Islam or other religions, is not. It is crucial to make—and 
emphasise—this distinction to maintain conceptual clarity. It is also vital to 
highlight it in order not to be seen promoting essentialised understandings of 
religious identities. 
 
There can, however, exist “the illusion of singular identity” or the emphasis 
and insistence on theological or religious difference being the single most 
important difference by those supporting and promoting sectarian discourse 
(Sen, 2006: 175). 
 
Religion and Violence 
 
Equally important to the analysis of the role of religion in relation to identity 
formation and as the significant difference is to examine the debate over 
religion and violence and locate this study in that debate, especially when this 
research draws some of the methods used to analyse violence from that body 
of academic research. 
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There is ever-growing academic literature on violence and religion. The 
significance of that body of literature changed in the Western academia after 
the dramatic events of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States 
in 2001. Since then, academic analysis, especially in international relations 
and peace and conflict studies, has had to get accustomed to religion as an 
uncomfortable but often unavoidable variable in analysis. In addition, although 
a significant amount of that analysis is centred on trying to understand the 
9/11 attacks and the processes that led to them, the research done on the 
relationship of violence and religion has contributed greatly to the 
understanding of the nuances and the contextuality of that relationship. 
 
There are a few seminal works that are central in their contribution to this 
exploration of the relationship: Hector Avalos’s Fighting Words (2005), Mark 
Juergensmeyer’s Terror in the Mind of God (2003), and Bruce Lincoln’s Holy 
Terrors (2003), to name a few. Most of the current research does not treat 
either religion or violence as ahistorical concepts but locates them, and their 
relationship, within historical and cultural contexts. They also mostly reject the 
universalised category of religion and are aware of the a priori epistemological 
considerations of those traces and assumptions that are being carried forward 
when we use terms such as religion and violence in different contexts (King, 
2007: 230). 
 
Without getting too drawn into the discussion of how religion relates to 
violence, it is essential to highlight what in that relationship is critical for this 
study. Religion as an identity-forming mechanism that constructs and 
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mobilises individuals and groups is also widely recognised and researched 
(see, for example, Wellman, 2007) in the context of Pakistan. 93  This 
relationship of religion, identity borders, and their potential for conflict and 
even violence is recognised, but the causality of that relationship is contested. 
Some researchers, such as Wellman (2007), would assert that “religion does 
create social and symbolic boundaries and that these often do lead to conflict 
and, more rarely, to violence” (Wellman, 2007: 10). Although this study, in the 
context of Pakistan, thinks that violence can create the borders along the lines 
of religious difference, these borders, then, carry the potential for further 
conflict and violence. 
 
This points towards the idea of active agency in producing borders and that 
the construction of identities is inherently linked to social action as well as the 
question of power. The relationship between religion and power has been 
endlessly debated and is further obscured by the complex relationship 
between religion and identity. Power, coercion, and religion are structurally 
linked (Wellman, 2007) as “our constructions of the world are therefore bound 
up with power relations because they have implications for what is permissible 
for different people to do, and for how they may treat others” (Burr, 2003: 5). 
This is illustrated by a decree issued by Sunni Maulana Rashed Ahmed: 
 
Undoubtedly, Shias are Kafirs, there is no doubt about this. They 
including literate, illiterate, man, woman or child are of the same belief 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Religion as a mechanism to mobilise for violence has been explored in detail, for example, 
by Abou Zahab (2004). 
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so they are all infidels. Shias are more dangerous than other non-
Muslims because they are entrenched in Muslim communities and are 
trying to destroy this world and the world to come. May God protect us 
from their shar [mischief]. (Shah, 2003: 15) 
 
By defining Shias as kafirs, making sure at the same time that all Shias are 
included in this category without exceptions, Maulana Ahmed is permitting a 
certain kind of action towards Shias. Some Islamic law traditions do not oblige 
Muslims to use the same peaceful laws of coexistence with infidels, which 
apply to other categories of people. In fact, when the enemy is labelled as 
kafir, the symbolic implication is to define the conflict as jihad,94 and the need 
to protect true Islam against nonbelievers arises. Thus, Maulana Ahmed is 
permitting the use of violence by this definition or at least opening violence as 
an option (Ase, 1999: 61). 
 
As observed by Waseem, “In the case of sectarianism in Pakistan, the 
enmeshing of violence and identity formation has all along underscored the 
conflict” (Waseem, 2010: 25). Religion provides the discourse of difference 
enforced by sectarian conflict and violence. It is important to emphasise that 
this study does not think that this means that religion in general—or in the 
specific context of Pakistan—does always lead to violence. However, it offers 
the potential for it, as do other ways to construct identities. In addition, as 
religion can mobilise groups for violence, it can also mobilise groups for 
peace. Violence, in a similar manner, can also act as a unifying factor, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 The word jihad comes from the Arabic root meaning “to strive,” to exert,” or ‘to fight.” The 
exact meaning depends on context (Esposito, 2003: 157–8). 
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although it is looked at as a dichotomising tool in this study. Therefore, this 
research wants to distance its analysis from what is understood as religious 
violence or violence in the name of god and talk about the sectarian violence 
analysed here as violence related to religious discourse. Although it draws 
from the literature of religious violence some of its concepts of analysing 
sectarian violence, it does not want to claim that religion is able to explain the 
phenomenon of sectarian violence in totality. In fact, the aim is to locate 
violence and assess how these locations of violence correspond to that 
religious difference that violence is assumed to create and enforce. 
 
 
Religious divisions and differences are not inherently bad or problematic. 
They become problematic when religious identities have exclusivist political 
agendas and hierarchical notions of existence, as is the case with 
sectarianism. An example of this exclusivist political agenda with an explicit 
hierarchical understanding of spatial existence is in an open letter that 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi distributed to Shia Hazara 95  residents in Mari Abad, 
Quetta: 
 
All Shias are wajib-ul-qatl (worthy of killing). We will rid Pakistan of 
[this] unclean people. Pakistan means land of the pure, and the Shias 
have no right to be here. We have the fatwa and signatures of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 “The Shia Hazara people of Pakistan, are a Persian-speaking ethnicity of predominantly 
Mongolian descent that emigrated from central Afghanistan to Pakistan beginning in the 
1890s. They are not to be confused with the Hindko-speaking and predominantly Sunni 
Hazara (Hazarewal) of Northeast Pakistan, a native population of Indo-Aryan descent” 
(Minority Support Pakistan 2012: 6). For more on Hazaras, see, for example, Alessandro 
Monsutti (2007). 
	  	   190	  
revered ulema in which the Shias have been declared kaafir. Just as 
our fighters have waged a successful jihad against the Shia-Hazaras 
in Afghanistan, our mission [in Pakistan] is the abolition of this impure 
sect and people, the Shias and the Shia-Hazaras, from every city, 
every village, every nook and corner of Pakistan. Like in the past, 
[our] successful Jihad against the Hazaras in Pakistan and, in 
particular, in Quetta is ongoing and will continue [in the future]. We 
will make Pakistan their graveyard—their houses will be destroyed by 
bombs and suicide bombers. We will only rest when we fly the flag of 
true Islam on this land. Our fighters and suicide bombers have 
[already] successfully operated in Parachinar, and are awaiting 
orders to operate across Pakistan. Jihad against the Shia-Hazaras 
has now become our duty. Our suicide bombers have successfully 
operated in Hazara Town on May 6, and now our next target is your 
houses in Alamdar Road. 
The Principal, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Pakistan 
(Minority Support Pakistan, 2012: 12) 
 
The one-page photocopied letter was distributed anonymously at night on the 
streets of Mari Abad in August 2011. In the letter, the upholders of “true Islam” 
vow to perform a purification of space, now the whole Pakistan, of the impure 
Shias. For this, they have the backing of the “revered” ulema, which have 
confirmed Shias as kafir, infidels, who are a justified target of their jihad. This 
letter—an example of the violence of the word—does not only incite violence, 
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but it also justifies violence with very powerful patronage. To disagree with 
this argument is to disagree not only with the power of violence and the 
militant LJ 96  but also with the “revered ulema.” It is, essentially, a 
disagreement with a powerful sectarian discourse.97	  
 
Protracted Violence 
 
If sectarian discourse is already an established characteristic of society and 
the conflict protracted, the nature of violence also changes. The sectarian 
system no longer requires large amounts of violence to maintain itself. (See, 
for example, Liechty & Clegg, 2001: 12.) Just an occasional act of violence 
will be enough to sustain the boundary that is already enforced and fortified. 
Based on the literature, violence is thought to be routinised and ritualised 
(Tambiah, 1996). Thus, violence is not irrational but part of the regularised 
conduct of sectarian politics. Such violence is up to a point purposive, 
ritualised, and repetitive, as noted by Tambiah (1996). It is therefore “a central 
experience in the defining self-perception of collectivities and their 
expectations of social intercourse” (Tambiah, 1996: 323). Violence is also 
very effective, in relation to communicating exclusivist sectarian discourse, for 
it targets the fundamental values and self-definition of those communities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Ahmed Rashid offers an additional, complementary explanation for this dedication of 
sectarian groups being the upholders of “true Islam.” According to him, sectarian groups are 
vying to prove themselves the standard bearers of Islam and being closer to “true Islam” by 
displaying extreme hostility and intolerance to those designated as being un-Islamic by virtue 
of belonging to religious minorities and minority sects (Rashid, 1996). 
 
97 Several weeks later, the LJ followed through on its threat to attack Hazaras in their homes 
when it detonated a massive car bomb on a crowded street near the Hazara Eid-Gah of Mari 
Abad in Quetta (Minority Support Pakistan, 2012: 12). 
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involved. Violence also triggers and breeds further violence in protracted 
violent sectarian conflict. What is developed is semiotics of violence, where a 
specific discourse of violence with its own logic, techniques, strategies, and 
objectivities is understood by the conflicting parties as well as anticipated and 
counteracted (Tambiah, 1996: 223). 
 
In protracted violent conflicts, the number of attacks or actual incidents of 
violence do not necessarily determine the extent of societal outreach and 
influence of the perpetrators of sectarian violence or the exclusivist discourse 
they promote (Siddiqa, 2013: 17–8). Sometimes, no actual violence is 
needed; a mere perceived threat is enough to cause the wanted effect. An 
interesting but less researched theme illustrates this point: the role of 
rumours. As the acts of violence against Shias have risen over the years, 
uncorroborated rumours of planned or failed attacks have spread rapidly 
within the communities experiencing the conflict (Karmon, 2006). For 
example, Tor Ase accounts how a rumour spreading in the Sunni areas of 
Gilgit assumed that Sunni women and children were being slaughtered by 
Shias in and around the city. Later, this proved to be false, but it immediately 
mobilised the Sunnis to come to the rescue of their fellow believers (Ase, 
1999: 58). A very different example on the mobilising role of rumour occurred 
in the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) operation in Islamabad in July 2007. The 
militants entrenched in the mosque were made to believe that the army 
soldiers who led the assault were all Shia. From the summer of 2007 
onwards, the Shia in the army and the paramilitary forces have become a 
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direct target of violence98 (Abou Zahab, 2009b: 4). In a location with a long 
history of violence, rumours on violence can be a part of maintaining sectarian 
discourse and difference without the actual use of violence. 
 
 
The Difference that Religion Makes 
 
Although the relationship of religion to the concept of sectarianism was briefly 
discussed earlier in chapter 2, it is also important to assess its relationship to 
sectarian difference and violence in Pakistan and how it relates to the idea of 
exclusivist identity discourse. 
 
The studies referred to above talk about the process of change in the 
multiplicity of individual and group identities that people in Gilgit hold because 
of the protracted violent conflict in the area. Religious identity became the 
most important identity in many contexts, and religious affiliation was 
mentioned the most when the people participating in the research were asked 
about their most important identity (Sökefeld, 2010: 242). This was also 
coupled with a “dominant tendency to view and assess people foremost as 
members of a sect within Islam” (Ali, 2010: 745). Often, religious difference is 
thought to be qualitatively different from other differences or group identities 
because of its connection to divinity and the fact that it draws from sacred 
texts, such as the Quran and Hadiths, which are seen as authoritative and 
whose position of authority is nonnegotiable. In the words of Leif Manger, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 For more on the role of rumour, see, for example, Das (2007) and Varley (2010).	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Couching the conflict in the idiom of Sunnis versus Shi’is brings 
particular dimensions to the conflict. Like the early Muslims, the 
Sunnis and the Shi’is of Gilgit do not see themselves as being part 
of an ‘orthodoxy-heterodoxy’ dichotomy within Islam or that the 
Shi’a position is more ‘political,’ which would be in line with 
academic views on this matter. As Muslim believers, their position 
is seen not as sectarian or political, but as the rightful position, 
representing universal, theological legitimacy. This explains why 
religious symbols are so charged with meaning, and hence so 
effective as mobilizing tools, and it explains why they added such 
heat to the conflict in Gilgit. (Manger, 1999: 21) 
 
 
This idea of a universal, theological legitimacy in relation to religious identities 
has direct implications on understanding sectarianism, which operates within 
the religious domain. This seemingly nonnegotiable difference can be used to 
legitimate violence and the need to differentiate from the other. This also 
connects exclusivist sectarian discourse to the enemy discourse of the current 
militant Islamism. That discourse has categorised two main enemies, as can 
be identified, for example, from the rhetoric of Osama bin Laden: “The corrupt 
and corrupting West” and the internal enemy of Islam, or “the traitors within” 
(Lincoln, 2003). Sectarian groups operating in Pakistan do acknowledge both 
of these enemies, and they can act against both, as has been the case with 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, but the main enemy discourse is always directed at the 
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competing sect, the enemy within. As noted above, when the groups lack 
radical differentiative elements, they have to be created or resignified, conflict 
and violence being one of the extreme ways of doing this. This also means 
that the role of violence as a border-enforcing mechanism is increasingly 
important. To use the words of a member of Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan, 
 
It is a two-track jihad. The external enemy is known, his 
intentions against Islam and Muslims are no secret. But the 
internal enemy posing as Muslims, as Shias and others do, is 
more dangerous. Stopping internal enemies are our priority.99 
(ICG, 2005: 5) 
 
Thus, enemy discourse can portray ‘the other’ as rebels against the divine 
order of which the sect or community is the instantiation, thereby constituting 
them as a “danger to God and community alike” (Lincoln, 2003: 35). When the 
Sunnis and Shias in Pakistan united their forces in the anti-Ahmadi campaign 
in the 1970s, this exclusivist thinking was being formulated and strongly 
promoted, as discussed in chapter 2. Still today, Ahmadis cannot build their 
places of worship looking like mosques or call them as such (Rais, 2004: 
456), nor are they allowed to use or display Islamic symbols, thus reinforcing 
the perceived difference in a very strong, explicit manner. By forcing Ahmadis 
out of mainstream Islam, violence against them became more “legitimate,” 
and it has increased since then (Rais, 2004: 461). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  ICG interview with Mohammad Anwar, former SSP activist, Faisalabad, August 2004.	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The literature on sectarianism offers us two useful examples of the existence 
of this exclusivist discourse—the process of defining by practise of exclusion 
what Islam is and who in Pakistan can call themselves Muslim—operating at 
both group and individual levels. These examples also illustrate how this 
discourse is tied to the idea of a “true Muslim” and how Deobandi Islam 
seems to have hijacked the idea of being a Muslim in Pakistan. 
  
Qasim Zaman (2002) discusses the Sipah-i-Sahaba in the context of Jhang 
and how in their view the landed gentry of Jhang not only exploits the 
peasantry in social and economic terms but has also led them astray in 
matters of the faith. For Zaman, SSP’s rhetoric seems to evoke the image of 
an “original” Sunnism: the people should be rescued from the influence of 
Shia faith and be brought back to Islam. “They must, in short, be made (or 
remade) Sunnis” (Zaman, 2002: 120). David Pinault in his book Notes from 
the Fortune-Telling Parrot retells a story he heard about a healer in Sindh 
named Ali Sher Haydari. He was described as “an ex-Shia who’s now become 
a Muslim.” A boy who had fallen from a roof and was about to die was brought 
to Ali Haydari. Ali wrote out a ta’wiz (spell), the gist of which was a sentence 
stating “the Shias are kafirs.” Apparently, Pinault was told, God was so 
pleased with this spell that he “allowed the boy to be healed” (Pinault, 2008: 
158). 
 
This idea of a “true Muslim” formed in exclusionary processes helps to create 
what Zaman calls “supralocal sectarian communities” whose “members can 
relate, and react, to the tribulations of their sectarian kin anywhere, 
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irrespective of local context” (Zaman, 2002: 131). This sectarian community is 
supralocal even as it is constantly reinforced by local conditions and 
grievances (Zaman, 2002: 131). One can rightfully ask whether this exclusivist 
and rigid definition of Islam is a strong-enough force to change the local 
interpretations and understandings of Islam existing in Pakistan. This, 
however, has not been studied in relation to sectarianism in Pakistan, 
although this trend is hinted at in some academic studies. For example, Tor 
Ase notes that in Gilgit–Baltistan, the discourse on Islam has become less 
local and more a part of the national discourse, as result of the protracted 
sectarian conflict (Ase, 1999: 78). 
 
Although this theorisation is useful when studying sectarianism in Pakistan, 
the notion of collective identity cannot be too simplistic. If religion in 
sectarianism is the key element in separating the different groups, the 
explanatory weight of theology and theological differences cannot be pushed: 
the theological considerations may play a relatively small part in distinguishing 
the rival communities. In addition, despite the salience of religious difference, 
it still is subject to multiplicity and intersectionality, to use Sökefeld’s terms 
(Sökefeld, 2010: 239). However, those communities define—and 
experience—their collective identity in terms of religion. As was shown by 
Sökefeld, “the dispute forced people in Gilgit to increasingly identify 
themselves either as Sunnis or Shias” (Sökefeld, 2010: 240). Religious 
differences were ascribed to heightened symbolic significance and put to work 
in social processes (Ase, 1999: 78). 
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It is impossible to locate the exact role of religion as compared with other 
differences any identity group negotiates in their social context, especially 
because those roles are not static but can vary depending on location and 
time of the analysis as well as the situation of the identity group in question. 
As observed by Tor Ase, “We have to go beyond religion in order to grasp the 
process of resignification that has taken place in Gilgit. Symbolic processes 
are always contextual; likewise, the religious discourse in Gilgit yields no 
meaning unless it is situated in time and place” (Ase, 1999: 63). What is 
important, however, is to recognise religion’s ability to create differences, 
symbolic and social borders that include and exclude, and that these borders, 
once established, can create tensions that differentiate the self from others, 
one group from another. Although “religion is not unique in how it functions in 
the human enterprise,” it is an immensely effective and powerful border maker 
and marker (Wellman, 2007: 5, 7). 
 
Next, we will turn to look at the concept of location of violence—the spatiality 
and temporality of violence—more closely. This location will be the key theme 
of what is analysed from the collected data; thus, a detailed account of what is 
meant exactly by the location of violence is needed. The next section also 
introduces with more detail the variables used in the analysis. 
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Location of Violence 
 
The place of violence, the space where violence happens, is the location 
where the borders are constructed and manipulated to include and exclude 
(Knott, 2005: 18). The location, or space of violence, is then not merely a 
passive conjuncture of time and physical geographic location where violence 
occurs. It is an expression of spatialised politics of identity as well as an 
identity politics of place (Keith & Pile, 1993: 2). In that space are intertwined 
contestations of spaces, particularly public space, the politics of identities, and 
the communication of these to the audiences. Conflicts tied to religious 
discourse are then often not only about space but also about the centrality of 
space (Juergensmeyer, 2003: 134). Next, we will look into the locations of 
sectarian violence already recognised and discussed in the literature. Most 
recognised and examined violent sectarian acts are those targeting religious 
places and rituals, which are at the core of expressing religious identities. 
 
Violence and Religious Places 
 
There are places that are outside the ordinary, but yet they are as 
ordinary as other places. Because they are outside the ordinary, 
they are powerful. They exert their power on human imagination. 
Because they are ordinary, they can be visited and inhabited. 
(Friedland & Hecht, 2006: 35) 
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Among the most important locations for sectarian violence in Pakistan are 
sacred spaces. 100  These are spaces with specific religious significance 
particularly to the sect or religion in question. Sacred spaces are not expected 
to be the only locations of sectarian violence, but their significance in the 
context of sectarian conflicts is highlighted in the literature, and their role as 
signifiers of identities authorises a closer examination of why they would be 
discernible locations of sectarian violence. 
 
All religions have their sacred spaces, as noted by Appleby (2000): “Sacred 
spaces function in part as territorial markers, heavily fortified reminders that 
the religious community, while geographically diffuse and otherwordly in its 
spiritual orientation, is not indifferent to the question of peoplehood and land” 
(Appleby, 2000: 61). Sacred spaces can be permanent constructions—such 
as mosques, churches, or shrines—or they can be temporarily formed through 
religious rituals. Space is then used as a medium in which religion is situated, 
as religious groups and individuals produce sacred spaces using religious 
symbols and rituals. “Ritual takes place, and makes place” as this sacred-
making behaviour brings about sacred space, not vice versa (Knott, 2005: 
43). Thus, sacred spaces are at the same time ordinary places, such as 
streets, parks, courtyards, as well as places outside the ordinary, as 
postulated by Friedland and Hecht in the quote above. This highlights that 
religion, by being inherently social, must express itself and exist in and 
through space. In addition, spaces themselves may be constituted and 
constructed by socioreligious relations (Knott, 2005: 15). The location, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  For in-detail exploration of the meaning and definition of sacred space, see, for example, 
Hassner, 2009. 
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spaces of violence, can then inform us of the understanding on the 
configuration of religious relations in social geography and thus is a significant 
factor in analysing sectarian violence. 
 
The occasion of Ashura, on the tenth day of the religious month of Muharram, 
has been the location for violence since before independence (Tambiah, 
1996: 164). The mourning processions on Ashura, in which Shias lament the 
martyrdom of Imam Hussain and his companions in the Battle of Karbala, are 
the most important bones of contention of all the Shia ritual practises, as 
observed by Sökefeld (Sökefeld, 2010: 240). The negative Sunni response to 
these rituals has often been focused on the practise of tabarra (the cursing of 
Muawiya, Aisha, and others, who are believed to have conspired against the 
Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law Ali in incantations) and matam (mourning 
usually accompanied by breast-beating). For Sunnis, this means dishonoring 
the Sahaba (companions of the Prophet), whom Sunnis revere. Muharram, for 
some Shias, is the ideal time for this cursing because it demands allegiance 
to the Prophet’s family and condemnation of those who caused suffering to 
that family. Matam, especially the bloodier manifestations of self-flagellation, 
is the second element of Sunni disapproval because self-flagellation violates 
Sunni notions of public decorum and ritual purity, and it is seen as an 
excessive, and thus un-Islamic, mourning of Hussain. These specific points of 
Shia rituals are focused on in justifying anti-Shia violence by the militant Sunni 
organisations (Pinault, 2008: 65; Hyder, 2006: 82). 
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Religious processions on festival or religiously important days acting as 
triggering events for clashes and violence highlights the notion of processions 
as an integral medium, and indeed a primary form, in which a tense 
religiopolitical issue is enacted (Tambiah, 1996: 241). Ashura and the other 
religious rituals underscore Shia distinctiveness from Sunnis. It is a time when 
the Shias announce who they are and when the Sunnis, by condemning and 
protesting or using violence against those religious rituals, also announce 
their objection to those Shia practises (Nasr, 2006: 32). Again, we come back 
to the notion of power and how it links to the conception of space, as such 
central places are also symbols of power and the act of violence claims them 
in a symbolic way. These momentary assertions of possession of those 
significant locations are also expressions of power to control those locations, 
“when in fact most of the time they do not control them at all” (Juergensmeyer, 
2003: 134–5). 
 
It is easy to see these religious rituals as spaces of enactment of one’s 
identity or as moments in the intersection of configured social relations. They 
are also forcing an audience by public display of religious rituals that are an 
integral part of the religious identity in question, thus asserting communal 
identities as well as enacting them. In the words of Pinault, “Shias I 
interviewed in Pakistan […] emphasized the importance of performing their 
rituals in public, for the express purpose of asserting Shia communal 
presence and Shia solidarity” (Pinault, 2008: 65). In Sunni-majority Pakistan, 
“it is hard to overstate the assertive quality of public Shia rituals,” as for most 
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Shia groups, they are a fundamental element of identity construction and self-
affirmation (Pinault, 2008: 65; Naef & Sahabi, 2007: 7).101 
 
Processions and other religious rituals point towards the temporal element of 
sacred space or spaces related to religion and religious identity. It is not only 
the location of these rituals that constitutes sacred space but also the timing 
of those rituals. Dramatic time—the date or season when violence takes 
place—is part of the violence performance, especially with the religious 
calendar, where there are centralities in time as well as space 
(Juergensmeyer, 2003: 135). For Tambiah (1996), the religious or festival 
calendar can channel and direct the shape, expression, timing, and spatial 
location of violence (Tambiah, 1996: 240, 310). Not only is the symbolic 
significance of that violence then most obvious, but those places are often 
crowded with potential victims (Nasr, 2006: 166). 
 
Processions and religious rituals mark the community or identity borders with 
public displays of that identity. Processions and marches are “colonialising” 
the community margins, and often, the demand or request for new routes—
attempt to acquire new space—for those processions are met with fierce 
resistance for this precise reason. But processions and religious rituals are 
not the only forms of sacred space that sectarian violence could situate in. 
Very little is said about mosques as signifiers of religious identity in the 
context of sectarian conflicts as compared with the aforementioned rituals. 
(See, for example, Pinault, 2008; Khan, 2003; Mujtaba, 2011.) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Despite the emphasis here on these rituals for Shia identity, Sunnis also are known to 
participate in them, although to a lesser degree after protracted sectarian conflicts. For more 
about Muharram processions, see Abou Zahab (2008). 
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Again, when analysing sacred space as the possible location of sectarian 
violence, the purpose is not to overemphasise the religious in sectarian 
conflicts or even attacks on sacred space. As noted by Lincoln (2003), no 
practise is inherently religious, but a practise may acquire a religious 
character when connected to religious discourse that constitutes them as 
such (Lincoln, 2003: 6). Perhaps religion or theological considerations are not 
the sole discourse for violence, but it features in the form of violence and the 
location that violence situates in. 
 
For the purpose of analysis, one important observation needs to be made 
explicitly. As was seen in chapter 3, sectarian violence is characterised by its 
being imbalanced—violence against Shias being more common than Shia 
violence against Sunnis. And above, we have mainly discussed Shia rituals 
and their role in triggering sectarian violence. As observed by Raman (2005), 
the attacks by the Shias have avoided Sunni places of worship. This is 
something that is looked upon in the data analysis. It is expected that the 
locations of violence against Sunnis and against Shias will have qualitative 
differences. 
 
Although the importance of sacred spaces—such as mosques or 
imambarghas (Shia place of worship) or religious processions—is recognised, 
it is not assumed that it is the only space of sectarian violence, but it is one of 
its most visible forms, opening up the possibility of anyone belonging to the 
competing sect to be a target. This method of targeting sacred spaces and 
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sacred time is one of the strongest boundary-reinforcing and communication 
mechanisms. It is important, then, to repeat that targeting religious or sacred 
spaces is more than simple military tactics, with the importance resonating 
with meanings far beyond the strategic (Mahmood, 1999: 82). 
 
Although this research assumes and expects the locations of violence to be 
religious places and spaces, it does not anticipate that these are the only 
locations of sectarian violence. In fact, finding how closely violence follows 
these expected—and perhaps evident—locations is something to be seen in 
the analysis. This research is also interested in finding out unexpected 
locations of violence, hoping they will reveal something new about the way 
sectarian identity is expressed and enforced. 
 
Individuals as Locations of Violence 
 
As noted earlier, it is not assumed that locations of sectarian violence are 
limited to religious or sacred spaces. This view is also supported by the 
literature, although very little analysis can be found on the targets of sectarian 
violence or their role in the overall phenomenon of sectarianism, as was 
discussed in chapter 3. It is assumed that sectarian violence targets Shias 
and Sunnis, but what that means exactly and how those categories are 
present in actual violence are things not touched upon in the analyses. 
 
Besides attacks on religious and sacred spaces, the literature mentions 
targeting of individuals, specifically the leading ulama or doctors, lawyers, and 
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traders. From the literature, we get very little clues as to why these specific 
targets have been selected. Some possible explanations mentioned are the 
attempt to gain publicity with violence acts and the strategic value through that 
visibility (Irfani, 2004: 157). Or the victims are considered as “trophies of 
violence” (Zaman, 2002: 133), perhaps to be attacked because they can be 
targeted. The killing of community leaders is also mentioned as an effective 
way to spread fear and terror (Abou Zahab, 2002: 88; Mujtaba, 2011: 41). The 
symbolic value of these categories of people who have been targeted and 
how they are linked—if they are—to the sectarian discourse are rarely 
discussed. This is briefly touched upon by Tor Ase, who concluded that 
“symbolically competent persons” are linked to the process of reemphasising 
differences in Gilgit—that is, making the sectarian difference more significant 
than before (Ase, 1999: 78). Mariam Abou Zahab quotes a Sipah-e-Sahaba 
militant’s reply when he was asked why his group specifically targeted 
doctors, lawyers, and traders: “It is useless to kill the malangs [the ordinary 
people].102 We kill people who pollute their minds” (Abou Zahab, 2002: 88). 
This points towards the idea that these targets have been chosen not only for 
their importance for the other community, both as community leaders and as 
having symbolic value, but also for their relevance in the maintenance of that 
identity group and their identity discourse. The location, or spaces of violence, 
can then be thought of as including important individuals for the identity 
groups in question, as instantiations of the other identity and whose symbolic 
value is an incentive to commit violent sectarian acts (Black, 2007: 180). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  The term malang is translated by Abou Zahab as “the ordinary people” in this context, but 
it can also be translated as a tramp or ascetic. 
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The next chapter, with the analysis of the data, will discover if these targets 
mentioned by the literature will be present in the data and how strong their 
overall presence is as compared with other targets and locations of violence. 
If the sectarian identity discourse can be used and mobilised for various 
purposes, it also limits possible political and violent action because it has to 
fall within the sectarian discourse to be legitimated within its parameters. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has analysed the difference that violence makes in identity 
formation through its ability to construct and maintain borders. When that 
difference being enforced and maintained is related to religious discourse, it 
becomes qualitatively different to the other possible differences that an 
identity group can occupy. Being connected to the divine, with divine and 
unquestionable truths, those differences can be more salient and rigid, 
possibly reinforcing exclusivist identity discourse in a different manner to other 
identity differences. It was highlighted that both the concept of identity 
formation through borders and violence and identity differences related to 
religious discourse do not lend themselves to essentialism or essentialist 
understandings of identities or religion. 
 
The interplay of space, religion, and violence is evident in the location of 
sectarian violence mostly discussed in the literature: sacred spaces. Now 
religion and religious identities are contested in their established spaces, 
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making sacred spaces the prominent spaces to negotiate and challenge those 
identities related to religious discourse. Sacred spaces—such as 
processions—are part of asserting communal identities in a shared public 
space. Claiming that space temporarily is a part of the spatialised politics of 
identity. Processions and other religious rituals highlight the temporal element 
of sacred space. The convergence of temporal sacred spaces and the 
dramatic time of violence create a powerful mode to enforce and display 
exclusivist sectarian discourse. 
 
In addition to sacred spaces, the literature highlights individuals, Sunnis and 
Shias, as targets of sectarian violence. These targets have been chosen for 
their importance for the other community, both as community leaders and as 
having symbolic value. Furthermore, they also carry significance as being 
instrumental in maintaining and reproducing the identity group they belong to 
and their identity discourse. The location, or spaces of violence, can then be 
thought to include these important individuals as instantiations of the other 
identity. 
 
These are not thought to be the only locations of violence, though, and the 
next challenge with analysing the data is to locate sectarian violence: where is 
violence trying to enforce the borders, where are they spatially located, and 
what do the locations tell us? By analysing the location, time, and form of 
violence and by looking at the spatialities and temporalities of sectarian 
violence, we are able to construct a new type of geography of sectarian 
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violence, which informs us where and how the borders of exclusivist sectarian 
discourse exist.	    
	  	   210	  
Chapter 6 
Locating Sectarian Violence in Pakistan 1996–2005 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we turn to the data collected to locate sectarian violence in 
Pakistan. By categorising and analysing the locations of violence, we will 
examine the spaces where the processes of exclusion are being enforced and 
what the spaces where sectarian discourse is reproduced.  
 
The chapter starts by making general observations on the data, first outlining 
what this analysis is able to say about violence based on the data collected 
and then uncovering how the data—and the analysis—is conditioned by the 
media’s representation of sectarian violence. Next, the chapter further 
specifies what is meant by violence and a violent incident and what were the 
types of violent incidents included in and excluded from the analysis.  
 
The chapter then moves to analyse all the main categories of locations of 
violence–target killings, processions and religious gatherings, and mosques 
and imambargahs–and how these locations were present in the data, as well 
as their significance as spaces of sectarian violence. We also get an 
understanding—albeit a limited one—of the agency behind the violent 
incidents and the patterns and methods used in sectarian violence. Most 
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importantly, we will gain understanding of the spatialised politics of religious 
identities and the contestation of spaces where those politics are played out. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with highlighting some of the stories related to 
sectarian violence that fell out of the scope of the focus of the analysis.  
 
 
Observations on the Data 
 
Before beginning with the data analysis, it is important to emphasise that what 
this analysis finds, or does not find, about sectarian violence is accurate within 
these data collected and within this framework of analysis. The analysis, or 
the thesis itself, does not—and cannot—claim absolute truths about sectarian 
violence. The analysis does not provide numerical truths about the violent 
sectarian incidents that have been perpetrated in Pakistan, as mentioned in 
chapter 4. The number of certain types of incidents and the locations of 
violence are presented as comparisons within the data collected and as 
compared with the other incidents in this data set, not as absolute figures of 
violent sectarian incidents in Pakistan during that period. 
 
By presenting the locations of violence found in the collected data, comparing, 
and analysing the relationships of these locations, this analysis provides one 
method of analysing sectarian violence. Again, this method is not claimed 
better or more accurate than other methods of analysing violence, but it will 
provide an alternative approach to understanding these violent incidents by 
placing them at the centre of analysis. 
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Does Media Make Sectarian Violence? 
 
One significant inherent limitation of the data collected for this research is that 
a violent sectarian incident exists (in the data set) if it has been reported by 
the media. The availability of data inevitably follows the logic and laws of 
reporting violence and violent incidents in the Pakistani media, presenting the 
question of what is left out or not known merely because it has not been 
reported. For example, is the Punjab-centricity of the Pakistani media also 
reflected in its reporting, or is sectarianism and sectarian violence genuinely 
concentrated to the province to the extent reflected in the data? Or do 
sectarian incidents that occur in small and far-away places from the news 
desks also find their way to the newspapers—if they take place? This concern 
is also voiced by Khaled Ahmed (2011, 168) when he said, “[t]he media 
covered sectarian deaths in the big cities but violence taking place in the 
small cities went unnoticed although the number of dead was much higher 
and the incidents more frequent”. 
 
The role of media has to be highlighted in relation to analysing sectarian 
violence for two specific reasons. First, the news sources are used and 
referred to often in academic analyses. Media sources are also used in 
several databases that collect data to produce statistics on sectarian violence, 
such as the South Asia Terrorism Portal. This bias in media reporting—if it 
exists—is subsequently reflected in the academic understanding of sectarian 
violence. Second, media report not only the violent incidents but also the 
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explanations of violence, both on the part of the agency and whether the 
attack or incident was sectarian or not. The agency—which was behind the 
sectarian incidents—can be conveyed in the news items through the people 
interviewed, the actors declaring to have perpetrated the attack, or the news 
reporters themselves, for example. The real motivations behind the different 
violent incidents and attacks are impossible to assess without an in-depth 
investigation on each particular incident. The media’s portrayal about these 
incidents and their explanations on whether the incident was sectarian or 
something else entirely affect how these incidents are perceived—despite 
their ‘real’ motivation. 
 
On 22 March 2002, The News reported that ‘2 unknown gunmen on a 
motorcycle’ in Karachi killed a Shia shopkeeper and wounded two bystanders. 
The victim, video shop owner Kazim Jafri, was killed as he was in his shop, 
where witnesses quoted by The News claimed Jafri had played videos of Shia 
speeches. These witness statements link the incident firmly to the sectarian 
discourse, although there have been several attacks on video shops for 
possessing ‘objectionable material’ without any connection to sectarian 
conflicts in Pakistan. Media can also work towards downplaying a potential 
sectarian connection by highlighting and emphasising other possible 
motivations and explanations for the incident in question, for example, 
personal disputes. As said, verifying the motivations of all the attacks and 
incidents is impossible, but it is important to highlight that the media’s 
explanation and portrayal play a significant role in how these incidents are 
perceived. 
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This framing of violent incidents by the media and the potential risks the 
sometimes simplistic framing carries in relation to the understanding of 
sectarianism and sectarian conflicts are summed up by Ali A (2010), as 
follows: 
 
To frame these attacks as ‘sectarian’ in the news misleads an 
uninitiated viewer into believing that this is a fight between the Sunnis 
and Shias in Pakistan. That is not true. For one, consider the 
background of people killed in the Ashura blast: according to one 
report, 15 of the 50 killed were Sunnis, two were Bohra Shias, and one 
was Christian. Anyone familiar with the ground reality in Pakistan 
knows that Muharram processions are widely attended by Muslims 
from diverse sectarian background, and at some places, even non-
Muslims also participate. Thus, the processions are not an exclusive 
tradition of Shias, contrary to how it is framed in the international news 
media. They are for all those who want to commemorate the noble 
sacrifice of the grandson of the Holy Prophet, Imam Hussain (peace be 
upon him). However, the reductive representation in the international 
news media further distorts the image of Sunni-Shia differences in the 
mind of general viewers: an attack on Muharram procession is 
automatically seen as an attack on “‘Shias by Sunnis” ’ in the news and 
analysis. Perhaps that was also the intention of the perpetrators of 
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these attacks: to provoke sectarian differences and to distance the 
Sunnis from the Shias and Muharram processions. 
 
This ‘reductive representation’ is a valid concern not only for how media—
both the international and the Pakistani media—represents violence but also 
for the analysis of this thesis. The categorisations used in the analysis are 
necessarily simplistic in the sense that they do not fully reflect the rich plurality 
of Pakistan—for some, the term ‘Shia’, for example, would be too simplistic in 
the Pakistani context, as discussed in chapter 2—but to deny the use of these 
categorisations would render any analysis meaningless and indeed 
impossible. Whether other people than Shia participate in the Ashura 
processions, for example, does not take away the fact that it is a religious 
practice at the core of the Shia belief, signifying Shia Islam in a particular and 
powerful way, as discussed in chapter 5. Targeting these processions is 
targeting the Shia as well as the practice of Shia beliefs in public spaces in 
Pakistan. Having noted all this about the possible media bias in reporting 
violent incidents and their representation and framing, the media are still the 
most accessible (and sometimes the only) source of those incidents, despite 
the limitations.  
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Violence and Violent Incidents  
 
Sectarian violence exists always within a specific context, and it is often 
interwoven with other types of violence, as discussed in chapter 3. The fact 
that it is now separated from its context as a separate category is recognised, 
and the limitations it places to the analysis are acknowledged.  
 
Violent incident is now defined as an event or occurrence where force is used 
with the intention to cause physical harm. The violent incidents placed at the 
centre of the analysis are moments or instances in space and time, but in 
practice, violent attacks entail a great deal that have preceded them. For 
example, this can refer to the meticulous planning and selection of the target 
and the method(s) of violence. Or, alternatively, sometimes the previous 
violent incidents, either recent of older, are the impetus for violence. There are 
also cases where there have been tensions and animosities building up for a 
long period, which then erupt eventually as violence. 
 
These histories, or cycles of violence, are not evident in the data presented in 
this form, nor are they represented in the analysis of the locations of violence. 
Revenge and retaliations—whether imagined or real—are important elements 
in explaining sectarian violence and giving its rationale, as seen in chapter 3. 
They are however present in the data as a subtext where the timing and the 
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target are occasionally, but not always, explained as a part of cycles of 
revenge and getting even. The data point out to how the alleged payback is 
not always perpetrated in the same locality or even province, implying the 
existence of those supralocal networks that act upon and promote violent 
sectarian discourse, as conceptualised by Qasim Zaman and discussed in 
chapter 5. Violence that is being retaliated is also not always returned in kind: 
target killing can be followed by a retaliation attack in a mosque, for example. 
The retaliation violence, according to the data, is also not always a response 
to violence but has been used to get back on other issues such as arrests, 
perceived mistreatment of religious figures, and unwanted government 
policies.  
 
There is also a presence of another type of retaliatory violence in the data 
analysed. This refers to violence that often follows a violent sectarian incident. 
The immediate retaliation or reactionary violence can take different forms, 
such as demonstrations or killing sprees, and it is often coupled with 
damaging properties, such as burning shops or vehicles. Sometimes 
reactionary violence is directed towards another sect, but occasionally, it is 
directed to the surrounding locality of the incident in question. This immediate 
retaliatory violence is not included in the analysis unless it results in further 
killings. It is important to note, however, that this type of violence does take 
place, and it sometimes adds to the casualty figure of the violent incident in 
question. The mobilising effect of these violent incidents, and the form this 
reactionary violence takes, would warrant a separate research.  
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Focus of Analysis 
 
The news items excluded in the first stage of data analysis were presented in 
chapter 4, but with a further analysis of the data on sectarian violence, a more 
precise focus was developed, and the following additional categories were 
excluded from the analysis: 
 
• Deaths in prison or police custody. The data included incidents where 
members of sectarian groups or religious figures died while in prison. It 
was frequently speculated in the media whether the deaths were natural or 
the deceased were murdered on sectarian grounds. The circumstances 
were often unclear, and these deaths were often mentioned in passing in 
the news items. There were also news items about deaths in police 
custody that are not included in the analysis for similar reasons. 
• Violence with the police. The incidents where Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) and 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) members were shot in incidents known as ‘police 
encounters’—where the victims were claimed to have either attacked the 
police or tried to escape from the police—started to appear in the data in 
1998 and peaked in 1999. Also, other violent incidents with the police are 
not included if the violence was between the police and another party. 
However, if police intervened in a tense or violent situation and were 
involved in the reactionary violence, these incidents are included in the 
analysis. 
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• Intra-Sunni violence. To focus the analysis, the violence between the 
different Sunni sects was attempted to be excluded from the analysis. 
However, it was difficult to gauge when violence fell into this category. The 
difficulty of separating intra-Sunni violence as a distinct category is 
explored further below. 
• Violence against Sufis. The data included cases where people from the 
Sufi branch of Islam were attacked, but these incidents were not included 
in the analysis. 
• Violence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). During the 
researched period (1996–2005), there were three periods of intensive 
violence in FATA (or bordering FATA): in 1996 in Parachinar and the 
nearby villages, in 1998 in Hangu, and in 2001 in Orakzai Agency. The 
way these periods of violence were reported in the Pakistani media made 
it impossible to locate the violence using the method of this research. 
Violence in these cases was presented as having multiple simultaneous 
locations, without specifying those locations in detail. It was referred to as 
‘clashes’ in specific villages or cities, and occasionally the news items only 
referred to casualty figures when talking about the incidents and violence 
involved. Because of the lack of adequate details on violence and its 
locations, and the methods used, those intensive periods of violence were 
not included in the analysis. It is recognised, however, that these are 
locations of serious sectarian conflicts, and the reason why they are not 
analysed here in detail are purely methodological.  
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• Finally, the violent incidents included in the analysis are all incidents of 
active and purposeful violence. For example, victims of self-flagellation or 
casualties from stampedes are not included in the analysis. 
 
 
The news items varied considerably in how much detail they provided on the 
incidents they reported. Some had very little detailed information, and some 
items consisted of barely anything other than the headline. There were news 
items that were printed in the ‘briefs’ section of the newspapers, without even 
the headline. This analysis did not want to value some attacks or incidents 
over others, and all those news items that had any information that could be 
analysed within this framework were included in the data set. 
 
 
 
Quantity and Location of Incidents Analysed 
 
There were a total of 520 violent incidents analysed.103 Table 2 shows how 
they were distributed during the researched period. Figure 1 presents the 
spatial distribution of those incidents by province.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103  To compare these figures to other available statistics on sectarian violent incidents 
compiled from the English language press, the South Asian Terrorism Portal (2012) reports 
the following figures for the period researched: 1996, 80 incidents; 1997, 103 incidents; 1998, 
188 incidents; 1999, 103 incidents; 2000, 109 incidents; 2001, 154 incidents; 2002, 63 
incidents; 2003, 22 incidents; 2004, 19 incidents; and 2005, 62 incidents. It is important to 
note, however, that the figures in Table 2 are the incidents analysed. The overall figures of 
incidents is higher before the process of excluding some categories of violent incidents from 
the analysis.  
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Table 2. Number of violent incidents analysed per year. 
 
 
      1996   24 
      1997  103 
      1998   70 
      1999   51 
      2000   50 
      2001   66 
      2002   40 
      2003   33 
      2004   28 
      2005   55 
       
      Total 
   
  520 
 
Source: Data analysis 
 
Figure 1. Spatial distribution of sectarian violent incidents analysed in 
provinces. 
 
 
Source: Data analysis 
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The data are Punjab dominated, with 296 of the 520 incidents being located in 
the province. Towards the end of the period included in the research, the 
other provinces have a more significant role as locations of violence. Although 
Karachi is present in the data from the first year analysed, it features more 
prominently from 1999 onwards. Nearly all incidents of sectarian violence in 
Sindh occurred in Karachi. Similarly, most of the violent incidents reported in 
Balochistan were located in Quetta. The province appears as a location of 
sectarian violence the first time in 2000. Northern Areas were present in the 
data only during the last two years analysed (2004 and 2005).  
 
During the process of data analysis, four main categories of spaces of 
sectarian violence emerged from the data:  
 
• Individuals of both sects killed in target killings 
• Processions and religious gatherings 
• Mosques and imambargahs 
• Others 
 
All these categories as locations of violence are explored in detail in the 
following sections. The analysis starts with the numerically largest category (in 
terms of the number of incidents rather than the number of people killed), 
namely, target killings. 
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Target Killings 
 
As anticipated by the literature on sectarian violence in Pakistan, violence 
targeting individuals of both sects is featured prominently in the data. If 
measured by the number of incidents, this is the largest category of violent 
incidents in the data set. There are target killings every year of the period 
analysed, although the number of incidents declines towards the end of the 
period, increasing again in 2005. Most of these incidents occurred in Punjab, 
as with the other types of incidents included in the data set. Other locations, 
particularly Karachi, start to be featured more prominently during the last six 
years of the period included in this study (2000–2005). It is noteworthy that 
target killings occurred in all the Pakistani provinces during the researched 
period, although significantly less in Punjab. There are target killings in 
Northern Areas only during the last year (2005) in this category of violent 
incidents. There is also a significant imbalance in the number of Shias 
attacked as compared with Sunnis, confirming the asymmetry of violence 
discussed in chapter 3. 
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Figure 2. Quantity and spatial distribution of sectarian target killings in 
provinces. 
 
 
Source: Data analysis 
 
When the incidents of target killings were categorised by the different types of 
identity categories the victims were reported to have, the following categories 
as presented by Tables 3 and 4 emerged as the main identity categories 
targeted in this type of sectarian violence. These categories are discussed—
and problematised—in the following sections.  
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Table 3. The main categories of Shias killed in target killings. 
 
           Leaders of TJP, SMP or ISO  
           Religious leaders and figures 
           Shia leaders or activists 
           Government officials and bureaucrats 
           Academics and teachers 
           Doctors 
           Policemen 
           Others 
               Source: Data analysis 
 
 
Table 4. The main categories of Sunnis killed in target killings. 
 
 
           SSP leaders and activists 
           Religious leaders 
           Lawyers  
           Others 
    Source: Data analysis 
 
 
Members of Sectarian Organisations and Religious Leaders 
 
 
People related to sectarian organisations, both Sunnis and Shias, formed the 
largest category of victims of target killings. In the Shia category, these 
included people affiliated with the Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP), the Sipah-e-
Muhammad Pakistan (SMP), and the Imamia Student Organisation (ISO). 
Similarly, in the Sunni category, those with affiliation to SSP were the largest 
group targeted. According to the data, the victims included people with vastly 
different types of affiliation and rank in these organisations. For example, 
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those victims affiliated with the TJP included TJP activists, members, workers, 
leaders, presidents, central leaders, and senior leaders. In fact, it is often 
difficult to gauge the exact type of affiliation the victims had with these 
organisations: by labelling someone an ‘SSP man’ does not provide a full 
picture of the victim’s role in the organisation or indeed their level of affiliation 
and activation. Also, sometimes the affiliation to sectarian groups is not clear, 
or it is disputed.104 It is then important to problematise these labels and ask 
what labelling victims as a ‘Shia leader’ or a ‘Sunni activist’ exactly means as 
a precarious use of these terms by the media can significantly affect how the 
news items—and the violent incident itself—are perceived.  
 
In addition to the above-mentioned groups, members of groups such as the 
Tehrik-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwat (TKN),105 an anti-Ahmadi movement discussed 
in chapter 2, and Sunni Tehreek (ST),106 a Sunni Brelvi organisation, appear 
as victims of target killings, albeit significantly less in numbers. Also, there are 
cases when family members of people affiliated to these organisations have 
been targeted. The absence of LJ from the data analysed, other than being 
the organisation claiming to be behind the attacks, is noticeable. In the data 
collected, LJ activists are present as being killed in police encounters or in 
police custody. More research would be needed to find out reasons for the 
lack of LJ members being targeted, but it could stem from the LJ being a more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 See, for example, Dawn (2000d) and The News (2000e). 
105 The most famous TKN leader killed during this period was Maulana Mohammad Yusuf 
Ludhianvi, who was killed with his driver in a drive-by shooting in May 2000 in Karachi. (Dawn, 
2000c). 
106 Sunni Tehreek was founded in Pakistan in 1990. Its members were the victims of target 
killings since late 2004 in the data set. This can signal the increasing level of intra-Sunni 
violence in Pakistan. 
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amorphous organisation as compared with SSP and not as active and present 
in the grassroots and community levels in Pakistan.  
 
 
What is evident from the data is that being a known member of these 
organisations, whether a local activist or a community leader, or a more 
prominent figure has been grounds for selecting them as targets. It is not 
surprising that the members, activists, and leaders of organisations 
specifically formed as Shia and Sunni organisations with sectarian agendas 
are targeted as a part of sectarian violence. Targeting these individuals is at 
the same time targeting these organisations in question and what they 
represent.  
 
 
The category of people affiliated with these organisations is closely linked to—
and significantly overlapping with—the second largest category of the target 
killings, namely, religious leaders or religious actors. These include, for 
example, prayer leaders, imams, clerics, seminary principals, and religious 
scholars—all terms that are not clearly defined or specified in the media use 
or how they are used overall in Pakistan. Some members of sectarian 
organisations are of course also religious leaders, such as Maulana 
Mohammad Abdullah, who was killed on 18 October 1998. He was the 
chairman of Central Ruet-e-Hilal Committee, a known religious scholar, and a 
khateeb (orator, person who preachers the Friday sermon at a mosque) of Lal 
Masjid (The News, 1998d). The same is true for many Shia leaders and 
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activists. Religious actors, as defined by Appleby, mean ‘people who have 
been formed by a religious community and who are acting with the intent to 
uphold, extend, or defend its values and precepts’ (Appleby, 2000: 9). As 
suggested by the definition, this is a broad category and can include different 
types of actors related to both sectarian and religious organisations and the 
sectarian discourse itself. The fact that there are religious leaders with 
different status included in the victims of target killings mean that religious 
leaders at both community and national levels are targeted, indicating the 
ongoing and mutually reinforcing local, supralocal, and national sectarian 
conflicts. As instantiations of the ‘other’ identity—and the sectarian discourse 
itself—both religious leaders and leaders and members of sectarian 
organisations are not merely symbolically relevant targets, and attacking them 
carry a different significance to merely targeting ‘Shias’ or ‘Sunnis’.  
 
 
Occupation as an Identity Category 
 
There are five main categories related to occupation that emerged from the 
data as categories of individuals being targeted: doctors, government officials 
and bureaucrats, lawyers, policemen, and academics and teachers. As 
discussed further, often these victims would also possess other identity 
categories that have been identified as relevant as categories of individuals 
targeted. For example, a doctor could also be a Shia leader or a religious 
leader, implying that the occupation might not always act as the only impetus 
for sectarian killing. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of sectarian target killings based on occupation. 
 
 
Source: Data analysis 	  
 
Doctors. Both Sunni and Shia doctors were killed, although the asymmetry of 
sectarian violence is applied in this category too. Until 2002, majority of the 
attacks against doctors occurred in Punjab, after which the focal location of 
killing doctors was Karachi.  
 
Government officials and bureaucrats, academics and teachers, and 
policemen. Only Shia government officials or bureaucrats, policemen, and 
academics and teachers were targeted according to the data collected. 
Although the number of those incidents is relatively small, it seems that all 
those targeted have had a visible and prominent role in their communities, 
and thus, their deaths were widely publicised. One Sunni official (Dawn, 2005) 
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and one ex-policeman (The News, 2005) who were targeted were exceptions 
to the rule. These target killings were not as Punjab-centric as other incidents, 
but Karachi and Quetta were featured prominently as locations where these 
identity categories were targeted. 
 
Lawyers. Almost only Shia lawyers were killed. There were only two Sunni 
lawyers killed in 1997, one with close affiliation to the SSP leader Azam Tariq 
and the second identified also as an SSP supporter and an activist of Jamiat 
Ulema-e-Islam (JUI, Samiul Haq group) (Dawn, 1997d; Dawn, 1997e). It is 
noteworthy that those Shia lawyers who were victims of sectarian violence 
also possessed several relevant identity categories. Of the 16 cases included 
in the researched period, 11 (69%) possessed other identity categories, many 
of them having a TJP or other Shia leadership roles. Some lawyers killed in 
these target killings were linked to specific court cases related to sectarian 
groups.  
 
 
Others. Finally, there is the ‘others’ category—incidents that do not fit with 
any of the identity categories mentioned earlier. This category is much more 
substantial with Shias than Sunnis, including, for example, Shia shopkeepers 
or businessmen, eyewitnesses of court cases related to sectarian groups, and 
family members of TJP leaders or members and other Shia leaders. Family 
members were also sometimes victims in the incidents, although not 
necessarily the intended main targets. Sometimes these ‘identity categories’ 
not only are religious or political (as in a membership of a Pakistani political 
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party) but also can signal a specific status in the social hierarchy. This ‘others’ 
category also included cases where the victim killed belonged to a landlord 
family or was a member of a ‘prominent Shia family’. In this category, any 
connection that the victims might have had to sectarian groups is hard to 
establish, often because there is not a lot of information available.  
	  
	  
Target Killings as a Space of Sectarian Violence 	  
 
Target killings—as shown by the data—are methodologically targeting 
particular individuals. In most of the killings, the method of killing is shooting 
from a moving vehicle, usually a motorcycle or a car, either on route following 
the daily routine of the victim or close to their residence or work. This shows 
familiarity with the victim’s identity and routine, and the method of killing is 
efficient in ensuring a quick escape from the scene.  
 
The observation from the data that these identity categories are often 
interlinked and overlap brings us to the important notion that often the victims 
of target killings had multiple identities that were relevant as categories in 
target killings. It is impossible to say whether a local prominent Shia leader 
who is also a lawyer was killed because he was an active and visible member 
of his community, he was a lawyer, or both. A closer examination of these 
‘identity categories’ might reveal if possessing more of these categories 
increase the likelihood of being targeted, or whether those incidents where 
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people with multiple identity categories are circumstantial. 107  The data 
presented here is not adequate to answer that question, nor is that the focus 
of the analysis. However, it highlights how these categories presented in the 
data and used by the media and eventually by the research done on sectarian 
violence are more nuanced and subject to oversimplification. As an example, 
by reporting on the numbers of Shia (or Sunni) doctors attacked, a study 
could discard the fact that doctors can also play a role in their religious 
communities or be affiliated with a sectarian organisation, oversimplifying why 
doctors are attacked and perhaps also which doctors are attacked.  
 
This notion of victims possessing different identity categories also 
demonstrate how difficult it is at times to remove sectarian violence from the 
terrain of political and ethnic violence ongoing in Pakistan. For example, Qari 
Abdul Raziq, who was killed in a target killing on 12 September 2005 in 
Karachi, was a Pesh Imam (prayer leader) of a Jannat Town mosque as well 
as a local leader of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) (Daily Times, 2005b; Dawn, 
2005c). This entanglement of different identity categories, and the 
impossibility to know from the data which—if it indeed has been one of those 
categories that has taken precedence—has been the reason for them being 
selected as targets. This is clear especially in the cases of target killings 
located in Karachi that was predictably featured as the location with the most 
target killings outside Punjab in the data set.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 For example, of the 25 target killings against Shia doctors in the data set, 8 (32%) 
possessed also other relevant identity categories and had for example an affiliation with TJP 
and SMP or a religious leadership role. Of the seven Sunni doctors killed during the 
researched period, two (approximately 28%) possessed other identity categories. 
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It is also clear that some cases are not evidently ‘sectarian’, but the data are 
infused with personal conflicts (The News, 2000), family quarrels and feuds 
(as shown in the next paragraph), robberies, and monetary disputes (Dawn, 
1999c; The News, 1999). Violence is also entangled with the criminal 
activities of some sectarian groups, especially LJ. This theme is present in the 
data from 1999 onwards. In addition, the method of violence in these cases 
does not often concur with the typical method of targeted killings, but the 
victims are stabbed, beaten, clubbed, or strangled rather than shot from a 
moving vehicle. 
 
It is also possible that sometimes a murder is presented as sectarian. After 
first reporting on the murder of Zulfikar Jandran, a TJP activist who was shot 
on 26 February 1998, The News stated that Zulfikar was apparently killed by 
Zakir Ali because the victim had tortured and kicked his family out of their 
house and kidnapped his sister. It was the religious leaders of TJP who had 
initially termed the incident as sectarian and exploited it ‘to their own ends’. 
Not all killings of religious leaders are sectarian, concluded The News 
(1998b). A murder can be also framed to look like a sectarian killing. Both 
Daily Times and Dawn reported of an incident where six members of a Shia 
family, including two women and an infant, were shot dead at their home in 
Mughalpura, Punjab, in 2004. According to the police quoted in the news 
items, the words ‘Shias are infidels’ were written on the walls of the family’s 
house, pointing towards a sectarian motivation for the killing. The police also 
noted that the writing could be an attempt to mislead the investigation as the 
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family had an ongoing marriage dispute, and there were also signs of a 
robbery in the house (Daily Times, 2004b; Dawn, 2004e). 
 
Whether or not these incidents are sectarian is not the most crucial thing to 
find out in this research. What is noteworthy, however, is that the incidents 
can be interpreted as sectarian by the family members of the victim, the 
police, the media, or the ‘religious leaders’, as mentioned earlier. The fact that 
violent incidents that fulfil certain characteristics can be interpreted as 
sectarian shows the impact of the protracted violence and the patterns 
established by that violence in Pakistan. Thus, these incidents, whether or not 
‘really’ sectarian, become a part of the sectarian discourse, reinforcing that 
discourse and presenting another type of ‘utility’ that the discourse can have 
for both those related to the victims of violence and its perpetrators. 
 
As also observed by the literature, the violence in this category is targeting 
men, with very rarely women being attacked other than as family members 
present when the main target was attacked.108 The above-mentioned incident 
in Mughalpura was the only one where a whole family was attacked. One 
incident stands out from the data as being different in method and in scale 
from the other target killings: the bomb attack in January 1997 outside 
Sessions Court in Lahore. The attack killed the SSP leader Maulana Ziaur 
Rehman Farooqi. Azam Tariq was also injured in the incident. The purpose of 
the attack was most likely to attack the higher tier of the SSP leadership. This 
was the first bomb attack in the data set, and according to the media, it was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 A female doctor was killed in Dera Ghazi Khan in 2004 (The News, 2004b). Victims also 
rarely include children. An incident where a 13-year-old son of a TJP supporter was killed in a 
target killing was a rarity (The News, 1999b). 
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the most powerful bomb ever used in Punjab, killing more than 20 people and 
injuring more than 90 people (Nation, 1997; The News, 1997; Dawn, 1997). 
 
As mentioned earlier, those perpetrating target killings have been meticulous 
in selecting their targets and executing the violence. When six Shias were 
singled out from all the 35 people sleeping in the adda (bus stand) in a 
predawn attack in Mondja village close to Multan in 1997, the killers knew who 
they were targeting, and no Sunnis were hurt in the attack, according to The 
News (1997d). There are also occasions when the victim’s sect or identity is 
confirmed before the actual attack. 109  
 
The data also include cases of mistaken identity or where having a ‘Shia 
name’ has led into a target killing. The Newsline magazine quoted the Tehrik-
e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) Sindh president Allama Hasan Turabi, who thinks that 
Sunni doctors were targeted ‘because they bore names that are common 
among the Shia community’ (Syed Ali, 2001). In the article, Turabi cited one 
name also present in the analysed data, Dr. Ishrat Hussain, a Sunni doctor, 
as an example of a case of mistaken identity. ‘Allama Turabi adds that some 
days before his death, Dr. Ishrat Hussain received a phone call directing him 
to drop “Hussain” from his name. He refused to comply’. Despite knowing that 
Dr. Hussain was not a Shia, the refusal to eliminate the name usually 
associated with Shias was enough grounds for his killing (Syed Ali, 2001; 
Dawn, 2001f). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 For cases where identity has been confirmed before attack, see The News (2000d) and 
Dawn (2001).	  
	  	   236	  
It also seems that target killings are mainly the domain of the sectarian groups 
because of the method most of them are conducted (shooting from a moving 
vehicle), confirming the view widely present in the literature. The agency of 
sectarian groups would also account for the theme of revenge being so 
strongly present in the explanations of violence. To quote Dawn from 30 July 
2001 to explain why Shia government officials were targeted, 
 
The Lashkar-i-Jhangvi has claimed responsibility for the murder of 
PSO managing director Shaukat Mirza and the defence ministry 
official, Syed Zafar Hussain. In a joint press statement on Monday, 
chief of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi Riaz Basra and Lashkar’s divisional chief, 
Lal Mohammed have claimed responsibility for both the killings.  
They also warned that any government functionary resorting to 
abuse of power would face the same fate. ‘We had urged the 
President, General Pervez Musharraf, not to implement the death 
sentence awarded to Sheikh Haq Nawaz as it could prove harmful for 
the integrity of the country but the government went ahead with its plan 
to appease a neighbouring country’, said the statement. They said they 
would not shun their struggle, come what may, added the statement. 
(Dawn, 2001g) 
 
Killing officials, according to LJ, was a retaliation for an unwanted foreign 
policy and a warning not to ‘abuse the power’ anymore. Shia public figures 
and community leaders now paid the price for those government policies, as 
the perpetrators used them as sites of violence to try to urge the Pakistani 
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government to refrain from any policies that relate it to all things Shia—as Iran 
is understood to be the ‘neighbouring country’ mentioned in the news item.  
 
In addition to the high-level targets of senior leaders of the sectarian groups 
and notable religious leaders, who are active in maintaining and spreading the 
sectarians discourse of those organisations and movements, there is an 
organised effort to target public and active figures, particularly Shias, also at 
the community level. This is an important function of the target killings, based 
on the premises of this thesis. With this method of violence, the attacks can 
be seen as an attempt to control public space by showing that it is dangerous, 
and potentially lethal, to be a public and active figure in one’s community and 
that the visible activism, particularly if carried out in various roles, is not 
tolerated and can lead to violence. 
 
 
Sacred Space and Sacred Time 
 
 
The locations of violence related to sacred space and time consisted of three 
main categories: religious processions, religious gatherings (particularly 
majlises), and mosques and imambargahs (Shia place of worship). These 
locations are discussed in more details in the following sections.  
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Processions 
 
Incidents of violence related to processions carried on throughout the period 
studied in the analysis. These incidents were also not as Punjab-centric as 
other locations of violence, but other provinces were featured as locations 
from the beginning of the researched period.  
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of sectarian incidents related to processions, majlises, 
and communal clashes. 
 
 
Source: Data analysis 
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One of the most important findings from the data revealed that the method 
used in violence related to processions was often low-level violence: there 
was a lack of sophisticated weapons and organisation, and the violence was 
perpetrated not only by firing but also with sticks and pelting of stones, or 
even fists. Often the casualty figures in these incidents were very low. Also, 
these incidents occurred often in smaller, rural locations and were not 
confined to urban localities, as the target killings mostly were. Thus, the 
presence of this location of violence in the data was not surprising, but the 
form it took was not expected—or discussed—by the literature. The existence 
of communal clashes is highlighted in Figure 4, were cases that were defined 
as clashes are separated as a distinct category, although they often related to 
processions and religious gatherings.  
 
The processions that featured as locations of sectarian violence reflected the 
plurality of processions held in Pakistan: Alam (flag, banner) processions, 
Zuljinnah (horse used by Hussain in the battle of Karbala) processions, Eid 
Milad-un-Nabi (birth anniversary of Prophet Muhammad) and Nauroz (Persian 
New Year) processions, or processions organised by sectarian groups for 
variety of purposes were among those attacked. Processions were also 
locations of intragroup violence, both between different Shia groups and 
Sunni groups, although this intragroup violence played a minor role in the 
overall incidents related to procession. The Shia groups conflicted mostly over 
procession routes or procession order,110 whereas the intra-Sunni clashes 
highlighted the differences in Sunni beliefs, for example, during the Eid Milad-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 See, for example, Dawn (1997c, 2000b). 
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un-Nabi procession (The News, 2003b; Dawn, 2003). Eid Milad-un-Nabi or 
the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad is accepted by 
some Sunni sects and thought as bidah, or innovation in Islam, and thus not 
celebrated by others (Esposito, 2003: 138). 
 
Processions were also sites of clashes, instead of only being attacked by 
sophisticated weaponry in organised attacks. Often these clashes revolved 
around the issue of the procession route, causing tension and violence. There 
were incidents where two processions (of different sects) were in the same 
route, resulting in violence during Ashura; there were conflicts resulting in 
changes in the route and resistance to those changes.111 There were also 
incidents where the attempt to take out a procession in a location where it had 
not been done before was met with resistance and violence.112 It is clear that 
in some of these incidents, especially with the negotiation of routes, there are 
long-term tensions that come to their peak during the procession times. 
Tension and violence were not only caused by the negotiations of the 
procession routes but also arose when the processions passed certain 
locations such as ‘Sunni strongholds’ or specific madrasas.113 Sometimes it is 
these locations that are passed that are also targeted from the procession.114  
 
In accordance with the literature, the data show that religious processions and 
their routes are a matter of serious negotiations, both with the other sects and 
the relevant officials. The data point to the fact that there are certain locations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 See, for example, Dawn (1998b, 2001b, 2004c). 
112 See, for example, Dawn (2001d, 2002). 
113 See, for example, Dawn (2000).  
114 See, for example, Dawn (1998d) and Muslim (1998).  
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that are particularly sensitive115 when it comes to negotiating those routes as 
well as along those routes that the processions take. This signals the 
existence of a type of ‘local geographies’ that different communities are aware 
of, where certain areas and landmarks carry specific meanings in relation to 
the sectarian discourse. Navigating these ‘local geographies’, for example, in 
the form of religious processions, has the potential to trigger violence. At the 
same time, these processions are part of the negotiations of those ‘local 
geographies’ and the ownership of space.  
 
Although the great majority of the violence related to processions was low-
level116 rather than big, striking acts of violence, there was one occasion of 
high-intensity violence where 45 people were killed and more than 160 
injured. The main Ashura procession in Quetta in March 2004 was attacked 
with both hand grenades and indiscriminate firing and later on with bombs that 
were attached to the attackers (Dawn, 2004b; The News, 2004). This was an 
outlier in the data when looking at violence related to the location of 
processions both in the method of violence and the number of casualties that 
resulted.  
 
Majlises 
 
Another location of sectarian violence related to sacred space and time is 
majlises. The term ‘majlis’ refers to ‘a gathering of a select group of people in 
the presence of a leading notable, religious dignitary, or well-known poet’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 See, for example, Dawn (1999b). 
116 Of 74 cases, 47 (64%) included low-level violence. 
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(Esposito, 2003: 187). In the Pakistani context, majlises are usually held by 
Shias, and the term refers to a religious gathering that has been organised, 
for example, to mourn Imam Hussain during Muharram. Surprisingly, 
according to the data, attacks against majlises resulted in higher casualty 
figures as compared with attacks on processions, and high-intensity rather 
than low-level violence was used more often.117  
 
For example, the shooting on Majlis-e-Aza participants in Vehari, Punjab, in 
1996 killed 18 and injured 50 people (Dawn, 1996). Also, 22 people were 
killed and more than 50 people were injured when three gunmen fired at 
Majlis-e-Aza in a Shia graveyard in the heart of Lahore in 1998 (Dawn, 1998; 
The News, 1998). The method favoured in the target killings was used to 
attack the majlis in Kot Addu, Punjab, when four gunmen with two motorbikes 
opened indiscriminate fire, killing four people.118 Although majlis as a form of 
religious gathering features in the data analysed, it is not usually separated in 
the literature as a space of sectarian violence.  
 
The contestations of space are also strongly present in the case of majlises. 
When the Majlis-e-Aza during the month of Muharram was about to start at 
the residence of Nazar Hussain Shah in Wah, Rawalpindi District in Punjab, it 
was found that the house was too small for all the participants to fit in. The 
majlis then occupied a part of the street next to the house, which ‘annoyed 
Maulana Habib-ur-Rehman’ and other SSP members, resulting in a clash with 
pelting of stones (The News, 1998c). Moving the religious gathering from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Of the 15 cases related directly to majlises, 10 (67%) included the use of sophisticated 
weaponry and organized violence. 
118 See also Nation (2000, 2002) and Dawn (2002b). 
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private to public space and occupying that public space showing religious 
identity were the trigger for violence, according to the data. In 1996 in Lahore, 
a majlis was organised at the same time with Naat Khawani (religious poetry 
recital) in a nearby mosque. Both gatherings wanted to outdo each other, 
gradually increasing the volumes of their loudspeakers. Eventually, the 
tension resulted in fist fighting and pelting of stones, and the clash was 
stopped after police intervention (Muslim, 1996). 
 
With the big, striking acts targeting majlises, there are also incidents with low-
level violence. Similar to processions, holding a majlis can trigger clashes with 
people not participating in the religious gathering, that is, the outside 
observers of the ritual. The triggers for these clashes cited in the data are also 
similar, such as ‘objectionable remarks’, referring to the practice of tabarra, for 
example, as discussed in chapter 5. There are several cases of this low-level 
Sunni-Shia violence in different provinces and in both rural and urban 
settings.  
 
Processions and Religious Gatherings as Spaces of Sectarian Violence 
 
The extent of the incidents related to sacred time and space that involved the 
use of low-level violence, conducted by shooting but also with chains, stones, 
clubs, and fists, was a surprising find, as low-level violence is not usually 
discussed in the literature on sectarian violence. Some of these incidents 
could be defined as small-scale localised communal violence (as opposed to 
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large-scale communal violence).119 These incidents are not premeditated, but 
they are triggered during sacred time and space, possibly after a long history 
of communal tensions in the locality. The plurality of these locations as sites 
of violence is also noteworthy. For example, the locations of processions are 
attacked from outside, but different processions can clash and individuals 
from a procession can also be the aggressors against outsiders.  
 
 
The clashing parties were described with slight variation in the data. Mostly, 
the clashes were described as being between the SSP and the Shias, 
between the SSP and the TJP, or between the Sunnis and the Shias. This is 
important if we want to look at the claim that sectarian violence is only the 
domain of sectarian groups and does not exist in the grassroots level in 
Pakistan. Further research would be needed to look at the membership of 
these organisations and the meaning of being affiliated with them to further 
analyse this question, as also observed in relation to target killings. However, 
when assigning all the participants in these low-level violent incidents or 
clashes as members of sectarian organisations, it is also a way to externalise 
and confine the problem of sectarian violence to something that does not exist 
outside those groups, thus being external to the mainstream Pakistani society. 
What we can confidently say based on the data is that these violent incidents 
are not confined to the specifically violent sectarian groups such as LJ and 
SMP. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 The term ‘communal conflicts’ originated in colonial analyses of religious conflicts in the 
Indian subcontinent (Human Rights Watch, 1995). For further definition and types of 
communal violence, see, for example, Van Klinken (2007) and Tambiah (1996).   
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Another important observation from the data is how the sectarian violence 
related to the sacred space and time is clearly linked to the concept of 
spatialised identity politics in Pakistan. The control of public space, for 
example, by controlling the procession routes, particularly through the inability 
to alter the established procession routes or to bring out new processions in 
localities where processions have not occurred before, was a recurrent theme 
in the data. The visible forms of practicing religion in shared public space are 
enough to trigger tension and violent clashes. Processions moving through 
‘sensitive locations’, that is, spaces associated with the other sect and their 
identity signifiers, are potentially violet equations. Sometimes violence occurs 
as a result of a competition between sacred spaces or the simultaneous 
occupation of a space by different sects.  
 
From the data collected and analysed, the role of police in these violent 
incidents is important, both in securing the sacred space and time and in 
intervening and mediating in conflicts and violent clashes. Policemen are also 
often among the casualties of these violent incidents, particularly because of 
their presences in these occasions and also because of their role as 
intervening when clashes or other forms of violence occur. Securing all the 
religious processions and gatherings during Muharram, and particularly during 
Ashura, is the largest police operation every year. Although protecting or 
securing sacred space is not the focus of the analysis conducted in this 
thesis, it is important to point out the strong link the concept has to the 
exclusivist sectarian discourse. The processes of protection are also 
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processes of exclusion: protecting sacred space limits, delineating the 
expressions of religious identities, excluding the communities needing 
protection, and taking the religious to the political domain. As explained by 
Hassner (2006: 150–151), 
 
Even though actions taken by a religious community to defend a 
sacred site from desecration or destruction are driven by religious 
precepts, they are essentially political because they involve monitoring 
access to the site and policing behavior within it. Sacred places thus 
translate abstract religious ideas into concrete political action and even 
violence. 
 
Although processions are now acted out in public spaces, they are 
increasingly controlled and monitored by the practices of protection because 
of the ever-present danger of sectarian violence. The need to protect those 
sacred spaces and communal religious expressions transforms those spaces 
and sites of reproducing the religious identities. The presence of police, 
armed guards, and elaborate security measures militarises the space and 
creates further processes of exclusion and inclusion.120 This relates directly to 
the transformative power of violence, as discussed in chapter 3, and how that 
power can manifest itself also through other processes than eliminating the 
‘other’. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  Furthermore, according to Abbas, official permissions and licenses for more processions 
have became rare after the district-level administrators and law enforcement discourage 
processions to avoid the security measures and police manpower necessary to secure such 
events (Abbas 2010, 22). The violence, therefore, had contributed to creating a state practice 
negative towards religious processions, further affecting the use of public space in Pakistan. 
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Mosques, Imambargahs, and Mosque Disputes 
 
The third main location that emerged from the data is related to mosques and 
imambargahs. This category for location of sectarian violence is not explored 
in the literature in detail, and the volume of the violent incidents related to 
these locations was thus surprising, as well as the type of violence used in 
those incidents.  
 
As with the other locations of violence, majority of the attacks related to 
mosques, imambargahs, and mosque disputes before the year 2000 are 
located in Punjab or Karachi. This time, the incidents in these locations are 
close to equal in numbers with both sects (approximately 31 incidents against 
Shia imambargahs or mosques and 36 against Sunni mosques), with the 
asymmetry of sectarian violence being reversed. 
 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of sectarian incidents related to imambargahs and 
mosques and mosque disputes. 
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Source: Data analysis 
 
 
One of the typical methods to attack a mosque or an imambargah was by 
shooting or by a grenade attack. Often there was indiscriminate firing either 
inside or outside the mosque or imambargah. These incidents, however, did 
not always result in casualties or a high number of casualties. In addition, 
mosques and imambargahs were targeted by some of the most striking acts 
of violence, in terms of the method of violence used and the number of 
casualties that resulted. There are several shooting incidents that resulted in a 
significant number of people getting killed and injured. For example, in 1996, 
four attackers fired on the namazis (people praying) starting their morning 
prayers at the Jamia Masjid Al-Khair in Multan, killing 21 and injuring 50 
people in what was suspected as retaliation of the killing of 12 Shias in a 
religious ceremony over a month before (Dawn, 1996b; The News, 1996). 
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Another method resulting in high casualty figures present in the data is suicide 
attacks. This form of violence is present only during the last three years of the 
period researched (2003–2005). Suicide attacks are used more against 
mosques and imambargahs than against any other locations present in the 
data. The first suicide attack, in any location, occurred in 2003 when the 
mosque-imambargah Kalan Asna-e-Ashriya was targeted during the Friday 
prayers in Quetta (The News, 2003c). Mosques and imambargahs were 
attacked with high casualty figures by suicide bombers also in Karachi,121 
Rawalpindi,122 Sialkot,123 and Lahore124 during 2004–2005. 
	  
When looking at the details of the incidents related to mosques and 
imambargahs, it becomes apparent that a mosque, as a space for and of 
violence, is used in different ways. As discussed earlier, there are cases of 
indiscriminate use of violence targeting everyone in the mosque, imambargah, 
or shrine. Usually, the method of these incidents is either shooting or 
bombing. There are also cases where low-level violence is used and where 
shooting is done outside the mosque or imambargah, with—what it seems—
the intention to intimidate as well as, or instead of, to cause casualties. There 
are also cases where it seems like a mosque is used as a space for target 
killings to target religious leaders. Whether they are indeed targeted or the 
mosque itself is often unclear.125 This does imply that occasionally mosques 
are also spaces for personal revenge, highlighting how these three categories 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 For more information, see, Daily Times (2004, 2005) and Dawn (2004d, 2004f, 2005b). 
122 For more information, see, Dawn (2004). 
123 For more information, see, Dawn (2004g), Nation (2004), and The News (2004c). 
124 For more information, see, Dawn (2004i).  
125 See, for example, Nation (1997c) and The News (1997d). 
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of locations for sectarian violence are interlinked and often difficult to separate 
as distinct categories for analysis.  
 
It would also take further research to uncover the different affiliations of each 
of the mosques and imambargahs attacked to get a more nuanced picture of 
who was targeted when a specific mosque or imambargah was attacked. Now 
we have to settle with the undoubtedly simplistic terms ‘Shia’ and ‘Sunni’. It is 
also safe to assume that although the data do not offer many details on the 
perpetrators of these attacks, there are also intra-Sunni violence among the 
incidents (and even potentially intra-Shia violence). The data also raise the 
question of a mosque as space. It is clear that mosques are places of 
worship, open for all Muslims in theory but affiliated with specific schools of 
thought in practice, thus becoming visible and important signifiers of particular 
religious identities.  
 
This clearly is not an exhaustive explanation or description of mosque or 
imambargah as space of violence. The data point towards mosques being 
spaces where sectarian groups’ offices are located126 or arms are stored, for 
example. As discussed in relation to madrasa institution in chapter 3, 
mosques can have multiple uses offering alternative explanations for 
attacking them other than being related to a sect’s religious identity. Then also 
attacking a mosque can have a different relevance to sectarian violence than 
attacking a sect’s religious space.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 See, for example, Nation (1996). 
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Mosques and imambargahs, as spatial signifiers of one’s religious identity, 
also become the locations of spatialised politics of identity. There are several 
cases in the data (16) where a mosque or imambargah has been at the heart 
of a violent dispute. There are violent incidents over the control of a mosque 
or imambargah 127  and attempts to violently occupy a mosque. 128  Some 
incidents relate to the construction of a mosque or an imambargah, such as 
the one reported in December 1999 by Dawn and Frontier Post. An ongoing 
dispute over the construction of an imambargah in the graveyard in Haripur 
had escalated to firing. Salamat Shah had built a kachcha house (mud house) 
in the graveyard and wanted to convert that into an imambargah, but SSP, 
also using the graveyard, objected to the attempt, and the tensions eventually 
resulted in firing in the graveyard after the last rites of a local SSP leader 
(Dawn, 1999d; Frontier Post, 1999).129 
 
The connection with mosques and imambargahs and the disputes related to 
the land are also present in the data in further cases. Hakeemi Shah, an 
activist of a religious organisation, occupied a piece of land in the premises of 
Hafizabad Railway station where he set up an office for his organisation. Later 
on, his wish to get more land for the mosque started a rivalry with another 
sect, resulting in a clash (The News, 2001). Either seizing more land or 
constructing a mosque or imambargah on space associated with another sect 
is a recurring theme in the data. This research questions the notion of these 
disputes being ‘just about land’: labelling them as land disputes ignores the 
contestations of spatialised identity politics clearly at play in these conflicts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 See, for example, Dawn (1996c), Nation (2003), The News (2003), and Daily Times (2003). 
128 See, for example, Dawn (2001e). 129	  For other incidents, see Nation (2000b) and The News (2000b).	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and local disputes. Further research would be needed to fully understand 
what holding a possession of a mosque or imambargah would mean in those 
localities, but it is evident that mosques and imambargahs, in all their usages, 
are strong, and visible signifiers of one’s identity and the location in and 
around that mosque or imambargah then become ‘associated with’ that sect. 
This idea of spaces and localities being associated with a particular sect runs 
throughout the data and is especially evident in the data relating to sacred 
spaces, mosques, and imambargahs. It again points towards the social 
geographies that denote public space, with localities being divided and 
associated with particular sects, as briefly discussed earlier. With these 
specific social geographies comes the notion of possessing and controlling 
space, through processes of inclusion and exclusion. These social 
geographies are also creating localised minorities and majorities, ‘Shia areas’ 
or ‘Deobandi areas’, for example, and a part of the contestations of the 
location of the borders of those localised majority and minority areas.  
 
These localised majority and minority roles then further channel the 
acceptable social behaviour in those areas. In 1999, in Dera Ghazi Khan, the 
Shia family of Barkat Ali built a small mosque ‘for saying prayers according to 
their religious beliefs’. Other people, Sunni by sect, asked the family to stop 
calling for prayers through loudspeakers as they were the only Shia in the 
village who would turn up for prayers (Nation, 1999; Dawn, 1999). To 
pronounce Shia faith in the majority Sunni village was not acceptable and 
resulted in the death of Barkat Ali.  
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Category ‘Others’ 
 
As often happens with data analysis, there are data that do not fit into any of 
the main categories identified. During the analysis process, several violent 
incidents were difficult to categorise because of the nature of the incident or 
the information available on those incidents. For example, there were a series 
of ‘Iranian targets’—targets that somehow related to Iran, such as attacks 
against Iranian cultural centres,130 or the killing of seven Iranian Air Force 
cadets that were targeted in their van in Rawalpindi also in 2001.131 These 
attacks were anticipated and explained by the literature, as deliberated in 
chapter 2, highlighting the regional context of sectarian violence and the 
relocated proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran that acted as an important 
impetus for the organised sectarian violence in Pakistan. 
 
The ‘others’ category also included cases where a series of violent incidents 
happened in the same spatial location, with very little information on the 
details of the separate incidents that could be analysed by using the variables 
and method of analysis.132 Those cases with very little details to analyse or 
where the sect of the victim(s) was not clear were also included in this 
category. 
 
This category also includes cases of the micropolitics of sectarian violence, 
resulting in humiliation and intimidation rather than physical violence or 
casualties. Religious scholar Maulvi Iftikhar Ahmad Awaisi was kidnapped and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 See Frontier Post (1997), Nation (1997b), and Dawn (1998e). 
131 See Nation (2001) and The News (2001b).  
132 See, for example, Nation (1997d).   
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tortured by the members of the rival school of thought in Dhani village, in 
Punjab. The accused shaved Maulana’s beard and moustaches, blackened 
his face, and made him parade in the village for writing a book against their 
sect (Dawn, 1998c). This incident can also be called sectarian violence, albeit 
being the type that rarely finds its way in to the national media or the 
academic literature on violent sectarianism. Nevertheless, it is important in 
illustrating the type of violent practices encountered by some Pakistanis in the 
localised negotiations of the sectarian difference. 
 
Spatial Politics of Identity—Final Reflections 
 
After identifying and discussing the main categories identified as locations of 
sectarian violence in the data, we turn to the final reflections on the findings 
and what those findings tell us about sectarian violence in Pakistan and the 
spaces where the boundaries between sects are being reinforced and 
maintained. 
 
The three main spaces for sectarian violence (individuals killed in targeted 
killings, religious processions and gatherings, and mosques and 
imambargahs) concur with the literature on sectarian violence by all having 
been mentioned in the academic analyses to some extent. The theme of 
revenge and revenge murders, tit-for-tat killings, come through in the data 
collected, as highlighted in the literature. There are also signs of changing 
patterns of sectarian violence with the introduction of new methods and 
modes of violence. It was also evident from the data that the incidents, which 
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in the beginning of the period studied were mostly occurring in Punjab, spread 
to other provinces, eventually occurring in all the Pakistani provinces. 
	  
Time to Kill 
 
In the previous chapter, we discussed the importance and significance of time 
in creating sacred space. The importance of those sacred spaces and times 
are featured in the data, although it is clear that the sectarian violent incidents 
are not confined to those sacred spaces. The data also suggest that sectarian 
violence creates its own specific times with significance by constructing 
temporal and spatial places where the dead are celebrated and mourned. 
Death anniversaries are times for revenge, times when those killed before are 
remembered with more violence. The spaces of remembrance manifest as 
gatherings and religious congregations, which then in turn are potential 
targets of sectarian violence. The death anniversary of Allama Arif Hussain al-
Hussain was commemorated in Majlis-e-Aza near Parachinar in 2002. The 
gathering was attacked by mortars, wounding five people (The News, 2002b). 
Those participants who had gathered to commemorate the first death 
anniversary of Azam Tariq in 2004 in Multan were targeted by a powerful car 
bomb, killing approximately 40 people and injuring more than 100 people. The 
mourning of a leader who died a violent death now attracted more violence 
and contributed to the cycle of violence (Daily Times, 2004c; Dawn, 2004h). 
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Shooting by Two Motorcyclists or a Bomb Blast: Does the Method Make 
a Difference? 
 
Although the main focus of this research was not to study the methods used 
in the sectarian violent incidents, they have provided important information on 
those violent incidents analysed here. First, sometimes the method of 
violence is specific to a certain location. For example, heavy weapons such as 
mortars were only used in FATA and NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). 
What is important for this study, however, is that the method of violence points 
towards the agency behind the attacks and whether or not the violent act has 
been premeditated. Target killings and suicide or car bombings, for example, 
require planning and specific expertise, implying an organised entity behind 
those incidents.  
 
However, these are not the only type of methods used in sectarian violence 
according to the data. There are clashes that are carried out by clubs and 
chains. Stones are thrown, and occasionally conflicts are acted out with fists. 
The low-level violence does not often feature in analyses on sectarianism and 
sectarian violence, although it clearly is a considerable part of what is defined 
as ‘sectarian violence’ in Pakistan based on the data analysed. The low-level 
violence often takes the analysis to smaller localities and introduces it to local, 
long-term sectarian disputes. These violent incidents are not the domain of 
the extremist sectarian groups but go beyond the Jaishs, Sipahs, and 
Lashkars. For us to analyse and understand the extent of sectarian violence 
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and the sectarianism as a phenomenon in Pakistan, these types of violent 
incidents need to be recognised and included in the analyses of sectarian 
violence.  
 
 
Spatial Politics of Identity 
 
 
But the tendency to romanticise public space as an emptiness which 
enables free and equal speech does not take on board the need to 
theorise space and place as the product of social relations which are 
most likely conflicting and unequal. (Massey, 2005: 152) 
 
A significant theme present in all the spaces of violence, when looking at the 
data of violent incidents more closely with their context of method and 
location, was that of spatialised politics of identity. Simply reducing these 
incidents to statistics and tables or figures obscure the spatial contestations of 
identities played out in all those locations of violence. 
 
Public space now, as observed by Doreen Massey, is removed from the idea 
of ‘emptiness’, or of a space of free and equal use. Instead, public space is 
conditioned by the contestations of conflicting and unequal social relations, 
and the attempts to limit the use of that space are powerful practices of 
exclusivist discourse. Confining the expressions of religious identities indoors, 
away from the public space, or restricting the public space allowed to that 
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expression to the traditional spaces it has occupied in the past (such as 
traditional procession routes), and refusing the negotiations about allowing 
new spaces for that expression are about the control of public space as well 
as the processes of exclusion of the plurality of religious identities from that 
space. 
 
Furthermore, targeting and systematically killing leaders, activists, and 
prominent figures not only of sectarian groups but also of local communities 
violence is a means of removing the public figures from the public space and 
from that leadership or community role they possess. By targeting the 
instantiations of one’s as well as the other’s identity discourse, the violence is 
also sending a message how dangerous it is to be a visible part of that 
community. Acquiring a mosque or an imambargah or more land to them is 
not only about obtaining a valuable property but also about possessing a 
visible, highly symbolic signifier of one’s identity. Thus, the space of that 
mosque becomes ‘associated with that sect’ being a powerful statement and 
showing power in that locality as well as a mechanism by which localised 
majorities and minorities are created. 
 
As observed by Kaur (2005: 36–37), ‘The destruction of mosques, temples 
and other sacred spaces symbolises the change of spatial usage and 
therefore the change in community hierarchy’. This thesis argues that the 
change in social hierarchies can also happen through other forms of 
spatialised identity politics and identity contestations than the dramatic forms 
of destruction of sacred spaces. Through the use of sectarian violence, 
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locations and localities become associated in a certain way, creating localised 
social geographies and specific areas of minorities and majorities, affecting in 
turn the way those spaces are used and perceived by different sects. Those 
‘associated spaces’ then can channel and condition behaviour and social 
interactions. 
 
Exclusion, if not in the form of annihilating the other but excluding the 
presence of another religious community or expressions of other religious 
identities from public space or from the space associated to one’s own sect, is 
a significant part of sectarian violence in Pakistan during the researched 
period. This also explains why marking spaces with the signifiers of one’s 
identity is an important part of sectarian identity politics and also can act as a 
trigger for violence. The spatialised sectarian identity politics is acted out also 
with the symbolic signifiers of one’s identity, marking the ‘associated spaces’. 
In Peshawar in 2001, right before Ashura, it was acted out by using wall 
writings by including and excluding words with specific meaning. The local 
SSP workers had written ‘Ya Allah Maddad’ on a wall of a mosque. However, 
one night before Ashura, the word ‘Maddad’ was erased, causing resentment 
among the SSP. Officials who intervened in the situation suggested replacing 
the slogan with Kalma Tayyaba (declaration of Muslim faith), which was 
agreed upon. However, since then, SSP has tried to write a fresh slogan on 
the same spot on that wall, continuing the spatial contestation (Dawn, 2001c).	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We will further explore why these social geographies, the localised divisions 
of spaces associated with a particular sect, and the control of public space 
matter in the Conclusions section of this thesis. 	  	  
Epilogue—The Untold Stories 
 
Although the data revealed a lot about sectarian violence in Pakistan, there 
were many questions left unanswered. For example, why was Haji Asha 
Abbas, the owner of Karachi’s oldest juice shop, killed in 2002 (Dawn, 
2002c)? 
 
Going through the data brought the human behind the violence to the fore and 
gave names to those killed in sectarian violence, occasionally offering 
glimpses at their personal stories. Through the news items, it was also 
possible to learn about the perpetrators or those guilty of sectarian violence. 
According to The News (1997b), Mehram Ali, first the accused and later the 
convicted youth behind the Sessions Court bomb blast, declared how he was 
‘born to kill those who ridicule my sect’ and showed no remorse for what he 
had done. Dawn later reported that Ali was tortured after his earlier arrest in 
1990, after which he was declared mentally unstable. One cure proposed to 
Ali according to Dawn was—as one would suspect—marriage (Dawn, 1997b). 
 
Through the data, it was also possible to learn about the heroes, myths, and 
martyrs of sectarian violence. The media were particularly fascinated by the 
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mythical character of LJ’s founder, Riaz Basra, and how he fooled the police 
and authorities with several body doubles who mimicked his limp to perfection 
to allow his escape from the police several times. From the data, it was also 
evident that this feared character, said to have masterminded many gruesome 
acts of violence, was also admired and idolised in the Pakistani media.  
 
When analysing the data, it was also possible to encounter the accidental and 
absurd sectarianism. Bibi Hava, a Sunni woman, was convicted by Peshawar 
High Court ‘for precautionary measures under the FCR’ (Frontier Crimes 
Regulations) after she married a Shia, as recently approximately 200 people 
had been killed in Kurram (Frontier Post, 1996). The media also instructed the 
reader in how to recognise a sectarian hit man: they carry hit lists in their 
pockets. 
 
 
There were also hints at how the sectarian discourse affects the lives of 
ordinary Pakistanis and how Islam is lived in the polyphony of multiple 
interpretations of the creed. A prayer leader in a village Chak no. 235 near 
Faisalabad decreed to dissolve the nikah (marriage) of some villagers who 
had attended the funeral prayers of a person belonging to a rival sect. Luckily, 
the son of the deceased reported this, and the police acted against the cleric 
for spreading sectarian hatred. Later, he renewed the nikah after the 
magistrate’s intervention (Muslim, 2000). This act was termed as ‘illiterate and 
mischievous’ by the Ulema (The News, 2000c). A similar fatwa from the 
mullas in Kalabagh took a more sinister turn and caused a threat of violence 
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in the city. It resulted in more than six people giving written statements that 
they did not belong to the accused sect, and the local police called people 
belonging to the sect to provide them protection and to help them to show 
their dissociation with the sect. These examples about the significance of 
sectarian difference and identification offer views of how that difference 
manifests itself in social interactions and how it is dealt with in the Pakistani 
society. These stories, all related to sectarian violence in Pakistan, have 
provided a valuable insight to the sectarian phenomenon not available 
anywhere else. 	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CONCLUSIONS	  	  
 
 
Finally, this chapter is going to sum up the main findings of the research. 
Therefore, this concluding section will discuss the theoretical, methodological, 
and analytic outcomes revisiting the research hypothesis and the subsequent 
questions that presented the key aims for this research and structured the 
approach for this thesis. This section also outlines the limitations of this 
research placed by the analytic framework, the chosen methodology, and the 
scope of the study. The significance of the findings is also discussed, as well 
as the contributions of this research to the body of knowledge on sectarianism 
in peace and conflict studies. It concludes by pointing towards future research 
areas stemming from the research process and the findings of this study as 
well as the questions not answered by this thesis. However, the rationale of 
investigating violence—the focus of this research—is explored first.  
 
 
Rationale of Investigating Violence 
 
 
In peace and conflict studies, violence can be researched in many different 
ways. The method with which violence is analysed in the academic inquiries 
reveals the role violence is assigned in relation to the conflicts or contexts it 
exists in. Often violence is treated as a derivative symptom, indicative of 
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larger societal processes lying behind the violence. Different explanations are 
offered as to the cause of violence, but often authors endorse similar 
processual models of violence, emphasising violence as a tool or utility. 
These instrumentalist explanations see violence as a surface expression of 
‘deeper’ socioeconomic and/or ideological contexts. Violence, in these 
explanations, is seen to transform socioeconomic inequities or ideological 
contexts, but the transformative role of violence itself, in particular, protracted 
violence, is not adequately recognised. 
 
Within the Pakistani context, sectarian violence is mostly researched as a part 
of the ‘dizzyingly diverse universe of Pakistani Islamic militancy’ (Roul, 2005). 
It is seen and treated as a by-product of the function of the militant sectarian 
groups and an addition to the ubiquitous world of terrorism and terrorist 
violence. Therefore, in most academic works discussing sectarian violence, it 
is featured as big striking acts of organized violence with significant body 
count and brazen tactics.  
This thesis wanted a departure from that understanding of violence and the 
role it has been assigned in academic analyses. Instead, the research here 
treats the acts of violence themselves as significant, independent of what they 
accomplish or fail to accomplish in strategic terms (Mahmood, 1999: 79). 
Violent acts are more than military tactics or related to the function of militant 
sectarian organizations perpetrated with the intention to eliminate the enemy 
and show military power.  
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Sectarian violence, as suggested by this thesis, is part of regularized conduct 
of sectarian politics and the production and maintenance of exclusivist 
sectarian discourse. Violence is not merely a frustrated political expression 
but a creator of (sectarian) a different, dichotomizing tool. The hypothesis at 
the core of the research postulated that ‘sectarian violence in Pakistan is 
conducted to reproduce and reinforce exclusivist sectarian discourse’. 
 
By placing violence and violent incidents at the centre of the analysis and by 
contextualising violence rather than looking at them merely as statistics and 
figures or as a derivative symptom, this research not only has a different focus 
to the majority of academic analyses on sectarian violence but also promotes 
a different understanding of that violence. The transformative role of violence 
is highlighted in the hypothesis: it assumes that violence is able to reproduce 
and reinforce the exclusivist discourse, therefore being an important former of 
that discourse. 
  
 
Theoretical Conclusions 
 
 
Theoretically, the thesis had two main challenges: to develop an analytic 
framework to successfully explore the validity of the hypothesis and to 
develop a conceptual understanding on the term sectarian both as a general 
term and as it applies in the context of Pakistan. 
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By choosing identity politics as an analytic approach, it allowed the research 
to draw from the vast literature examining identities and how they are formed 
and transformed in violent conflicts. The analytic framework subsequently 
highlighted the tripartite relationship between identity, violence, and space 
and encouraged the analysis to examine the discursive practices on 
constructing space and identity as identities are mutually formed in an 
inherently spatial social interaction. The spatialised forms of identities and 
their interaction in conflict were then operationalized by using the concept of 
border that illustrated the mechanisms at work in spatialised identity politics.  
 
Through the analytic framework, the research was interested in the 
communicative dimension of sectarian conflicts instead of the social and 
political dimensions, which are often the focus of academic writers. This focus 
highlighted how violence, as it is understood in the thesis, is tied to the 
exclusivist identity discourse and that violent acts are often more expressive 
than instrumental in nature. The aim of the research now was not to quantify 
the communication but to look at the contextualised processes of 
communication, in particular, the temporal ‘when’ and spatial ‘where’. 
 
 
The task for the research then was to look at the spatial uses of violence and 
locate the sectarian violence. What are the locations of violence? Where are 
the identity borders drawn, enforced, and maintained? Through what spaces 
does the violence communicate that discourse?  
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This analytic approach is encouraging not only a different understanding of 
violence but also a stand against the essentialised understandings of 
identities: constructed identities are constructed here and now, in their 
sociopolitical context, ‘not archeologically salvaged from the disappearing 
past’ (Massey 1993, 158). This is particularly important when discussing 
identities related to religious discourse, a context in which the essentialised 
identity perceptions have been particularly persistent. This theme was 
explored in chapter 5, which examined how the meaning and consequences 
of sectarian differences change in relation to other differences related to 
identities. In particular, the role of violence in the processes of producing and 
resignifying that difference as a part of protracted violent conflicts was 
analysed. 
 
 
The second specific aim of this thesis that is related to theoretical 
understanding of sectarianism and sectarian violence was to gain conceptual 
clarity on the term sectarianism, especially in the context of Pakistan. This 
was seen as particularly important because this analysis is almost lacking the 
peace and conflict studies literature, and when the study was performed, the 
analytic examination has been conducted in a very different context as 
compared with Pakistan, as shown in chapter 2.  
 
The thesis distinguishes between sectarianism as a term and sectarianism as 
a phenomenon in Pakistan. Sectarianism as a generic term refers to a 
particular relational group attitude, is tied to a religious discourse, and can be 
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understood as a destructive way of dealing with difference. It is different to 
what a ‘sect’ or a denomination is in Islam; it is not a group attitude inherently 
related to those different religious groups. Thus, belonging to a sect (or 
denomination) does not equal having a sectarian group identity. When placed 
in the Pakistani context, the terms sectarian and sectarianism usually refer to 
the Sunni-Shia conflict. However, the broad categories of Sunni and Shia in 
chapter 2 were found to be simplifications unable to fully convey the dynamics 
of sectarian conflicts. Thus, it was important to emphasise that to see 
sectarianism in Pakistan only as a Shia-Sunni problem is too simplistic, as it is 
to assume that there is only one sectarian conflict.  
 
The construction of identities is conditioned by several simultaneous political, 
social, and ideological processes. These processes also form the context of 
sectarianism in Pakistan. Chapter 2 investigated the processes that have 
contributed to the sectarian phenomenon and to the birth and development of 
exclusivist sectarian discourse in particular. These processes are not confined 
within the borders of Pakistan, but sectarianism in Pakistan is a complex mix 
of the local, supralocal, national, and regional. There is no undifferentiated 
sectarianism: the plurality and complexity of the elements reinforcing 
sectarian conflicts converge in the sectarian phenomenon that defies easy 
definitions and simple categorisations. 
 
The important role state practices play in the development of the exclusivist 
discourse in Pakistan was highlighted in chapter 2. How that discourse and its 
proponents have found institutionalised representations within the Pakistani 
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polity highlighted the scope and variety of representations of sectarian 
exclusivist discourse. This showed how the discourse is not limited to 
organized sectarian groups or how only a fraction of those contributing and 
maintaining the exclusivist sectarian discourse carry and use a gun.  
 
The thesis also wanted to clarify the complex relationship between 
sectarianism and sectarian violence as the literature often conflates 
sectarianism, sectarian conflicts, and sectarian violence. Chapter 2 focused 
on sectarianism, whereas chapter 3 explored the elements that sustain 
sectarian violence and contribute to the permissive environment and 
operational spaces for it to exist. It was examined how the current literature on 
sectarian violence also conflate sectarian violence with the organised 
sectarian groups and what this means to the understanding of that violence. 
This view neglects the systemic forms of sectarian violence and the violence 
of the word, for example, as important parts of sectarian violence. Also, its 
protracted nature is often left unaddressed as well as the intricate and 
complex interplay of local dynamics with national sectarian discourse. 
 
With a functioning analytic definition, this thesis contributes to the academic 
understanding of sectarianism by providing a better understanding of what is 
exactly meant when we talk about sectarianism, both as a more general state 
of conflict or tension and especially as a type of violence used (sectarian 
violence). This will hopefully enable the term to be better operationalized in 
academic studies in the future.  
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Furthermore, the acknowledgement of the scope of violence committed in the 
name of sectarianism not only in Pakistan but also in other parts of the world 
requires peace and conflict studies to build a theoretical body of knowledge of 
the phenomenon to be able to address the issue. This research has linked the 
peace and conflict studies literature with sociology’s understanding on 
sectarianism in Pakistan, in particular, on identities related to religious 
discourse. For its theoretical understanding, this thesis draws from human 
geography and its understanding of the concept of space. This study then 
resides at the intersection of different disciplines, contributing to the 
understanding of sectarianism by bringing together these different disciplines 
within this analytic framework and forming a unique synthesis when analysing 
sectarian violence. In addition, by developing the concept of violence as the 
former and enforcer of borders between identities and as a way to 
communicate and maintain exclusivist identify discourses, this research has 
contributed also to the theoretical understanding of sectarian violence. 
 
 
Methodological Conclusions 
 
 
Chapter 4 discussed the methodological possibilities for conducting research 
on violence in a place where security concerns are real and the security 
situation is continuously changing. By selecting a method of analysis that 
allowed an archived-based research, some of the concerns related to the 
feasibility of the research were attempted to be minimized. It also allowed a 
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framing of sectarian violence to be present in the analysis that was not 
imposed by the outside researcher. 
 
Despite the benefits of this approach, there were also significant limitations on 
the research—and analysis—process. As it became clear during the process 
of gathering and analysing data, the sphere of sectarian violence is inevitably 
much broader than that presented or analysed in this thesis. The enterprise of 
violent sectarianism in Pakistan is multifaceted and complex, as discussed in 
chapter 3. It is also impossible to fully remove sectarian violence as an 
independent and a separate category from the other forms of violence present 
in Pakistan.  
 
However, as the violence related to sectarianism includes such varied forms 
of violence and combinations of different actors, it would be impossible to 
study ‘all sectarian violence’ or all the violence related to the phenomenon of 
sectarianism in Pakistan. The process of exclusion of certain types of violent 
incidents done according to the analytic framework gave an insight into the 
enterprise of violence and its extent. Although the process of exclusion and 
the focus it brought was valid within the analytic approach chosen (and 
necessary to be able to carry out a focused research), it is recognised that the 
approach inevitably offers a limited understanding of sectarian violence in 
Pakistan.  
 
During the data analysis process, further limitations of using this 
methodological approach became evident. With this method of analysing data 
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and the data available, it was clear that intense periods of violent sectarian 
conflict (e.g., the periods in FATA) did not fit the chosen method and had to 
be left out of the analysis. This was due to the way both the intense periods of 
violence were reported in the Pakistani media and the method the data were 
categorised for this analysis. To include those intense violent periods 
(inevitably an important part of what sectarian violence is in Pakistan) in future 
analysis, the method of analysis should be refined. In addition, more detailed 
information on the different violent incidents and the methods of violence 
used, most likely from other sources than the Pakistani newspaper reports, 
would be needed. 
 
It also became obvious that this method of analysing sectarian violence 
functions much better when the violence studied is focused on, or even limited 
to, the violence against the sect that is ‘to be excluded’, that is, the Shia sect 
in this case. The asymmetry of violence—Shias are targeted and killed 
significantly more than Sunnis—indicates that besides targeting the members 
and leaders of those sectarian organisations that have a part in producing, 
spreading, and maintaining exclusivist sectarian discourse, Shias are not in a 
majority Sunni country able to, or indeed hope to, exclude Sunnis as a whole 
from the public space or from the realm of what is being a ‘Muslim’ in 
Pakistan. Sects subscribing to the majority Sunni schools of thought are in a 
different position in producing and maintaining sectarian exclusivist discourse. 
Having said this, it was clear that there are some locations in Pakistan where 
the national majority and minority roles are reversed. These can be entire 
villages or pockets within cities, towns, and villages. In these cases, the use of 
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violence could fit with the analysis model, encouraging a more geographically 
limited focus for those studies.  
 
More research is also needed if this method would be suitable for studying 
intra-Sunni violence, although the understanding after this research process is 
that this method of analysis could at least be used as the starting point to see 
where the contested spaces for that aspect of sectarian conflict in Pakistan 
are located. 
 
 
Spaces of Violence 
 
 
This thesis looked at the categories spaces for expressing identities, which 
were also the locations for expressing competing identity claims and spaces 
for violence as the extreme way to communicate and enforce those competing 
identity claims. The main category of location for sectarian violence that 
emerged from the research was individuals killed by target killings, such as 
community and religious leaders and Shia and Sunni activists, including 
activists and members of sectarian groups. The second category of location 
was sacred spaces, such as religious gatherings and rallies. Finally, the third 
prominent category of location is mosques and imambargahs. Of the data 
analysed, these were the three categories that included a vast majority of all 
the violent incidents perpetrated in Pakistan during 1996–2005. 
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By targeting spaces for reproducing religion and the visible symbolic signifiers 
of ‘the other’, sectarian violence targets the fundamental values, the sense of 
security, and also the self-definition of the communities in question. Sectarian 
violence is then located in the context of broader contestations of Islam in 
Pakistan and tied to the ongoing debate of what is it to be a (true) ‘Muslim’ in 
Pakistan. That violence also plays an important role in how those 
contestations are played out in public shared space. 
 
As formulated in one of the research questions, the analysis wanted to find 
out whether only the militant sectarian groups perpetrated sectarian violence, 
as suggested by many analysts and as implied by the role violence is 
assigned in the academic analyses. As discussed in chapter 6, the incidents 
of low-level violence and communal clashes in particular are difficult to explain 
purely by being confined to the militant sectarian groups, suggesting that 
there are at least some local cases of violence that are not initiated or 
perpetrated by militant sectarian groups. This is a significant find that 
challenges the common assumptions on sectarian violence in Pakistan.  
 
It was noted in the previous chapter that there could be a tendency both in the 
media and in the literature on sectarianism to use broad definitions of 
belonging to a ‘sectarian group’. By using these broad definitions, it is 
possible to externalise the phenomenon of sectarian violence from the 
Pakistani society and brand it as only existing with and through the violent 
sectarian groups. Although this study recognises that more research is 
needed to understand exactly the extent of sectarian violence not perpetrated 
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by those groups, it strongly suggests that this violence exists and should be 
part of analyses on the violence going forward.  
 
What is the value in knowing that sectarian violence does exists beyond the 
violent sectarian groups, that the spaces of sectarian violence correspond 
with the spaces where religious identities are reproduced, or that, indeed, 
sectarian violence can be thought as reinforcing and communicating 
exclusivist sectarian discourse? As mentioned previously, on the basis of the 
findings of this thesis, it is important to expand the understanding on 
sectarianism and sectarian violence to include considerations on wider fault 
lines than merely those associated with or imposed by the sectarian groups. 
The existence of ‘associated spaces’ that ‘belong’ to a certain sect is the first 
step in making the identity borders more rigid and tangible, thus affecting and 
limiting the shared public space. In other words, the local sectarian 
geographies limit the interactions between the sects and the possibilities for 
those interactions. Also, in conflicts, these borders are easy to deploy as 
barriers, impenetrable objects affecting the social life of communities even 
more and, most important, reducing shared space and spaces for interaction 
and cooperation.  
 
Because of this mechanism of associating space with a particular sect, there 
are incentives for different communities to move closer together, to form 
localised majorities and thus gain local power and ability to claim the 
ownership of their space. The transformative role of violence vis-à-vis the 
spatial arrangement of different identity groups was discussed in chapter 3. 
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Spaces of violence as well as the transformative power of violence contribute 
to the understanding of the configuration of religious relations in space and 
the changing spatial patterns of those relations. These spatial patterns are 
exclusionary, forming localised majorities and minorities, with the possibility of 
further transformation through privatised securitization of those spaces, as 
was seen in chapter 3. 
 
In this context, the contestations on mosques, imambargahs, and shrines and 
the ‘land disputes’ often associated with them can be seen in a different light 
and not being ‘only about land’. Thus, the politics of religious identities and the 
relational politics of space as well as the contestations of spaces through the 
use of violence offer significant insights to the function of sectarian exclusivist 
discourse and the multiple forms of exclusion in Pakistan.  
 
 
Areas for Future Research 
 
During the process of this research, there are several areas that have 
emerged as either being underdeveloped in peace and conflict studies 
discipline and its body of literature or being new, previously unaddressed by 
the researchers working towards developing an academic understanding on 
sectarianism and sectarian violence. 
 
As the theme of contestations of space and disputed spaces emerged so 
strongly in the analysis, developing an understanding on public space and its 
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contestations in Pakistan is needed. An understanding of those social forces 
that compete for space and control space and the different ways that control 
is enforced need to be addressed in the future. In particular, control over 
public space, spaces where different religious, ethnic, and linguistic identities 
meet and play out their sometimes unequal social relations, should be 
researched further. It would be important to gain an understanding of the 
current state of the (public) space in Pakistan where Islam exists in pluralistic 
forms and the different ways in which the pluralistic existence is being limited 
or excluded from the public shared space. There needs to be a deeper 
understanding on the discursive practices on constructing space and identity 
in public spaces in Pakistan and mapping those disjunctures of space where 
mutual existence is being contested.  
 
There are three areas for further research suggested by the outcomes of this 
thesis. First, as one of the locations of sectarian violence, mosques and 
imambargahs stood out as not being fully understood as significant spaces for 
the production and maintenance of sectarian exclusivist discourse. It was also 
evident after the research that the understanding of mosque as a space is not 
adequate to assess what exactly is being contested and targeted in sectarian 
violence. Further studies focusing on mosque and imambargah disputes and 
exploring them as space and as spatial signifiers of religious identities would 
greatly enhance the understanding of sectarianism in Pakistan.  
 
Second, the data analysis alluded to the idea of ‘social geographies’, spatial 
understandings of one’s own locality with spaces associated to one’s own 
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sect and those belonging to other sects. This idea should be tested with 
further research to gain an understanding of the extent of this in Pakistan and 
how these social geographies channel social interaction and the use of public 
space in Pakistan. Part of this line of research could be to look at the symbolic 
signifiers associated with particular identity groups and how they are used to 
demarcate and own space, how they mark the delineations of the associated 
spaces, and how those symbols or identity signifiers are used to declared a 
sect’s space and its control over that space. Mapping these local sectarian 
geographies would then give us tools to understand whether the borders 
between these ‘associated spaces’ are ever turned into impenetrable barriers 
affecting the use of social space in both urban and rural localities and to know 
the process or events that led to that transformation. 
 
Finally, a recurring theme encountered during both fieldwork and data 
analysis was the role of police in securing sacred spaces and in intervening 
and mediating in the disputes and violent conflicts between the different 
identity groups. The process and the extent of securitization of sacred spaces 
and religious entities (e.g., religious leaders, buildings and other sites, and 
events) and the role of different actors in that process are not discussed in the 
literature, but it would greatly contribute to the understanding of both 
sectarianism and the different Islamic discourses in Pakistan. The effects of 
that securitization on both public and shared space as well as limitations this 
places on the expression of different religious identities should also be 
researched in the future. 
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Overall, this research is an opening towards new ways of approaching and 
analysing sectarianism in general and sectarian violence in particular. It is 
hoped that there will be further academic research that is inspired by, and 
drawn from, both the analytic approach and the findings of this research. In 
particular, the future studies on sectarianism in Pakistan should have the 
courage to look at security as a broader concept than being merely related to 
extremism, violent groups, and big striking acts of violence. This thesis 
strongly argues that the security-related research and analysis should 
recognise that the studies done outside the usual focuses of security analyses 
are crucial for understanding and assessing also security-related issues in 
Pakistan.  
 
It is undeniable that it is not possible to comprehend sectarian violence 
without analysing sectarian groups. However, as shown in this thesis, there is 
a need for further studies that look at sectarianism and sectarian violence as a 
broader phenomenon than merely belonging to the domain of those sectarian 
groups or ‘Islamist extremisms’. Thus, further research also needs to go 
beyond the Sipahs, Jaishs, and Lashkars. 	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